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We have a few more days before there is a noteworthy event related to a specific day, meanwhile over the course of the month President Lincoln had been organizing the downfall of Vicksburg and the opening of the Mississippi.
The president attached so much importance to this mission that he indulged in a bit of overkill. The political general, Nathaniel Banks, who had been handled roughly by Stonewall in the Valley, was transferred to the west and given command of an army which was to cooperate with Fleet Commander Farragut, approaching Vicksburg from the South. With a base at Grand Junction, General Grant's army would descend from the north, following the line of the Mississippi Central Railroad, which would supply the force.
And if two prongs were insufficiently complex, a third one materialized on its own, the product of the political ambitions of Grant's subordinate, General John McClernand.
McClernand had requested and received a leave of absence during the month of October, and he used it to travel to Washington and do all that he could to undermine his boss. He spread rumors that Grant was back on the sauce, that the ranks were muttering against Grant and would refuse to fight for him, and stated that he, McClernand, was sick and tired of providing the brains for Grants operations while Grant wound up with the credit.
Lincoln wasn't buying this obvious attempt to get him to fire Grant in favor of McClernand, but McClernand was still a political asset which the president did not wish to risk losing. So instead of giving McClernand the Army of the Tennessee, he authorized him to travel to Indiana, Illinois and Iowa, there to raise his own army of volunteers which he would command. This force would then become the third prong, moving out of southern Illinois and descending on the target from the NW.
McClernand was overjoyed. His vision stretched well past his heroic capture of Vicksburg and on into a glorious future where he replaces that pompous clerk Halleck as general in chief, quickly wins the war and is swept into the White House by an adoring and appreciate nation. That ridiculous, unsophisticated juicehead Grant, would be dumped into the gutters of the forgotten.
McClernand's army and special command were the stepchild of Lincoln and War Secretary Stanton who were operating on their own, outside normal army channels. Army chief General Halleck was not at all pleased by these developments because, 1) They were taking place behind his back, and 2) Halleck the West Pointer hated most political generals...and McClernand especially.
In less than two weeks, McClernand would be learning what it meant to make enemies out of Halleck and Grant.
President Lincoln had established in his head, a test for General McClellan back on October 26th when the Army of the Potomac had arrived at their namesake river, and was at the time closer to Richmond than was General Lee's army at Winchester. If Lee managed to impose his force between McClellan and the rebel capitol, Little Mac would be dismissed.
Lee had no trouble at all accomplishing this. McClellan required a ponderous nine days to get his army across the Potomac and concentrated around Warrenton. With plenty of time and no opposition, Lee shifted half of his force to Culpeper and assumed a blocking position.
That was enough for the president. On the quiet he informed his cabinet members of the impending change, but all agreed to keep silent about it for a few more days...until after November 4th.
The reason was that it was election day 150 years ago, a unique historical circumstance as a nation engulfed in a Civil War, was staging what would amount to a plebiscite on their continuing participation in that war. The president was hoping that he had done enough for both of the groups he had to have behind him in order to sustain a vigorous prosecution of the war, the radical Republicans and the war Democrats. The former had been given the preliminary Emancipation Proclamation, no small sop at all. The Democrats had enjoyed a high number of military/political appointments, Butler and Banks being the high profile examples. And when a political general had been sacked, it had been the radical Republican darling, Fremont The Pathfinder. All the political capital which came Lincoln's way as a consequence of these appointments, would evaporate quickly with the firing of the Democrat McClellan.
So it would have to wait one more day.
In this atmosphere of half gratitude, half resentment, the president needed to find enough votes to sustain the Republican majorities in both houses. All 185 seats in the House of Representatives were being contested. The GOP began the day with 108 members, and were reduced to 86 when the votes were counted. The Democrats advanced from 44 seats to 72, but were still short of a majority. In the Senate the Republicans won three additional seats, extending their strong majority there to 66 % of the body.
It wasn't an overwhelming endorsement of the president and his cause, but it was far from a rejection and the continuing Republican control meant that the war would not be stopped by the legislative portion of the government.
And with his party still in command, the president wasted no time in giving the word to let the blade fall on McClellan's career. It was item # 1 on the next morning's agenda.
Inventor, politician, industrialist, soldier, railroad executive, and by all accounts one of the most likable people of his age, Ambrose Burnside was all of these things. The cliche "Jack of all trades, master of none" almost seems coined to describe Burnside, who was always adequate, but never outstanding in anything.
Genial and competent, what Burnside wasn't was imaginative. He was an intelligent man, with his gifts mostly of the mechanical rather than creative sort.
And he was completely aware of his own shortcomings, it was not false modesty when Burnside claimed that something was beyond his talents.
150 years ago this evening, Burnside was at his post in Salem, Virginia, five miles from where General McClellan had his headquarters. Around 8 pm there was a knock on his tent pole and a visitor was ushered inside. This was General C.P. Buckingham, personal adjutant to Secretary of War Stanton, a man of far too high a rank to be serving as a mere messenger, but that indeed was what he was doing this night. Burnside took the papers offered to him and discovered that he had just been appointed to replace McClellan as commander of the Army of the Potomac.
The next two hours were devoted to Burnside arguing with Buckingham, trying to persuade him that it was far better to leave McClellan in charge because he, Burnside, did not believe himself qualified for the position. Part of this was a manifestation of Burnside's characteristic loyalty, and part was absolute sincerity concerning his lack of fitness. Buckingham grew more and more irritated, explaining that he had no authority to make such a decision, only to present orders. It wasn't until Buckingham revealed that a refusal on Burnside's part would mean that the command would next be offered to General Joseph Hooker, that Burnside finally consented to accept.
The two generals rode together to McClellan's headquarters, arriving about 11 pm. Mac received them as though they were late night guests who had arrived for a chat, but he had already guessed the purpose of the visit, having been alerted to Buckingham's arrival at Burnside's tent more than two hours previously. After 15 minutes of pleasant conversation, Buckingham at last got down to business, handing Mac an order from General Halleck which read:
Quote:
General; on receipt of the order of the President, sent herewith, you will immediately turn over your command to Major General Burnside, and repair to Trenton, New Jersey, reporting on your arrival in that place, by telegraph, for further orders.â€
Burnside, mortified by the situation, then pleaded with McClellan to stay on for at least a few more days to help familiarize him with the command responsibilities and whatever plans were in the works. McClellan graciously agreed. His conduct throughout the change in command was outstanding. Mac's popularity with the troops had never lessened and as word of his dismissal spread through the camps, grumbling began, along with talk of keeping Mac at the head of the army and marching on Washington rather than Richmond.
McClellan discouraged it all, quietly reminding the men of their duty and urging them to support Burnside with the same fidelity that they had always had for him. For Burnside, Mac was as helpful and encouraging as he could be in the few days he remained with the army. When he departed on the 11th, his orders called for him to report to Trenton, New Jersey to await further orders, but Mac knew that none would be coming. Trenton was where he lived.
McClellan was not the man to lead the Army of the Potomac to victory. His absence of aggression, his serial overestimation of the opposition in front of him, his sluggish movements and continuous state of never being quite ready to get started, overwhelmed his virtues.
And he was not without virtues, Mac did indeed make a huge positive contribution to the Northern war effort. Twice when the Union morale was at its lowest following the routs at the two Bull Run battles, it was Mac who arrived and brought order to the chaos. The Army of the Potomac was his creation, and would remain his creation regardless of who commanded it. McClellan turned an amateur mob into a disciplined, professional army with a great sense of pride. Though poorly led in the field, they had fought very well in all of the engagements, accepting staggering numbers of losses and retaining cohesion as a fighting force. Under Mac, the Federals had never fled from the field, as they had under McDowell, Pope, Fremont and Banks.
They would continue to fight well in future engagements, and they would continue, for a time, to be poorly led.
As with celebrity deaths, the sacking of Union generals seemed to come in threes. General Buell and General McClellan had both been cashiered for their lack of aggression and sluggish progress once in the field. 150 years ago today a third commander of an army was discharged, but for very different reasons.
We have seen in previous posts how General Benjamin Butler had a habit of making himself controversial every place he served. As the department head of the Federal forces occupying southern Louisiana Butler had already created trouble with his execution of flag defiler William Mumford, his infamous order that any New Orleans woman who insulted a Federal soldier was to be treated as a prostitute plying her trade, and his rather liberal program of confiscations of rebel property using loose definitions of what constituted war material.
What put Butler over the top was his expansion of confiscation to include property owned by foreign nationals. He had seized 800 grand in cash from the Dutch Consul, arrested a French champagne importer and published a list of banned imports and exports which he applied to British merchants. All was done under the general heading of "giving aid to the enemy" and the result was an infuriated France, enraged Netherlands and hopping mad Britain.
President Lincoln had it in his mind to begin employing Butler's army as the southern arm of his multi prong strike against Vicksburg. He certainly did not want Butler in charge of an army during field operations, so the ongoing controversies were his excuse to get Butler somewhere else when it came time for fighting. Now that the fall elections were over, it was no longer critical to keep "The Beast" and his Democrat constituents happy.
So...150 years ago today Butler was notified that he was being replaced by General Nathaniel Banks. Lincoln would try and keep Butler on the shelf and out of harm's way for as long as possible, but Butler's political potency meant that eventually he would have to be given some sort of command.
It is worth noting the evolution of Abraham Lincoln as commander in chief. At the start of the war he was willing to rely on the expertise of his military advisers, appointing commanders and allowing them to plan operations. As the war progressed, the president, as was his habit in all things, decided that he needed to develop his own expertise in the field and began reading all that he could find on the subjects of strategy and tactics.
The first manifestation of his increased confidence in this area showed that he still had a lot to learn. Generals Lee and Jackson had played him like a violin with Stonewall's Valley Campaign, causing him to interfere with McClellan's operations exactly as the rebels officers hoped. Then Lincoln tired to play general with his Valley convergence plan, and that ended in a Pathfinder inspired fiasco.
But Lincoln was learning. He was already seeing what neither Buell nor McClellan seemed to grasp...that victory was going to require far more severe measures and much greater aggression on the part of the Northern forces. Lincoln now understood interior and exterior lines of communication and defense, he understood the value of approaching an enemy by the flank and how attacking an enemy supply source was often better than attacking the enemy army. And he was also beginning to understand the imperative of simultaneous actions by his forces.
But first he had to be able to get the armies to move when he said so. Those with what the president called "the slows", were being shunted aside.
While President Lincoln was devoting the early fall to replacing his sluggish generals with what he hoped were more aggressive men, in the other capitol, President Davis had been doing the reverse, trying to find a diplomatic way to retain one of his generals in command.
Davis could not ignore the severe criticism heaped upon General Bragg by co-commander General Kirby Smith, and subordinate generals Bishop and Hardee. This dispute, as these things unfailing did, worked its way into the Southern newspapers with more sympathy being shown to the critics than to the sour personality which was Bragg.
The Southern president could not afford to make his decisions on the basis of popularity or disgruntled subordinates. He wished to retain Bragg in command for two reasons. 1) Bragg and Davis were long time friends, dating back to their service in the Mexican War and Jefferson Davis was a man for whom the word "loyalty" was coined. He had a very highly evolved sense of personal honor and part of his code was that friendship, once earned, was perpetual and unlimited. And 2) Despite all of the criticism, Bragg had actually accomplished a great deal with his Heartland Campaign. He had halted for what was to prove to be a half year, the progress of the Yankee western invasion, shifting the battle zones to Kentucky. Eastern Tennessee and Chattanooga not only didn't fall to the Federals, it became obvious that it would be some time before the Union army could threaten them again. Bragg's "raid" had netted a great deal of very valuable supplies and draft animals, and when you added in all the small garrisons he captured on his march north, he had inflicted twice as many casualties on his foe than his army had absorbed.
Bragg had been much more successful with his northern invasion than had been Lee, and immensely more successful than the eternally optimist General Van Dorn. Davis' need for successful commanders was an imperative, his need for popular commanders, a non factor.
Thus, even before Bragg arrived in Richmond in late October to explain his actions, Davis had already made up his mind to retain him. What remained was finding the means to get Smith, Polk and Hardee back on board. The rebel president handled this cleverly. Polk and Smith were both invited to Richmond to air their complaints about Bragg, but before either man arrived, they each received impressively diplomatic personal letters from Davis, engineered to appeal to the patriotism of each man and making it evident that time invested in backbiting was a manifestation of personal selfishness in a time of national crisis. Davis also cleverly, and truthfully included in both letters, the fact that when Bragg had been there, he had nothing but the highest praise for both Smith and the Bishop.
So by early November when Polk and Smith arrived, one at a time in that order, the president had already done a highly effective job of making them feel like backstabbing lowlifes for having complained about Bragg in the first place. Each in turn pledged to Davis that they would return to their commands and do all that they could to support Bragg in whatever endeavor he directed.
150 years ago today a chance meeting validated the rebel president's handling of the matter. Smith was returning to eastern Tennessee. While changing trains in Lynchburg, he encountered Bragg who was doing the same while heading for Chattanooga. Smith knew that Bragg was aware of his visit to Richmond and the original intent of his meeting with Davis. Consequently Smith steeled himself for what he feared would be a withering dressing down from Bragg. Instead Bragg was kind, polite, and told Smith in person the same things he had said to Davis about the high quality of Smith's leadership.
From that point, through the end of the war, Smith never again uttered a single public word of criticism toward Bragg, nor would he tolerate any such remarks from any member of his staff.
President Davis had quietly and effectively smoothed the crisis. There would be further Bragg problems the following year with many of the same complaints raised, but for the moment, Davis had brought harmony and order to the western theater.
General McClellan took his leave from the Army of the Potomac 150 years ago today. In a letter to his wife, written just after the notification of the change in command, McClellan stated that when the time to depart came, he would go straight through Washington, not stopping to see anyone, no fuss, no ceremony.
But this was Mac.
Despite his half hearted protests, the ranks insisted on providing him with an honor escort, 2000 men strong, to see him off on his train. Mac yielded to their demands. After the whole act had gotten McClellan to the station and aboard his car, before the train could start moving, a group of men uncoupled McClellan's car from the engine and swore that they would serve no other commander and that he must not leave. Mac stepped out on to the platform, made a quiet speech appealing to the men's patriotism and reminding them that they served the United States government, not George McClellan. Well, grumble, grumble, okay, they recoupled the car and the train went its way.
McClellan would return to the stage in 1864, but no longer as a military man.
While this farewell business was taking place, Mac's replacement, General Burnside, was hard at work formulating plans. Burnside was very much aware that the reason he was in the position he then enjoyed, was due to the administration's displeasure with McClellan's slowness. Consequently, Burnside had quickly reformulated the army, grouping six of the seven Corps into three "Grand Divisions" under generals Sumner, Hooker and Franklin, each 30 to 35 thousand strong with the seventh corps designated as the reserve.
Burnside commanded nearly 230 thousand men. 98,000 would man the defenses of Washington, making certain that the rebels could not distract another advance against Richmond by generating a threat to Washington ala Jackson's Valley Campaign. 20,000 more would guard the Valley and the repossessed Harper's Ferry, leaving 113 thousand for operations against Lee's army.
Burnside was also aware that the president was much fonder of the overland approach, one where the Army of the Potomac was always imposed between the rebel army and the capitol. He decided to target Fredericksburg which was currently undefended. If he could steal a march on Bobby Lee by a feint against Culpepper, followed by a rapid left turn and SE advance , and reach his destination a day or two ahead of the Confederate army, he could throw pontoon bridges across the river , his army across the bridges...and eliminate as a barrier the entire Rappahannock/Rapidan defensive line which Lee had used to thwart Pope in September. The road to Richmond would be open.
Burnside submitted his plans to General Halleck, who took them to Secretary Stanton, the two men then meeting with the president to fill him in and obtain his views. Lincoln's first reaction was to moan when it was instantly apparent that Burnside was seeing Richmond as his goal, not Lee's army. However, the president was so very pleased by the rapidity with which Burnside had put together his plan, along with his promise of immediate execution if approved, that he decided to hold off on an instant decision. He would study the plan first.
Nothing of importance in the Civil War today, just thought I'd note that we're getting very close to someone winning the $5000 that City-Data will be awarding to the 20,000th viewer of this thread.
General Grant had at last gotten wind of an unofficial army being raised by General John McClernand in the Ohio River states. While Grant had been delighted to get McClernand out of his military district, it was apparent that the army being raised was intended for operations along the line of the Mississippi and Grant did not want the political general returning at the head of an army and disputing jurisdictions.
Grant's relationship with general in chief Halleck had been marked by periodic hostilities. Halleck had been jealous of the attention Grant got after Forts Henry and Donelson were taken and he had unjustly charged Grant with disobeying orders to keep communications constant. After Grant had been surprised leading to the bloodbath at Shiloh, Halleck had placed him on the remainder shelf with a responsibility free appointment as second in command of the united western armies. But when called back to Washington to take up the chief's position, Halleck had restored Grant to theater command in western Tennessee.
Now these generals found that they had something in common, a mistrust and distaste for John McClernand.
Grant wrote to Halleck, voicing his suspicions about the employment of the mysterious army, and asked him what was taking place. Halleck replied that the still forming McClernand army would be shipped to Memphis to be part of the advance against Vicksburg.
Well....Grant's army was based in Memphis (occupied and governed by Sherman's division) and it was supposed to be assigned the Vicksburg objective...so...who was to be in command of the operations against Vicksburg? Another query was sent to Halleck.
Though they did not conspire together to produce the eventual outcome, both Halleck and Grant knew the real meaning of Halleck's reply. "You have command of all the troops sent to your department."
"Sent to your department."
One could certainly interpret that to mean that when the troops McClernand was raising reached their home base of Memphis, they passed over to Grant's command rather than remaining an independent force.
And of course that is precisely how Halleck hoped Grant would interpret it.....that when the time came for McClernand's men to take the field came, Grant could steal them out from under the political general. McClernand then would be left with the choice of leading them as a sub commander of Grant, or resigning his commission in a huff. Grant did indeed understand the power he was being handed. He wrote to Sherman with orders that as soon as McClernand's men arrived in Memphis, he was to incorporate them under his command and move out immediately.....do not wait for McClernand.
So 150 years ago today, while McClernand still labored mightily to recruit and train what he was certain would be the army he would lead to great victory and his eventual presidency, he was unaware that he was already defeated by the "sour drunk" and "fussy clerk" for whom he had so much contempt.
Halleck went to bed a very satisfied man. Not only had he crafted the means to frustrate the hated political general, but he had also gotten in a jab at president and secretary of war for going behind his back with this move. Those two would find out about the command arrangements only after Sherman had marched the men out of Memphis.
In the course of explaining General Burnside's plan to take Fredericksburg, General in Chief Halleck had left the president and the secretary of war under the impression that the army would cross the Rappahannock River above the city, and take the heights behind it from the rear. Burnside had a reputation for lack of clarity in his written orders, and perhaps this shortcoming was at fault, or perhaps Halleck misinterpreted. The reality was that Burnside planned to march the army to Fredericksburg and cross over into the city. The plan relied on the timely delivery and construction of pontoon bridges, and Halleck was to be in charge of that.
150 years ago today President Lincoln approved the plan, or at least approved of what he believed was the plan. Burnside received a wire from Halleck:
Quote:
"The President has just assented to your plan. He thinks that it will succeed, if you move very rapidly; otherwise not."
President Lincoln had placed emphasis on celerity of movement and his new Army of the Potomac commander, General Ambrose Burnside, did not disappoint.
He had set the army in motion on the 15th, the day after getting his operational plan green lighted by the administration. They had moved off smartly on a SE course which ran parallel to the Rappahannock River and 150 years ago today, the leading elements, the troops of General Sumner's Grand Division, arrived and began occupying the heights across the river from Frederickburg. General Franklin's Grand Division was scheduled to arrive the next day and General Hooker's, along with Burnside himself, on the 19th.
Facing Sumner's Grand Division across the river on this day was a single rebel battery and a handful of cavalry. Burnside had stolen a march on General Lee whose army was still divided with General Longstreet's Corps at Culpepper and General Jackson's keeping an eye on the southern Valley. Lee would not figure out where Burnside had gone, nor what his intentions were for a few more days. He would not have a substantial blocking force in place until the 22nd.
So here was opportunity. The Federal pontoon train was scheduled to arrive on the 19th and 20th. If all went well Burnside could have his men across the river and beyond the heights on the western bank before Lee would be able to do anything to stop him. The Rappahannock/Rapidan defensive line would be bypassed.
If all went well.
For the moment President Lincoln was delighted. He now believed he had two generals, Grant and Burnside, who could be counted upon to respond to orders by getting their armies in rapid motion. (Immediately after General Halleck's "..all the troops who come into your department" clarification, Grant had set his army in motion and had covered about a third of the 150 miles to Vicksburg.) After Lincoln's frustrating ordeals with generals Buell and McClellan, this was a very encouraging sign.
Less encouraging to the president was that generals Banks and Rosecrans, his other army commanders, not only had not started, neither was even close to getting started. Banks in fact had gone to New York on a recruiting mission and wasn't giving any indication of when he might even be headed for New Orleans, much less launch the southern strike at Vicksburg.
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