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While General Franklin was needing the entire day to clear Crampton's Gap to the south, the Corps of Generals Burnside, Hooker and Reno were aiming for Turner's Gap to the north with the idea of blasting their way through and catching General Longstreet's Corps before they could reunite with the rest of Lee's army.
This was a tougher nut to crack than was Crampton's Gap. Lee, by now having learned of the lost order and the fact that the Army of the Potomac was nearby and in motion, sent D.H. Hill's 5000 man division to defend the passes through the mountain in that area. The terrain was more rugged than to the south, the passes less wide, and this acted as a force multiplier for the rebels.
Burnside had overall command on the field for the Union and he sent Hooker against Turner's Gap while Reno's Corps attacked Fox's gap just to the south. The fighting was bitter, bloody, and lasted all day. Hill's men slowly gave ground, falling back from one natural defensive position to another and inflicting a heavy cost on the assaulting Federals. By the end of the day Hooker had gained the high ground, but the rebels were still blocking the pass by clinging to the the western side. At Fox's Gap, Reno made better progress and was just about to sweep through when the timely arrival of General Hood and his Texas brigade broke up the final attack before darkness ended the fighting for the day.
The three gap battles are collectively referenced as the Battle of South Mountain. It was costly, 2325 Federals were casualties and 2,685 rebels were killed, wounded or captured. At the end of the day General Franklin controlled Crampton's Gap but had decided that had been enough for the day. Turner's Gap was still held, but barely and obviously would not last long the next day when the Hooker's Corps would descend to finish them off. Only at Fox's Gap did the rebels still hold the high ground, and that would be worthless once the Union troops came through the gaps to the north and south of that pass.
General Lee had no choice but to abandon South Mountain entirely and try and concentrate his forces as quickly as possible. Once more a golden opportunity was in front of any Union general who acted swiftly to attack before that concentration could be achieved.
"I will lose no time" General McClellan had written to President Lincoln before his innate cautious nature took over and he decided that he shouldn't muff this opportunity of a lifetime via careless haste.
Because he delayed, rather than smashing through the South Mountain passes yesterday morning and cutting General Lee's army in two, the entire day had been consumed in attempting to secure control of the passes. In typical McClellan manner, he declared the previous day's fighting a glorious, morale restoring victory for the Army of the Potomac. He was partially correct. The men's spirits were lifted by finally driving the rebels from a field after a summer full of defeats and retreats. And it was a tactical win for the Federals, most of their objectives were achieved and the way was all but clear for their move into the west side of the mountains and Lee's divided army.
That it was "glorious" is certainly questionable for McClellan failed to capitalize on it in any manner.
Lee was contemplating his next move. One option was to call off the Harper's Ferry attack, gather his troops and get them back across the Potomac as quickly as possible. That had been Lee's first instinct when he had been surprised by how quickly McClellan had moved in pursuit. Then Lee learned about the lost order and it was all suddenly clear to him. Mac was still timid, cautious Mac, only the advantage of knowing Lee's plans had stirred him into uncharacteristic high velocity.
As he was thinking, word came from Stonewall Jackson that Harper's Ferry was surrounded by Confederate troops and would be surrendering or attacked any moment. So Lee put aside the flight option, concentrated Generals Longstreet and D.H. Hill's men into their singular unit and began falling back from South Mountain, looking for a place where his army could make a defensive stand to allow Jackson time to complete the capture.
Harper's Ferry was not much of a challenge to an attacking force. With water on three sides to prevent escape and high ground overlooking it from three directions to serve as ready made artillery platform for besiegers, it was a defender's nightmare. September 12th through today had seen sporadic fighting as each of three wings of Jackson's Corps approached and looked to sieze that high ground from the spread out defenders.
Commanding those 12,000 blue garrison troops was General Dixon S. Miles, an 1824 graduate of West Point who had a long but undistinguished career before the war. At 1st Bull Run he looked to gain courage from a bottle and wound up convicted of drunk on duty in a court martial. He was suspended for eight months and then given this inactive garrison command because it was thought he would do the least harm there.
Miles' defense was ineffective, placing far too many troops to defend one height at the neglect of the others. His subordinate officers were astonished by his incompetence and suspected that he had started drinking again. 150 years ago this morning the last of the Federals were compelled to abandon the heights and concentrate below at Harper's Ferry. Jackson rolled his artillery into position to bombard the town into submission and wasted no time opening fire.
Miles convened an officers call as the shells rained down. By this time his men were near mutiny, but all could agree upon the hopeless of their position. Miles announced that he would have the white flag raised. He stepped out of the tent to give that command and just then a shell exploded next to him, shattering his left leg. His officers actually debated whether to take him to the regimental surgeon or not, finally deciding that they had to for honor's sake. Miles was to die the next day.
The surrender was completed and just over 12,400 Yankees went into captivity, the largest surrender of a US force during the war. It had cost Stonewall just 40 dead and 250 wounded. As Jackson was rounding up his prisoners, a rider came in on a heavily lathered horse with an urgent message from Lee....get your men to Sharpsburg as rapidly as you can.
While Harper's Ferry was being lost, McClellan's troops had pushed on through the gaps in the morning and found....nada. Lee had pulled his forces out and fallen back toward the Potomac River. Outside the town of Sharpsburg Lee had found a position of low hills and rises, fronted by Antietam Creek and backed by a loop in the Potomac. He could anchor one flank on the creek and one on the river, and with the rolling terrain, take advantage of numerous natural defensive positions. Lee decided that this was the place to make his stand. Now if he could just get Jackson's Corps up from Harper's Ferry before McClellan attacked....
And of course rather than launching an instant pursuit, Mac decided that he needed time to reorganize his troops after their "glorious" victory on the 14th. His advance was hyper cautious, such that by the end of the day, only two of his divisions had arrived on the eastern bank of Antietam Creek. Nothing was going to happen this day, and more shockingly, nothing would happen tomorrow either save Jackson having the luxury of using the whole day to get his troops up from Harper's Ferry and positioned next to Longstreet's men.
Had McClellan moved aggressively that day he would have had four Corps, about 60,000 men, to attack Lee's position which was manned by fewer than 30,000 rebel troops.
But this was Mac.....
Harpers Ferry Besieged
General Dixon Miles....his less than stellar career came to an unhappy ending 150 years ago today
Last edited by Grandstander; 09-14-2012 at 07:00 PM..
The rest of the Army of the Potomac arrived on the east bank of Antietam Creek throughout the night. 150 years ago this morning 75,000 Federals could have been sent against General Lee's defensive position in front of Sharpsburg before Stonewall Jackson's arrival from Harper's Ferry. The Confederate Army had been bleeding men throughout this campaign. A certain number had refused to leave Virginia, citing their willingness to defend their homeland, but not attack the US. Others felt that they had fought all summer and needed some time off to go home and help their families with the fall harvest. Some deserted with no intention of being found or returning. Lee had 55,000 at 2nd Manassas, but only 44,000 with him in Maryland. This morning he had approximately 20,000 scattered about the hills, farms, dips and rises.
Jackson was on the march with 18,000, but would not reach the scene until late morning at the soonest.
In keeping with the theme of squandered opportunities, General McClellan decided against attacking this day. He knew of course that his 75,000 man force was badly outnumbered, estimating the Army of Northern Virginia to contain more than 100,000. So instead he devoted the entire day to planning his attack for tomorrow. Mac decided that the heavy blow would fall on the enemy left, a decision reached as a product of the geography. The southern and center bridges over Antietam Creek had high ground on the western banks, making them easy to contest by defenders. The northern most bridge was further to the east and would have required a long extending of the rebel line to defend, so it could be crossed unopposed. Mac's program called for a huge hammer blow on this end of the line, crossing three Corps the night before and sweeping due South in the morning to strike the rebel flank.
General Porter's Fifth Corps would advance against the middle of the Confederate line, General Burnside's Ninth Corps would cross at the southern bridge and strike the Confederate right flank.
Small scale fighting erupted around dusk as the advance elements of General Hooker's Corps crossed the creek and moved into assault positions for the next morning.
The southern soldiers doing the skirmishing were from Jackson's Corps. They had arrived that afternoon and been placed on the rebel left flank by Lee.
When the sun went down that evening, it was the last sunset which would ever be seen by more than 3600 Americans.
At half past five in the morning, General Joseph Hooker's 1st Corps, 8600 strong, marched south down the Hagerstown Turnpike, passed through a small forest called the North Woods and emerged into a cornfield. At the opposite end of this field were two more small patches of forest on either flank, the West and East Woods. South of these two patches was a clearing where sat a small building called the Dunker Church. In battle formation and waiting in those woods were the 7600 men of Stonewall Jackson's Corps along with General Stuart who had brought his horse artillery to cover the rebel flanks. As Hooker's men began crossing the corn field, Stuart's guns opened fire, killing the first of thousands who were to die this day.
Hooker had his guns brought up to the edge of the North Woods and an artillery duel commenced which many were to recall as the most hellish of the entire war. A portion of Jackson's men had been concealed in the cornfield and the Federal shellfire began sending them flying through the air. Enraged, they rose up and attacked Hooker's men.
For the next five hours this cornfield and clearing would be the object of an immense struggle, both sides feeding men to the cauldron and the ground changing hands more than a half dozen times. Had General McClellan sent his entire force forward in concert, it seems certain that the rebels would have been crushed. Instead, they came into the battle unit by unit, Mansfield's Corps taking over when Hooker's was fought out, General Sedgwick's Corps arriving just as Mansfield's troops were stalled.
General Lee had no strategic or tactical reserve, all of his men were involved throughout the day. With the advantage of interior lines, Lee was able to shift troops from one threatened zone to another, troops which were available from his center and right because McClellan was not coordinating his assaults.
Both Hooker and Sedgwick were wounded and knocked out of the battle, leading to temporary confusion in the Union command structure. Their replacements continued the same tactics, sending men forward, seeing them drive the Confederates back, and then seeing them come tumbling back from a rebel counter attack. At 10:30 am there were 13,000 casualties in this sector and the fighting ground to a halt because of complete exhaustion and disorganization.
When General Sumner's Corps had been fed into the attack, one of his divisions, commanded by General French, had gotten lost in the woods and emerged before the Confederate center. Here General Longstreet's men manned the defensive line which was using a sunken road cutting through the farmland as a natural trench. French sent his men forward against the line four times, and four times they were blasted back by rifle fire. Both sides rushed reinforcements to the scene and the casualties began to mount in this sector as well.
The assaults continued until 1 pm when General John C. Caldwell managed to swing his brigade around on the rebel flank and open an enfilading fire. This, combined with a mistaken order to retreat caused the Confederate line to collapse and the defenders to go streaming back.
Once more an incredible opportunity had been handed to McClellan. The rebel center was broken, there were but a handful of troops between them and Sharpsburg where Lee had his headquarters. Two Union Corps, Franklin's and Porter's had been held in reserve and stood ready to advance and cut the Confederate army in two. Also available were 3500 reserve cavalrymen. Franklin begged Mac for permission to advance, but McClellan insisted on holding his force in reserve in case of some unexpected calamity. While the Union advance was stalled, Longstreet rallied the retreating troops behind a solid wall of artillery pieces which discouraged further advances on that front.
Just as that action was ending, the curtain opened on the day's last drama. Burnside had been ordered to demonstrate before the southern bridge across Antietam Creek with the idea of holding the defenders in place and preventing them from reinforcing other parts of Lee's lines. Burnside was late getting started, and his demonstration was so unconvincing that Lee did not hesitate to strip this front to shore up his threatened left and center. By early afternoon, all that was left to oppose Burnside's full Corps from crossing the bridge were portions of four brigades under Brigadier David R. Jones, about 3000 men.
It wasn't an easy position to take. The objective, the 125 foot long stone Rohrbach's Bridge, featured high ground on either bank. Defenders could conceal themselves in the woods on the west bank, while attackers had to come down hill to a road which ran alongside the river before turning into the bridge. This made them easy targets.
Foreshadowing the horror of Fredericksburg four months from now, Burnside spent hours watching the same tactic fail over and over. Showing no imagination, he sent unit after unit sprinting down the hill and getting shot to pieces as they tried to approach the bridge. Informed that a ford had been discovered unguarded two miles to the south, Burnside failed to take advantage of it and instead continued with the same frontal assaults, not consenting to the flanking movement until attack # 4 had been repulsed with heavy casualties.
Finally at mid afternoon, with the Confederates running low on ammunition and word reaching them that a flanking force had crossed the creek below them, Jones had his survivors fall back on Sharpsburg. Burnside was slow in following and slow in setting up what should have been the final assault where Lee's weak right flank was driven in on his weak center. Burnside insisted on holding back his assault until he got his artillery across the creek, a slow process given the steep banks coming and going from the bridge.
Finally at 3 pm Burnside determied that he was ready and sent his men forward for the war winning attack. Jones and his men put up a furious defense but the numbers were too unbalanced and he was driven back in steps. Lee's army was being folded in on itself and it had its back to a river. Destruction seemed certain.....except.....
When Jackson had departed Harper's Ferry to rejoin Lee, he had left behind A.P. Hill's division to complete the processing of the 12,400 prisoners. Hill was ordered to join them the next day. Throughout this day he had his men on the road covering the 17 miles to Sharpsburg as rapidly as leg power allowed. He arrived at 3:30 pm on the rebel right flank, the perfect time and perfect place, for there in front of them was the flank of Burnside's great final assault, totally unprepared for a threat from the south. Hill's 6000 men tore into Burnside's left flank, breaking up his attack and ultimately sending them fleeing back across the bridge, which forever after would bear Burnside's name.
With that the fighting ended for the day. with both sides still more or less holding the positions they had held in the morning. It had been horrendous, producing 22,700 casualties. The North had 2,108 dead, 9.540 wounded and 753 missing/captured. For the South it was 1,546 dead, 7,752 wounded and 1018 missing.
Who had won? That would take some time to become clear.
Antietam Battle
Burnside's Bridge..looking peaceful in this modern photgraph
The previous evening had been one of horror for the thousands of wounded, many of whom still lay between the lines unattended. General Lee's night was devoted to receiving reports from his unit commanders and realizing that he had lost more than a quarter of his force in that day's battle. Lee solicited views from his generals and all were in agreement that the Army of Northern Virginia was not in shape to withstand another attack like yesterday's and that a failure to retreat that night would mean getting pushed into the Potomac tomorrow and wiped out as a fighting force.
But Lee overruled all of them and opted to stick around. If General McClellan was willing to go at it again the next day, so was Lee.
Was Mac willing? In the morning he was, stating in a letter to his wife that
Quote:
“We fought yesterday a terrible battle against the entire rebel army. The battle continued 14 hours & was terrific—the fighting on both sides was superb. The general result was in our favor, that is to say we gained a great deal of ground & held it. It was a success, but whether a decided victory depends upon what occurs today.†He told her, “The spectacle yesterday was the grandest I could conceive of—nothing could be more sublime. Those in whose judgment I rely tell me that I fought the battle splendidly & that it was a masterpiece of art.â€
But as the day wore on, as usual, Mac's aggression was overwhelmed by his caution. He decided to wait for a day to regroup his army, tend to the wounded and wait for the arrival of two reinforcing divisions. The consequence was the two armies remaining in place all day. When no attack materialized by sunset, Lee decided to pull out that night. After dark, the rebel army left burning campfires to create the illusion that they were remaining, and by sunrise the next morning the entire force was safely across the Potomac and back into Virginia.
McClellan launched no pursuit of any kind beyond sending a unit to reoccupy the now burned out Harper's Ferry. In reply to President Lincoln's pleas that he follow up this "victory" with a heavy blow which might end the rebellion, Mac argued for the necessity of reorganizing, refitting and replacing his fallen men. Rather than doing what needed to be done, Mac would indulge himself only in doing that for which he did have a talent....organization.
The Army of the Potomac remained at Sharpsburg.
The battle itself was a tactical draw. Why Lee chose to fight it is still a matter of speculation. Once McClellan left Washington in pursuit, weeks ahead of when Lee imagined such a movement likely, his Maryland campaign was defeated. The original conception had called for reaching as far as Harrisburg in Pennsylvania, and threatening Baltimore and Philadelphia when the Union army at last marched north to meet them. Mac's early departure, and movements accelerated by the discovery of Special Orders 191, ended all those hopes and forced Lee into having to concentrate his army and accept battle only a few miles across the Virginia border. The expected recruits had failed to materialize, no foreign recognition was encouraged by the drawn fight at Antietam, northern Virginia had been relieved of being a battle zone for only two weeks.
In sum, Lee's Maryland campaign was a failure, none of the objectives were realized regardless of how well he fought at Sharpsburg. McClellan of course thought he had won a Napoleonic scale victory and saved the Union at the same time, and the truth was that he had thrown away a series of incredibly fortunate opportunities to destroy the rebel army. Nevertheless, the strategic win was the North's and it was an important one for two reasons.
First it brought an end to the two and a half month period where Lee held the initiative and was pro active, forcing the Federals to be reactive, which is not how you defeat a revolution. Lee at least for the moment, was back over on the defensive.
Secondly, and more critically, because Lee wound up retreating back to Virginia, the administration was able to promote Antietam as a far more sweeping victory than it had been. This was the win that Secretary Seward had pointed out was needed before the atmosphere would be proper for announcing the Emancipation Proclamation.
As the war in the east was cooling down after a furious summer, the war in the west continued. A 4000 man Union garrison at Mumfordville Kentucky had surrendered to General Bragg's army on the 17th after a three day siege andBragg appeared to be targeting Louisville next. General Buell was in frantic pursuit, rushing his army into Kentucky once he discovered that Bragg's objective was not Nashville. Though Bragg had enjoyed a big head start, Buell's men were making up ground on a parallel track to the west. Kirby Smith was still occupying Frankfort in support of the Confederate state government that he and Bragg had proclaimed for Kentucky.
And what was our old friend General Earl Van Dorn doing all this time? You may recall that part of Bragg and Smith's grand vision included Van Dorn marching forth from Vicksburg and keeping Grant's army occupied while the Kentucky invasion took place. Having met with defeat north and south in his grand plan to retake Missouri (St. Louis, then huzzah!) as well as his sweeping program of reconquest in Louisiana (Ho! For New Orleans!), Van Dorn decided to show his versatility and strike due east with the goal of retaking Corinth.
If he had a campaign slogan for this adventure, this time he kept it to himself. The first move was to slip around Corinth and move to the SE, occupying Iuka, Mississippi. Charged with this mission was that favorite son of Arkansas, General Sterling Price who arrived with 14,000 men on the 14th. There he waited for Van Dorn to arrive with another 7000 men before launching the attack on Corinth.
It did not take General Grant long to divine the intentions of the rebels and he devised an envelopment trap. General Rosecrans would be sent with 10,000 men to sweep south of Iuka and attack it from the SW. General Ord would bring 8000 troops from Corinth to the NW and between them they would crush Price's command.
The plan called for both wings of Grant's army to be in place 150 years ago this evening with the attack being sent forward at sunrise. Ord's men arrived on time and skirmishing between the two sides' pickets began. Rosecrans had further to march and that combined with some units getting lost and wasting time marching and counter marching on the wrong road, was still 20 miles away from Iuka and sent word to Grant that he would not be there in time for the morning assault. He could be there by mid afternoon if Grant wanted to go ahead and attack with just Ord's troops
Grant decided to wait. Ord would attack the next day, but he was to wait until he heard the sounds of guns to the south indicating that Rosecrans had arrived and engaged the Confederates.
Iuka...then whoop dee doopa?Van Dorn's latest dream of reconquest:
General Grant's plan called for General Ord's 8000 men to demonstrate in front of General Price's 15,000 Confederates occupying Iuka, Mississippi. While Price was looking to the NW, sometime that afternoon General Rosecrans and his 10,000 would strike Price's rear from the SW. As soon as Ord heard Rosecrans' guns, he was to turn his demonstration into a general assault, and between them Price would be crushed.
So it went in theory.
On paper Grant still commanded more than 60,000 men, but Sherman's division was occupying Memphis, and three of Grant's other divisions were on loan to General Buell who was far away, racing General Bragg to Louisville, Kentucky. The 18,000 in these two divisions were all Grant had for duty in Northern Mississippi. It was not much of a numerical advantage with which to be taking the offensive, but this was one more demonstration of how different Grant was from General McClellan who was never satisfied that he had enough troops to take any chances.
In the morning Ord had moved out as instructed and gotten Price's attention via skirmishing and long range artillery bombardments. While waiting for Rosecrans to arrive and spring the trap, Grant indulged in some PsyOps. A wildly inaccurate newspaper report on the Antietam battle had arrived at Grant's headquarters. It stated that Longstreet's entire Corps had surrendered, that Lee was trapped against the Potomac River with the remainder of his force, General A.P. Hill had been killed and the entire rebel artillery and supply train had fallen into Union hands.
Grant already knew the truth of matters from more official channels, but he sent the newspaper along with a note from himself to Price via a flag of truce. Grant's note stated that he knew for a fact that the article was correct in all particulars, and that in light of this disaster, the Confederacy was defeated and there was no sense in shedding any blood here. Grant would happily receive Price's honorable surrender.
Price didn't bite. His reply stated that he did not believe the report, and that even if her learned that it was true, it would make no difference, whoever else was surrendering, Sterling Price was not about to give up the fight.
So, on they waited for Rosecrans. All through the afternoon, not a peep from the SW. Around 6 pm one of Ord's forward units reported seeing a large column of smoke coming from the SW, and it was assumed that this was Price burning his excess stores in anticipation of a retreat. The sun went down and Grant and Ord were left wondering why Rosecrans had failed to arrive, or failed to launch an attack if he had.
In fact Rosecrans had arrived. At 4:30 pm he was two miles from Iuka when his column ran into a brigade Price had posted to watch his back when reports of approaching enemy units were received. Rosecrans brought up his artillery to engage but none of the noise reached Grant and Ord due to an acoustic shadow , a frequently encountered phenomena during the Civil War where a combination of the contours of the landscape, along with the wind direction, causes sound to travel in one direction but not another. Consequently Rosecrans fought alone this day.
Price, seeing that Ord was still standing by in a passive mode, shifted the bulk of his force to deal with Rosecrans, and being rather careless with the lives of his men as he sent three failed attacks forward in an attempt to capture a single Union battery which only fell to the 4th assault which followed. Rosecrans was pushed back at first, his men rallied and regained the lost ground and so the fighting went until darkness ended combat.
Early the next morning a messenger from Rosecrans arrived at Grant's tent reporting their position and activities of the day before. This was Grant's first awareness that there had been a battle afterall. Rosecrans reported his command in shape to launch an attack, so Grant revived his plan of yesterday and ordered both wings forward and late in the morning they stormed into Iuka only to discover that the opposition had skedaddled in the night. Price had used the Fulton Road to march south and then loop around Rosecrans's division before heading north west to join up with General Van Dorn.
It was an odd affair, more costly to Price who suffered about 1500 casualties to Rosecran's 800. Grant's plan to trap Price had failed, he wound up taking Iuka, but that had never been the goal. Who won this fight, if anyone did, is subject to conjecture.
General Braxton Bragg was an admirer of Stonewall Jackson. He had conceived of his Kentucky invasion as being in the manner of Jackson's Valley campaign and had shared this idea with his subordinate officers.
It had begun with a Jackson like aura, Bragg's use of the railways to beat General Buell to Chattanooga had been clever and well executed. Further, the move north into Kentucky had generated exactly the impact which Bragg had wanted. It forced Buell to abandon his movement against Chattanooga and race north to defend Nashville. Then Bragg had thrown another surprise at Buell by ignoring Nashville and continuing into Kentucky with Louisville on the Ohio River the apparent goal. Buell then was compelled to leave General Thomas and three divsions behind to defend Nashville in case Bragg doubled back, and set out with the rest of his force to try and save Louisville.
Here was a case of the smaller army (Bragg had about 32,000 with him) dictating the movements and plans of the larger force. (Buell had 60,000 of his own and another 15,000 on loan from Grant.) Stonewall himself would have been proud of this accomplishment.
And then 150 years ago today, Bragg suddenly lost his nerve and seemed to be channeling McClellan more than Jackson.
While Bragg was investing three days in the siege and capture of Mumsforville and its 4000 defending Federals, Buell closed the distance on his parallel track, crossed the Green River and was now as close to Louisville as was Bragg. With this, Bragg abandoned the advance on Louisville and instead headed toward Bardstown to the NE. His official explanation was :
Quote:
With my effective force present reduced by sickness, exhaustion, and the recent affair before the entrenchments at Mumfordville to half that of the enemy, I could not prudently afford to attack him there in his selected position.........we were therefore compelled to give up the object and seek for subsistence."
That was part of the reason, but Bragg was also recognizing at this point that his dream campaign was not working out as he had projected. His conception had been that if he marched into Kentucky with 32,000 men, he would soon have ten or perhaps as many as twenty thousand new recruits for his army. Bragg had never thought that he could take on Buell with only half of his numbers, but if his army was swollen to 45 or 50 thousand by the Kentucky rebels at heart he expected to find in the Bluegrass state, then combined with General Kirby Smith's 12,000, Buell could be met with more or less equal numbers.
That just did not work. Bragg's army was bolstered by a few hundred recruits, not the thousands he was certain were just waiting for the opportunity to show their true colors. Now here he was just a few miles from the Ohio border, far, far from his supply base and still badly outnumbered. His invasion and hope for adding Kentucky as the 12th Confederate state, were now reduced to little more than a large scale raid of the state. Just at the moment he had little idea of what to do next.
Buell continued his march to Louisville, arriving there three days later to cheering and greatly relieved citizens. Buell sent a wire to the war department:
"Louisville is now safe. We can destroy Bragg with whatever force he may bring against us. God and liberty." Braxton Bragg | Facts Summary Information
While President Lincoln was relieved that Louisville would not be falling into enemy hands, he was frustrated by Buell's hinting that the next step was waiting for "whatever force Bragg may bring against us." Why wasn't the next step making Bragg wait for whatever force Buell could bring against him?
At noon 150 years ago today, President Lincoln convened a meeting of his full cabinet. He opened with a short reading of some pieces by humorist Artemis Ward. Then he became serious and told them of a promise that he had made to himself, and kept to himself until this moment.
Back on the same day that Barbara Fritchie supposedly thumbed her Yankee nose at Stonewall, Lincon had resolved that as soon as the rebels had been evicted from Maryland, he would issue a proclamation of emancipation "..as I thought likely to be useful."
Lincoln defended the action not on moral, but practical grounds. The opening paragraphs explained that this was primarily a war measure, not social engineering. He had been preparing North and South for months. When trying to sell gradual, compensated emancipation to the loyal slave states, Lincoln had added a warning that the progress of events in the war might result in their losing their slaves with no compensation. When Southerners complained of negro troops being raised in occupied Louisiana, the president told them that returning their loyalties to the Union would solve all of their problems, and that failure to do so would most likely lead to much more severe problems.
Those in rebellion were told that they had 100 days to surrender their cause, otherwise losing the war would also mean losing your slaves.
Quote:
That on the first day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three, all persons held as slaves within any State or designated part of a State, the people whereof shall then be in rebellion against the United States, shall be then, thenceforward, and forever free; and the Executive Government of the United States, including the military and naval authority thereof, will recognize and maintain the freedom of such persons, and will do no act or acts to repress such persons, or any of them, in any efforts they may make for their actual freedom.
As it evident, the document did not immediately free anyone. Those runaways who had reached Union lines had their status changed from contraband to free, but had already been free in all but name. The loyal slave states would retain their property. The emancipation would be in force only wherever the Yankee army was present to enforce it.
The Radical Republicans were overjoyed and believed that the president had finally caught up with the morality which should be prevailing. The reaction in the South was that Lincoln was at last showing his true colors, that despite all of his pledges to not interfere with the institution, this had been his plan all along.
Neither was correct. Lincoln had always viewed slavery as a moral horror, a stain on the nation which prided itself on freedom and the equality of the citizens. He also truly believed that the chief executive was in no manner empowered to liberate the property of US citizens and he had no program for emancipation apart from a voluntary, compensated one. It was the war which had changed matters.
The proclamation took pains to make all this clear:
Quote:
...by virtue of the power in me vested as Commander-in-Chief, of the Army and Navy of the United States in time of actual armed rebellion against the authority and government of the United States, and as a fit and necessary war measure for suppressing said rebellion.
The South of course wasn't buying any of it. The proclamation was treated in the newspapers as a deliberate call by an evil tyrant for the slaves to rise up, cut their master's throats and make for Union lines.
No one seemed completely pleased. In the North one segment felt that it went too far, another not far enough. Democrats complained that the president was trying to alter the war from one to save the Union to one to free the slaves. Radical Republicans focused on the inoperative part, how it was only in effect where it could not be enforced.
The Proclamation was designed not only to help the war effort by depriving the South of its labor force, it was also very much aimed at Europe. Since emancipation would come about only with a Northern victory, any interference by England or France would now be assisting the cause of slavery, and that would not be tolerated by the people of either nation. In this regard it truly was a war measure.
Finally it was a momentous document because despite the denial by Lincoln, this indeed was the US government becoming involved in social engineering, the first time it was to do, establishing a precedent which would simmer until the Progressive Age, and reach full flower under FDR and LBJ. The Emancipation Proclamation was a fundamental altering of what Americans expected of their government.
First Reading of the Emancipation Proclamation of President Lincoln by Francis Bicknell Carpenter
150 years ago today found General Braxton Bragg in Bardstown, Kentucky. He was in a state of irresolution at the moment. He had allowed General Buell to win the race to Louisville by default and lacked the numbers to assault him there. Bragg was prepared to stand on the defense against an attack by Buell, but the latter seemed content to remain entrenched where he was.
Bragg lacked the strength to extend his invasion into Ohio, if he started raiding Kentucky towns to try and draw Buell out of Louisville, he would be alienating the very people whose loyalties he said he had come to cultivate. It was starting to look like a retreat back to Tennessee was the most reasonable option available, so Bragg began to lay the groundwork for that in a letter he wrote to Richmond.
Quote:
It is a source of deep regret that this move was necessary as it has enabled Buell to reach Louisville, where a very large force is now concentrated.
...We are sadly disappointed at the want of action by our friends in Kentucky. We have so far received no accession to this army.
..Unless a change occurs soon we must abandon the garden spot of Kentucky to its cupidity. The love of ease and fear of pecuniary loss are fruitful sources of this evil."
Back in Louisville, Bragg's counterpart had difficulties of his own. Throughout the entire 250 mile retrograde movement from east of Chattanooga to Louisville, Buell had been continuously bombarded with telegrams from General Halleck demanding to know why he wasn't moving faster. Buell thought that Washington would be pleased that he had won the race and saved Louisville, but instead came more wires from Halleck demanding to know why Buell had not moved out after Bragg.
This was the same sort of pressure Buell had been under throughout his conquest of middle Tennessee. No one ever seemed to appreciate his victories, only chastise him for the glacial manner in which he went about achieving them.
Buell was in a snit. He suspected that his command status was in jeopardy, but did not know that there was a double whammy coming his way in four more days.
Several months previously, reacting to the local outrage, General Benjamin Butler had ordered a halt to the attempt to form an all black regiment from among the residents of occupied southern Louisiana. Since that time he had seen the size of his command reduced by the need to turn back General Earl Van Dorn's "Ho! For New Orleans" campaign and the expiration of the enlistments of some of his units wheich were not being replaced by Washington.
The consequence was Butler reversing himself on the the idea of black troops and authorizing a regiment of "free men of color", although runaway slaves were also welcomed by embracing the pretense that they had previously been free. 150 years ago today they officially came into being, the first all black regiment in US history.
In army records they were the 1st Louisiana Native Guard, (the same name used by the short lived unit formed by the Confederates in the war's early months...they are often confused with one another) but they styled themselves the The Chasseurs d'Afrique , named for a French cavalry unit raised in Africa during the 1830's. Unlike the black units which were to follow, the Native Guard featured black officers, allowing them to rise to the rank of captain. (Majors and above had to be white men.)
They began about 1000 men strong, but when their first seven months of duty consisted entirely of fatigue details, membership dwindled to a little over 500. They would finally see combat in May of 1863, participating in the campaign against Port Hudson.
I mentioned how they were frequently confused with the Confederate unit which came before them. To illustrate, when looking for a picture of them I came across:
American flag..officer in a blue uniform, certainly must be US troops, right?
But...the above is actually a doctored picture, taking a photograph of the Confederate 1st Louisiana Native Guard and airbrushing them into Federals, gave them a cute little drummer boy as well. The original:
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