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And if you read the links they are downsizing those bases.
Quote:
The Commission assessed the Department of Defense’s (DoD’s) closure and realignment recommendations for consistency
with the eight statutory selection criteria and the DoD Force Structure Plan. The recommendations announced by Secretary
Rumsfeld on May 13, 2005 comprised, by the Commission’s count, 190 separate DoD recommendations that would
produce as many as 837 distinct and identifiable recommended BRAC “close" or "realign" actions. These 837 distinct actions
also involved an additional 160 installations that would gain missions or resources due to the proposed closures and
realignments. All told, the 2005 BRAC recommendations exceeded the number considered by all prior BRAC
Commissions combined. In addition to the unprecedented number, many DoD recommendations were extremely complex,
proposing intertwining movements between and among numerous installations. Other DoD proposals consolidated
apparently unrelated actions within the same recommendation.
Secretary Rumsfeld was very clear that his primary goal for the BRAC process was military transformation. And, unlike prior
BRAC rounds, the Commission evaluated DoD’s recommendations in the context of a stable or increasing force structure,
an ongoing conflict in Southwest Asia, and the projected redeployment of 70,000 servicemembers and family members from
Europe and Asia to the United States. The 20-year BRAC outlook required the Commission to make allowances for major
uncertainties in the military and strategic environment. While acknowledging the importance of savings as a BRAC goal, the
Commission went beyond a business model analysis of DoD’s recommendations and weighed the strategic environment
within which recommendations would be implemented and their effect on DoD’s transformational goals.
I think we could get by with 4 aircraft carrier strike forces. Right now we have 11, while only a few countries have even 1, and none have more than 2.
The carrier itself cost about $14B, and it travels with around 10 other ships in it's strike force. I once heard that each carrier has the around 70 jets on it, which is about the equivalent of the 7th largest air force in the world.
We could get by on 4 carrier groups. For reference, Russia has one aircraft carrier, and China has none.
And where do you send those in the Navy after that cost reduction? What do you do with the carriers?
Don't get me wrong, I'm for cuts (all over). But when I started to look at where money could actually be saved it's quite a bit more complicated with what to do with those people and how much can we put up front to save in the long run.
And where do you send those in the Navy after that cost reduction? What do you do with the carriers?
I'm for limited government, so I don't think the government should hire people just to give them employment. That being said, personnel is less than a quarter of the cost of Navel operations. While I would rather see a gradual draw-down, it's the operational and procurement cost that could be saved immediately.
The carriers would be mothballed, but more importantly, we don't need to bring out a new super carrier every 4 years. Nor do we need the high number of supporting cast.
Our Navy is way out of lines with our needs, It's budget alone is bigger than the entire military spending of Russian and China added together.
That would cripple our ability to mobilize. Is that something that we're willing to sacrifice? A military is absolutely defined in its ability to mobilize, and do it quickly.
That would cripple our ability to mobilize. Is that something that we're willing to sacrifice? A military is absolutely defined in its ability to mobilize, and do it quickly.
Other countries are able to get by on 0 or 1 aircraft carrier. 3 countries have a pair. That's it.
Maybe not. But becoming like the others isn't just a one-way street. They'll all the sudden find themselves on equal-ground with the worlds leading superpower. Will that promote peace or embolden?
I think we could get by with 4 aircraft carrier strike forces. Right now we have 11, while only a few countries have even 1, and none have more than 2.
The carrier itself cost about $14B, and it travels with around 10 other ships in it's strike force. I once heard that each carrier has the around 70 jets on it, which is about the equivalent of the 7th largest air force in the world.
We could get by on 4 carrier groups. For reference, Russia has one aircraft carrier, and China has none.
What about when those carriers are in dry dock for refit?
What missions would we scrap? Missions to Haiti?
What about when we use them for humanitarian efforts like after the tsunami of 2005?
What about when our college students are held hostage?
I agree we can do with less, unfortunately our elected reps seem to feel that we need to be the back bone of UN missions.
They like to talk cutting the budget but don't reduce the demands.
The military in an effort to stretch what they have tend to reduce training, spare parts and maintenance. This leads to deaths. Unnecessary deaths.
So do we cut spending on upgrades? Do we not owe our troops the best possible equipment? The reason we suffer so few casualties is due to the fact they our troops are the best trained best equiped in the world.
We can't afford to be "that guy" anymore, and no one appreciate us anyway. Like you, I believe our spending provides stability, but it does so for everyone but us.
Consider how many battles we've fought in the last 20 years. Panama, Kuwait, Somalia, Bosnia, Afghanistan, Iraq, etc. About 1 every 3 years.
How many has China been in? Russia? France?
We are doing all the heavy lifting here, and we don't get much of a benefit out of it.
Maybe the world won't be better off without our stability, but we will be.
Since the 1991 Persian Gulf War and Operation
ALLIED FORCE (1999), PLA strategists have
emphasized the urgency of building force
structure, strategies, and tactics around new or
unexpected capabilities. They also have
emphasized developing innovative strategies
and tactics to employ with existing technologies
and weapon systems to level the playing field
against technologically superior opponents. An
article published in the Liberation Army Daily
in 1999 posits:
“[A] strong enemy with absolute
superiority is certainly not without
weakness…. [Our] military preparations
need to be more directly aimed at finding
tactics to exploit the weaknesses of a
strong enemy.”
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