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Old 12-09-2012, 05:15 PM
 
Location: Pennsylvania
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Sorry to interrupt the flow of this thread, but two things. One is that having visited Fredricksburg and walked the battlefield makes Burnside's decisions appear that much more incredible. This operation was a complete and utter debacle from the Union end. The other is to thank Grandstander for the updates - this has been a fantastic tool to learn more about the war.
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Old 12-09-2012, 06:28 PM
 
Location: Parts Unknown, Northern California
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December 10th, 1862:

150 years ago today General Ambrose Burnside summoned a meeting of all of his senior officers to further explain his plan for moving the Army of Virginia off the heights on the other side of the Rappahannock River. There is no surviving transcript of what was specifically said, but the memoirs and correspondence of the officers attending seemed to agree that A) Burnside talked..and talked..and talked.. and B) When he was finished no one there still had much of an idea as to what precisely Burnside expected them to do.

When Burnside finished his remarks there was a stunned silence. He turned to one of the brigadiers from the 9th Corps, General Rush Hawkins, and made a casual inquiry about what Hawkins thought of the plan.

"If you make the attack as contemplated, it will be the greatest slaughter of the war. There isn't enough infantry in the whole army to carry those heights."...was the reply Burnside wasn't expecting.

This loosened other tongues. One of General Sumner's staff officers offered "The carrying out of your plan will be murder, not warfare." General Darius Couch wrote later that not a single officer present at the meeting viewed the plan as anything less than the extreme of folly.

Burnside was jarred by the lack of confidence shown, but his reaction was to become more stubborn and more determined to carry out things as he had planned. His orders stood. The bridging of the Rappahanock would begin the next morning.

On this same day, by a vote of 96-55, the United States House of Representatives followed the lead of the Senate which had voted five months earlier...and the new State of West Virginia was officially created. What remained of formalities now was for the state legislature to petition Congress for admission to the Union, followed by Congress passing an enabling act. The political support was already there as evidenced by Congress' vote to create the state. Once the president signed that act, West Virginia was admitted.

However.....Lincoln arranged for word to reach key Congressmen....he would sign the act provided that language was inserted calling for the gradual elimination of slavery in the state. The president would get his way.

Thus we have the irony of a nation at war because it refused to recognize the right of secession, facilitating the political reward for a people who seceded from the rest of their state. Needless to say the southern press was especially creative in crafting invective for their public commentary on these actions.
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Old 12-10-2012, 06:08 PM
 
Location: Parts Unknown, Northern California
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December 11th, 1862:

The geography of the Fredricksburg region offered both advantages and disadvantages to the attempt to throw multiple pontoon bridges across in the face on opposition.

On both sides of the Rappahannock River, the ground rose as the distance from the water increased. On the SW, or Confederate side, behind the town was a wide, long plain which gradually rose to a ridge which was composed of a series of interconnected hills. The obvious military defensive position was to defend the ridge behind the town rather than attempt to defend the city itself. Thus, General Lee's army was posted on the high ground about a mile beyond the river.

Lee's forces could not be readily moved down to the river banks to contest a crossing because of the geography on the NE, or Federal side of the river. There the ground rose more quickly and sharply, culminating in a long high ridge which provided a commanding, open view of the opposite bank. The ridge was called Stafford Heights and it was there that Union artillery chief General Henry Hunt parked the majority of the Federal's heavy pieces. While the entrenched Confederates across the way were out of effective range for these guns, the shoreline and town were not. Thus, any attempt by Lee to send units toward the shore to disrupt the bridge building, would be subject to a storm of metal from Hunt's guns.

The exception to this was the town of Fredericksburg itself. Mostly evacuated on Lee's recommendation a week earlier, it had numerous buildings which were constructed near the river's edge and these structures could support a brigade of sharpshooters who would not be open targets for the Union guns. Lee sent a brigade of General William Barksdale's, an aggressive commander and veteran of the terrible slaughter in the triangular woods at Antietam. These 1600 men spread themselves out in the buildings and waited.

150 years ago this morning, the late December dawn, accompanied by a heavy fog, worked in the Union's favor as the work on the five bridges began. (three leading to Fredericksburg, two more a mile downstream around a bend.) A pontoon bridge is a series of rowboats which are steered out into the water and parked side by side where they are fastened together. Then a series of planks are laid across from one boat to the next, forming the roadway of the bridge.

Pontoon bridge....this one spanned the Appomattox River.



Things went well for the Union engineers until just after 7 am when the fog lifted. Across the water came sharp reports and puffs of smoke as the rebel snipers began picking off the workers. A game of sorts followed where the rebels would cease fire, tempting the engineers to resume work, and then when they were back out in view...

After a few fruitless hours and numerous engineering casualties, General Sumner lost patience and ordered the Federal artillery to bombard the waterfront buildings where the Confederates were sheltering. 9000 shells were hurled into the town, some landing near the desired target, most just visiting random destruction on homes, stores and churches. When the guns stopped, the engineers went forward once more...and discovered that the snipers were still there, now using the ruble as cover. Once more work ground to a halt.

General Hunt his artillery unable to solve the problem, suggested a call for volunteers to row across the river on pontoons, and drive the sharpshooters out of their positions. Four regiments offered to accept the duty. Miraculously they managed the trip across the river losing but a single man. Grabbing a beachhead, they moved in on the town and engaged the rebels. Occupied by the first to cross, the Confederates were unable to contest the crossing of additional troops. The bridges were completed while this fighting was taking place and as the early winter darkness fell around 5 pm, they men in gray retreated, leaving the town in Federal hands.

Several brigades crossed to establish bridgeheads at all five points, but the crossing of the bulk of the army would have to wait until tomorrow. Meanwhile, those already across found the deserted Fredericksburg a looter and vandal's delight. That which hadn't been destroyed by the artillery was now stolen or smashed by the Yankee troops.

The shelling/sack of Fredericksburg became a celebrated outrage in the South, an atrocity cited again and again as the proof of the barbaric, uncivilized character of their northern opponents. These flaming editorials however always seemed to forget to mention that the rebels were the ones who decided to make the town into a battlefield by stationing their snipers there.

Last edited by Grandstander; 12-10-2012 at 06:17 PM..
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Old 12-11-2012, 05:23 PM
 
Location: Parts Unknown, Northern California
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December 12th, 1862:

The orders for the day from General Ambrose Burnside to his Grand Division commanders called for their crossing the newly laid pontoon bridges spanning the Rappahannock River and occupying the ground in front of the ridge defended by General Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia. However, they commanders were also instructed that they were not to commit their units to battle just yet. The orders were silent with regard as to how battle was to be avoided if Lee turned aggressive and came down off the ridge.

With the bridges now in place, Lee at last had absolute confirmation that Burnside had chosen their immediate front as his battlefield. He now brought General Jackson's four divisions to Fredericksburg and stationed them to General Longstreet's immediate right, covering the front where the upstream bridges had been built and extending the battle frontage to seven miles. The ground in this area was not as steep as the ridge which Longstreet's Corps occupied, but it had the advantage of a heavy tree line behind which Stonewall was able to conceal his men.

The Federal Grand Division commanders received their final, written orders from Burnside. They struck the generals as fragmentary and incomplete, hardly shedding any additional light. General Sumner was to:

Quote:
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
December 11, 1862-4.20 a.m.

Major General E. V. SUMNER,

Commanding Right Grand Division:

In addition to the verbal orders already given you, I will add the following:

Your first corps, after crossing, should be protected by the town and the banks of the river as much as possible until the second corps is well closed up and in the act of crossing; after which you will move the first corps directly to the front, with a view to taking the heights that command the Plank road and the Telegraph road, supporting it by your other corps as soon as you can get it over the river. General Hooker will immediately follow in your support, and will see that your right flank is not troubled.

General Franklin crosses below, as you are aware, thus protecting your left. The extent of your movement to the front beyond the heights will be indicated during the engagement.
eHistory at OSU | Online Books | The Official Records of the Civil War

Franklin received orders which directed him to move up the Richmond Road, supposedly under the theory of light opposition, assuming the Confederates would rush men to the left to meet Sumner's assault on the heights. Then he was to roll up the rebel right. The orders seemed the sort that failed to anticipate that there just might be some opposition which made this more than a parade ground manuever.

General Hooker was told that his Grand Division would be held on the Federal bank, and be at the ready to cross and go to the aid of Franklin or Sumner, depending upon need and "...if we should be so fortunate as to dislodge the enemy.." He was to be "..governed by circumstances." That of course cannot be reconciled with the orders Sumner received where he was assured that Hooker would be protecting his right flank.

General Lee devoted the day to riding his lines and inspecting the placements of the 275 field pieces which were there to greet the Federals. He also helped direct Stonewall's arriving troops and saw to it that no possible approach was left uncovered. Lee warned Jackson that he should expect the brunt of the Union assault, that since Longstreet's position was so impossibly strong, Federal efforts there would have to be just a feint. Lee could still not bring himself to believe that Burnside could possibly be so cement headed as to make a major effort against the height behind the town. With the likelihood of the need for moving some of Longstreet's men to support Jackson, Lee had a military road constructed behind his lines, connecting the two wings.

With only vague ideas of what it was that Burnside was expecting them to do, Franklin, Sumner and Hooker all stayed up late that night trying to make their own battle plans and arrangements for their specific divisions and brigades. None of the three thought that there was any chance at all that tomorrow would produce a Union success, in fact they were all anticipating a prime magnitude disaster.

The assault was set for tomorrow. On the basis of the numbers involved, it would be the largest battle ever fought in the western hemisphere.
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Old 12-12-2012, 05:41 PM
 
Location: Parts Unknown, Northern California
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December 13th, 1862:

It is very difficult to conclude that general Ambrose Burnside had any sort of appreciation for the scale and complexity of what he ordered his army to undertake on this morning 150 years ago. With written orders filled with phrases such as "...if possible..", "...keeping lines of retreat open.." and " ...as developments permit..", the Army of the Potomac was to go forward and attack an especially strong, well prepared defensive position, without any concern for coordinating activities among the three Grand Divisions. General Sumner was to go for the heights behind the town, General Franklin was to attack and roll up Stonewall Jackson's flank, and General Hooker was to stand ready to use his Grand Division "..as developments permit."

The action for the day began about 8:30 am on Franklin's front. Conforming with his orders from Burnside, Franklin sent a single division, that of General George Mead, forward to strike Jackson's troops which were concealed in the woods which began about a mile from the river. General Gibbon's division, to the right and rear of Mead, was also sent forward to support Mead's attack.

At the far end of Jackson's line, General Stuart's cavalry had been posted to guard that flank. Stuart sent out two guns under the command of an extremely energetic young Major, John Pelam. In a justly celebrated display of courage and audacity, Pelam advanced his guns to within 800 yards of Mead's force and opened fire. So rapid and so accurate was the storm of metal being thrown out from this brace of cannon, that Mead's advance ground to a halt after advancing only another 200 yards. Mead was forced to wait while his field artillery was brought up and trained on the rebel gun crews. Now under a shower of shells, Pelam retained his position and continued to keep up his fire. Gunners fell dead and wounded, one of the two guns was blown out of action...and on Pelam fought. Finally Stuart had to send a direct and unambiguous order for Pelam to retire, which he did in good order, bringing his one working gun off the field with him.

Pelam became a huge hero in the South, deservedly so, and he was so frequently referenced as "The Gallant Pelam" in news reports of the action that he became "The Gallant Pelam" in all future mentions of his name.

When Pelam finally withdrew, Mead resumed his advance. Franklin had 54,000 men under his immediate command, but thanks to Burnside's inexplicable orders, only the divisions of Mead and Gibbon were involved in the fighting on this front. In a fortuitous coincidence, the center of Mead's attack struck a point in Jackson's line where there were few troops. A section of the woods jutted forward at that place and was considered enough of a tangle that no attacker would attempt to penetrate, thus it was lightly defended. Mead's men broke through the thin line and actually reached the military road which Lee had constructed to facilitate movement between his two Corps. Incredibly, exactly what Burnside had ordered, had been accomplished.

But......Franklin had no orders to send any more units forward, and was unaware of the deep penetration that Mead had made. Gibbon advanced his supporting division to try and aid Mead, but discovered that with no other units being advanced, both of his flanks were coming under attack. Further forward, the same thing was happening to Mead as Jackson's men recovered from the surprise and and began counterattacking from three directions. Hopelessly outnumbered and absent support, Mead and Gibbon were forced to fall back. The only real opportunity of the day for the Federals, lost.

And that was the full extent of Union success this day. Only about 13,000 of the 54,000 troops available had participated in the battle and their attack had been so ineffectual that there had been no need for sending any of General Longstreet's men to the right to assist in beating it back. Consequently, the Union assault on the heights behind the town would be met by the full force of Longstreet's 40,000 veterans.

On the Union right flank, General Sumner had been instructed to delay his attack until the impact of Franklin's assault had discombobulated the rebels. When this failed to materialize, Burnside sent Sumner forward anyway.

Longstreet's Corps was guarding a four and a half mile long front, the strongest part of which was entrenched on a ridge called Marye's Heights, made even stronger by there being a sunken road and stone wall which formed a natural trench and fortification. Behind this barrier Longstreet placed the brigade of General Thomas Cobb, reinforced by a North Carolina regiment from General Cooke's brigade. Cobb formed them into two lines so that the first could discharge a volley, then step back and reload as the second came forward and fired. That meant that about every 20 seconds, another sheet of flame and lead would erupt into the faces of any oncoming attackers. The bulk of Sumner's attack would head directly for that spot and the flanking divisions of Generals Ransom and Anderson. Longstreet's artillery was backing up these troops and had been so well sighted in advance that Longstreet told Lee that "not even a chicken could live to cross."

(Personal aside here....I had been reading about this battle since I was ten or eleven years old and always took the pronunciation of "Marye's Heights" to rhyme with "stare" or "fair." Then I heard someone pronouncing it as "Marie's Heights" as in Marie Osmond. I accepted that as correct. Finally, in 1984 I visited the battlefield and was surprised to learn that it was, and always had been pronounced by the locals as "Mary's Heights" as in Mary Tyler Moore. Okay....I'll take the word of the people who actually live there.)

Around noon, just as Mead and Gibbon were making their penetrations on Jackson's front, Sumner ordered the first of his divisions to advance. The Grand Division had been sheltering in the town of Fredericksburg while forming up for the attack, and as soon as they cleared the town and began ascending the heights, the rebel artillery opened upon them, tearing huge holes in the well dressed lines. When they got to within 200 yards of the stone wall, Cobb's infantry added their rifle fire. Sixty yards short of the wall, the Federals of the leading elements broke and went to ground, looking for any sort of dip in the land to serve as cover. They would advance no further.

One by one, Sumner sent in his other divisions, the men having to step around, over, or on the those from the first division who were taking cover. The second division managed to advance to within 40 yards of the wall before they also were forced to seek cover.

And on it went, in the least imaginative manner possible, division following division into the same hell with the same result each time. By now it had become apparent to the rebels that Sumner's attack was focused on this narrow front, so the reinforcements were sent to the sunken road, doubling the defenders there and now they had four firing lines, meaning that the wall of bullets being thrown out was now more or less continuous.

By mid afternoon, Sumner's entire Grand Division was spread out on the plain, all seeking whatever shelter they could find, including piling up the bodies of deceased comrades to serve as protection. Burnside, who remained at his headquarters on the far bank of the river throughout the day, and who was apparently oblivious to the calamity taking place, then ordered Hooker to send in one of his Corps to take up the same attack on the same place.


Hooker who was on the battlefield and saw what was unfolding, raced back across the bridges, found Burnside and explained that further attempts would be mindless suicide. Burnside ordered Hooker to return and attack as previously commanded.

It was a repeat of the disaster which befell Sumner's Grand Division. Brigade after brigade marched up to the defensive line and was shot to pieces. Hooker had deliberately stalled and delayed the start of his attack with the idea that the early winter darkness would justify calling it off more quickly. After the battle Hooker bitterly noted "Finding I had lost as many men as my orders required me to lose, I suspended the attack." In total, some 40,000 Federals advanced against that stone wall which began the day with about 2300 defenders, but had swollen to 6000 by the time the last of Hooker's men were being blasted away.

The men from Sumner and Hooker's forces had to remain in place, flattened on the ground, waiting for darkness before they dared to attempt to cross the killing field once more. In his final, inexplicable act of stupidity for the day, Burnside ordered an unbloodied division from the V Corps to advance close to the wall under cover of darkness by way of preparation for resuming the attacks in the morning. These men went forward after dark and found great difficulty in finding a place to lie down which didn't already contain a wounded or dead Federal soldier.

This had been a mess, an unrefined, unmitigated catastrophe of a battle for the United States. Mead and Gibbon had suffered just over 4000 casualties in their attack on Jackson, another 8500 had gone down in the futile assaults against Marye's Heights, 12,600 in all, nearly 1300 of those dead. Lee's army had suffered about 5400 casualties, making this the most lopsided major battle of the war.

That night Burnside's sub commanders devoted themselves to begging their chief to cancel any further attacks on this front. This effort only seemed to drive Burnside further over the edge and he started talking about crossing the river and leading the next attack in person come the morning.

While the generals argued, the wounded lay in place on the battlefield, suffering from their injuries and the cold, trying to survive by building breastworks out of the dead.

Map of the Battle....it was as straight forward and simplistic as it looks...

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Old 12-13-2012, 05:08 PM
 
Location: Parts Unknown, Northern California
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December 14th, 1862:

The previous night had been one of relentless misery for the thousands of wounded Federal soldiers who had been unable to leave the battlefield under their own power. They lay where they had fallen, a hundred yards shy of the stone wall, shivering in the December cold, many bleeding to death or having their wounds become infected as a consequence of no treatment.

Almost as miserable were the men of General Syke's division who had been advanced during the darkness to a position where they competed with the wounded and dead for a place to flatten themselves and avoid the sporadic shooting which came from the rebel line throughout the night. They were there under Burnside's orders to resume the attacks in the morning, an assault he had told his Grand Division commanders, he would lead in person.

Franklin, Sumner and Hooker were now starting to view Burnside as a man who had become unhinged by the magnitude of his failure. They thought he was seeking a suicidal ending of his own life by way of atonement. Their major concern was not preparing to resume the attacks the next day, rather they spent the night urging Burnside to place the army in a defensive posture, worried that Lee would be coming down off the ridge to finish them off as soon as daylight permitted.

Burnside finally caved to their reasoning and canceled the resumption of his disastrous attacks. It would not have mattered too much if he had not because there was no power on earth which could have moved Sykes' division forward that morning. When the sun rose they discovered to their horror that they were just a hundred yards away from the rebel line and any attempt to raise one's head instantly drew a hail of bullets. The consequence was that they would spend the entire day trapped where they were, hugging the ground for dear life and praying for the approach of darkness so that they could retreat in safety.

A consequence of having Sykes' fresh troops in that position was to make it impossible for Burnside to request a truce to deal with the wounded still on the battlefield. So their suffering would go on for another full day.

On the southern side of the river, the Army of Northern Virginia was in high spirits over their one sided victory, an exception was their leader, General Lee.

Lee had been unhappy about the battlefield all along because the situation dictated that he stand on the defensive only. Lee much preferred fluid situations where he could employ his audacity to make surprising troop movements, get on the enemy flank and destroy the opposition entirely. At Fredericksburg he enjoyed a completely safe position from which he could punish any attackers, but that was the trouble....he had to wait for them to attack, he did not hold the initiative.

Stonewall Jackson was feeling his usual martial self this morning 150 years ago and he approached Lee for permission to launch an assault to drive the Yankees into the river. While Lee appreciated Jackson's aggressive instincts, he also recognized that a Confederate attack would result in throwing away the fruits of yesterday's victory. The array of heavy Union guns on Stafford heights across the river would inflict terrible damage on any attempt to get at the Federals lining the river, and the Confederates would not be able to deal with those guns until they had defeated the Union on their side of the river, and then crossed to take on the artillery.

The result of these command decisions was to restore the situation which had prevailed since late November....two massive armies eyeballing one another from close quarters, but neither making any sort of aggressive move. After a day of indecision. Burnside would concede defeat and bring his army back to the NE bank of the Rappahannock on the 15th, where more indecision would follow.
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Old 12-14-2012, 06:40 PM
 
Location: Parts Unknown, Northern California
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December 15th, 1862:

Events on several fronts 150 years ago today.

At Fredericksburg, General Burnside finally recognized defeat and pulled his army back across the Rappahannock River. He also finally was able to arrange a truce so that the Federals who had fallen on the slopes of Marye's Heights could be removed and given care, or be buried if they had perished in the attack.

In New Orleans, General Banks at last arrived after having invested most of what remained of the campaigning season on a recruiting trip to New York. This day brought to an end to the administration of General Benjamin Butler whose departure was regretted by none who had lived under his kleptocracy. President Lincoln had hoped that Banks would launch a campaign against Vicksburg from the south which would be coordinated with General Grant's and General McClernand's coming from the north. It was too late in the year for that now, and as things turned out, the northern stroke would not materialize either.

The reason for that got its start today as General Nathan Bedford Forrest set out with a 2500 man cavalry force he had recently raised and trained himself as an independent command. Their mission was to disrupt and destroy Grant's communications with Memphis and with his main supply base at Holly Springs. Forrest planned to do as much damage as he could to the railway which Grant was relying upon for his supplies.

Also headed north were the 3500 cavalrymen of General Pemberton's army which was assigned to the defense of Vicksburg. The gray horsemen were under the command of the former chief of this army, our old friend, the eternally optimistic General Earl Van Dorn. Their target was Holly Springs...Grant's supply base.
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Old 12-16-2012, 05:48 PM
 
Location: Parts Unknown, Northern California
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December 17th, 1862:

General Grant was to suffer two reverses this month, one would be military, the other would be self inflicted damage to his reputation.

Grant's Department of the Mississippi and the Tennessee had been experiencing an ongoing conflict between military and political necessity. In those areas of the Confederacy in which the Union had gained control, the Lincoln administration was anxious to see the resumption of trade, with loyal US citizens if possible, but with still hostile rebels if not. To facilitate matters, the government had been liberally issuing trade licenses to southerners in occupied territories. Abuse and fraud was immediately widespread and before long a regular network was established which was running vital war supplies to the South in exchange for cotton brought out of unoccupied rebel lands.

Naturally the generals wanted to put a stop to any sort of trade which aided the enemy, but political concerns intervened. The resumption of trade had been a huge benefit for the merchants of Illinois, Indiana, Missouri and Kentucky. Most of these merchants were Democrats and their support for the war was linked to their ongoing prosperity. Democrat politicians stood behind these traders, some lining their pockets as well, and all ready to pounce on the Lincoln administration should the generals get their way.

Grant was extremely displeased with the government's attitude, believing that it demoralized the soldiers to be watching these profiteers, North and South, conducting business as though there was no war at all, and took a number of steps within his power to frustrate the trade in his department. He required those with governmental licensees to also get a permit from his provost marshal. He restricted the areas where the traders could operate. And he ordered that all trade must be conducted with government greenbacks, no gold, no silver, no specie of any sort may be used.

None of these steps had much on an impact and the trade continued. Grant got it into his head that those who were smuggling specie to the South were mostly Jewish speculators. (Many of them were.) Grant shared the common prejudices against Jews which prevailed in his day, and he increasingly linked the ongoing frustration he was experiencing over the trade problems, as "The Jewish problem."

150 years ago today he issued "General Order No. 11"


Quote:
The Jews, as a class violating every regulation of trade established by the Treasury Department and also department orders, are hereby expelled from the department [the "Department of the Tennessee," an administrative district of the Union Army of occupation composed of Kentucky, Tennessee and Mississippi] within twenty-four hours from the receipt of this order.

Post commanders will see to it that all of this class of people be furnished passes and required to leave, and any one returning after such notification will be arrested and held in confinement until an opportunity occurs of sending them out as prisoners, unless furnished with permit from headquarters. No passes will be given these people to visit headquarters for the purpose of making personal application of trade permits.
General Grant's Infamy

Grant was a general, not a politician, and he had not thought of the serious political backlash this order would generate. Thousands of Union soldiers were Jews and wealthy Northern Jews were important war supporters. Most importantly, starting January 1st the war officially became one to free the slaves and Lincoln hardly wanted to launch this crusade with repressive measures against another minority. Grant would be instructed to withdraw his order, which he of course immediately did.

Grant later claimed, with some plausibility, that he had never intended that his order meant that all Jews were expelled, just the ones engaged in the speculation. He blamed the pressure of dealing with this problem while simultaneously trying to conduct his Vicksburg campaign, as the cause of his careless use of language. An examination of Grant's war correspondence finds numerous complaints about Jews, but always, without exception, in the context of their participation in the trade with the South. On the other hand Grant was famed for his economic and precise use of language in his orders, the clarity of which was always praised by his subordinates.

Whatever was truly going through Grant's mind, this was not a proud moment for him.

Last edited by Grandstander; 12-16-2012 at 06:15 PM..
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Old 12-17-2012, 06:04 PM
 
Location: Parts Unknown, Northern California
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December 18th, 1862:

The two pronged move against Vicksburg from the north was still two pronged, even though it now had a single head. Political general John McClernand had finally figured out that he had been sandbagged by Generals Halleck and Grant, and that the army he had raised in expectation of leading them to the conquest of Vicksburg, the collapse of the Confederacy and the US presidency for himself, had been stolen out from under him.

Halleck had told Grant that he would command all the troops sent into his department, and the unwitting McClernand had been shipping his newly trained soldiers to Memphis as the starting point for his expedition. Unfortunately for McClernand, Memphis was in Grant's Department, administered by Grant's closest confident, General Sherman.

McClernand learned that Sherman had taken the troops he had sent to Memphis, absorbed them into his divisions, and was setting out for Vicksburg without McClernand. The political general hustled down to Memphis, and after appropriate expressions of outrage, realized he could either command one Corps under Grant, or no divisions at all if he refused, resigned himself to the subordinate's role. 150 years ago today Grant formalized the set up, creating four Corps under William T. Sherman, John McClernand, Stephen A. Hurlbut and James B. McPherson. The first two would descend upon Vicksburg by water, using the Yazoo River to land troops on the Eastern bank of the Mississippi. Grant was commanding the other two in person and they were following the railroad which connected Memphis and Vicksburg.

As noted a few days ago, General Nathan Bedford Forrest was on the prowl in Grant's rear, leading a 2500 man force on a mission to wreck the railroad and Federal communications. 150 years ago today found Forrest attacking and forcing the surrender of the 470 man Union garrison in Lexington, Kentucky.

Wrecking railroads was not as rewarding as it had been earlier in the war, for the US Corps of Engineers had become astonishingly prolific at rapid fire repairs. Seldom was a railway out of commission for longer than 48 hours. Forrest also had his men destroying telegraph wires and poles and in the process of this, he severed direct communications between the two wings of Grant's army advancing on Vicksburg. This was to have lethal consequences.
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Old 12-19-2012, 05:14 PM
 
Location: Parts Unknown, Northern California
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December 20th, 1862:

General Grant's plan for the conquest of Vicksburg was for his column, consisting of two Corps, forcing General Pemberton out of the Vicksburg defenses to meet and try to stop him somewhere north of the town. While Pemberton was busy with Grant's wing, General Sherman would lead two Corps down the river, disembark on the eastern bank of the Yahoo River, and attack the northern defenses of the city, which presumably would be thinly held thanks to Pemberton's occupation with Grant. The place where Sherman would be attacking was called Chickasaw Bayou, and was not a position any commander would have selected as the attack point...except that he knew that it was lightly defended. The land there was steep with bluffs and the surrounding terrain swampy to the degree that there was little in the way of room for an army to maneuver.

150 years ago today Grant's plan was defeated, not by 25,000 men of Pemberton's army, but by 3500 rebel cavalrymen led by General Earl van Dorn.

By this time, van Dorn had gained something of a Wiley Coyote type reputation. He would make some grand plan, sally forth and be defeated in the very first stage of his epic campaign, and then retire. But he always popped up again, just as optimistic, just as grandiose in his ambitions for his next campaign...which would also be defeated in its first steps.

This serial pattern of leaving immense gaps between promise and execution, had cost van Dorn the command of the Vicksburg defense army. He had gone from commanding 20,000 to leading 3500, but he was to do more with those 3500 than he ever accomplished with his larger force.

150 years ago this morning van Dorn's force surprised and captured the 1500 man Federal garrison assigned to protect Grant's main supply base at Holly Springs. Then it was a repeat of Stonewall Jackson's destructive party at Manassas as the rebel troopers set about destroying everything which they could not loot and carry away. Grant's disgust with the cotton trade in his department might have been eased a bit as 4000 bales stored there were set afire. There were more than 100 rail cars parked in the area containing the food for Grant's army, this too went up in a huge bacon bonfire which consumed all, rail cars as well. Then they found all of the medical supplies, including the medicinal alcohol and what wasn't consumed or carted away was smashed or burned. The fires got out of control and though unintentional, several town buildings were burned to the ground as well, including the county courthouse.

In the space of four hours, the supply depot was a flaming wreck, not enough was left behind to support a regiment much less an army. Van Dorn then took his leave before any organized pursuit could mount a chase.

Grant did not know it yet, but his first Vicksburg campaign was over. His plan placed reliance on the supplies that could be brought down the Mississippi Central Railroad from Holly Springs. Grant could repair the damage done to the tracks by General Forrest, but replacing the supplies which had taken months to build up, was not something which could be done until sometime in 1863. When word reached Grant of the calamity, he gave the matter some thought and then conceded defeat and called off the advance. He sent word to General Sherman of the cancellation, but Sherman never received it because Forrest had done such a complete job of pulling down the telegraph wires used for communications between the wings.

This meant that when Sherman's force arrived at Chickasaw Bluffs, Pemberton's entire army would still be on hand, not out chasing Grant. Unaware that his orders had been canceled, Sherman would go ahead with his attack as planned.

Earl van Dorn finally had a victory, and a major impact triumph at that. His reach had always exceeded his grasp in his earlier campaigns, but this time his grasp turned out to be greater than his reach. He and his 3500 had done what no one else in gray had so far accomplished, they made U.S. Grant call off a campaign.

Van Dorn would have but a few months to enjoy his victory, he was destined to become the second general of the war to be shot to death for reasons unrelated to the military conflict.



The Cover Tells It All


Last edited by Grandstander; 12-19-2012 at 05:58 PM..
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