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From above , Naturalism is the intellectual position that naturally -occurring physical forces are an adequate theoretical explanation for the universe as it is.
If science cannot explain the mechanics in superposition and all the huge time problems then it has no clue what is really going on in these area's. No foundation to back a position , nothing intellectual about the phrase at all.
Two problems. I might say god is a natural process. Also, some Scientist can say "more intellectual" things about what went "before". Definitely more so then non science people in most cases. "god" went "poof" is not on equal terms because some non scientist said so.
science is a process. not a thing.
science doesn't explain anything. Scientists do. And anybody can question them that has the energy to learn something about the background information. Scientist get condescending when someone with little training says "I don't believe that". Like what we believe, if no evidence is offered, means anything past Santa clause.
Scientist, well any worth his weight that is, only comment using what is known. They do not make claims, state beliefs, or draw conclusions on what is not known. Well, unless they are studying it that is. But even if they are studying it the claims really are not that far off the "curve" of what is known.
That is the difference between many people. Some people think it is totally reasonable to say things about a god without a lick of understanding about science or engineering. Would we take the word of an untrained layer to be our council in law? Or pay a pro football team to play when the players never played football?
The two statments that have no evidence are "there is no nothing" and "there is "my type" of god only". These to types make claims past what is known and are a clue into the person mind set.
I am begining to like this site. The atheist don't seem like adults that were abused children.
Those are some really good points . Also wanted to mention there seems to be allot of Utubes and so on with either a scientist or some degree of training, offering opinions, astronomy in general I think by even the networks has become a hot topic.
Last edited by Sophronius; 08-24-2014 at 08:36 PM..
yes, former "whatever" is cool. I mean as we learn more it is ok to "change our minds" based in new information to me. Either way. It is not cool to bash regular people for no "rational" reason. I am not going to this place called "hell". if a peron can honestly say that to another person that is pretty telling to me. Nor am I going to call every personal that doesn't believe what I don't believe delusional, stupid, or retarded. Well, unless I can handle the responses that is.
I am no philosopher, but my view on this is that the distinction between substance and property dualism is as much a chimera as the 'difference' between sub atomic particles with mass and those without. They are all the 'same Stuff'.
The logical implications of substance and property dualism are significantly different. Christianity - and basically any form of religion that talks about disembodied souls (surviving the death of the body, transferring from one body to another, etc.) requires substance dualism. A "substance" (in philosophical lingo) is a type of thing that can, in principle, exist all by itself - its existence does not necessarily depend on other things. If consciousness is a different type of substance than physical entities, then consciousness could presumably exits without the physical world. Substance dualism, therefore, is not logically compatible with physicalism.
Property dualism, on the other hand, is consistent with physicalism - although things get complicated because people have radically different ideas about what "properties" are. (The classic division is said to be between Plato and Aristotle. My own view is more like Aristotle's.) When I talk about properties, I'm thinking of energy as the primary "substance" of reality, but I think of energy as having a variety of fundamental properties - brute properties that just "are what they are." You cannot have energy without these fundamental properties (the properties basically just define what energy "is" in essence) and you cannot have these properties without energy.
The Cheshire cat happens to be smiling. You could have the cat without the smile, but you can't have the smile without the cat (according to me). This is essentially the "Aristotelian" notion of properties (in contrast to Plato's notion of eternal "Forms".)
If, per chance, you find that the cat is smiling, then you can use your knowledge of the smile to help you "reverse engineer" the cat (so to speak). If you want to model the fundamental elements that constitute reality, then you need to build you model in such a way so that you can explain the possibility of smiling in terms of the model. If your model cannot explain the known data, then your model is incomplete at best, and it might be completely wrong.
In recent discussions the phrase "something more" has been popping up. With substance dualism (and with Platonic Forms), yes, there is "something more," but with a Aristotelian type of property dualism, then no, there is nothing more. If you think property dualism implies "something more" then you are missing the point of property dualism of the Aristotelian sort that I'm advocating (which is why I generally prefer other terms like "dual aspect theory" or "neutral monism" - the word "dualism" in "property dualism" throws people off and causes unnecessary confusion). We know that we are conscious - which is to say: we experience the world qualitatively. This is the basic data that we start with. This is the basic data from which we "reverse engineer" reality. Logically, we have no choice about starting with this immediate empirical data. The qualities of our "here/now" experience are the only data that we know without resorting to hypothetical "stuff" existing "in the past" and/or existing "out there" serving as the cause of our immediate experience.
Based on this immediately-known data, we have lots of good logical reasons to infer the existence of a "material world" out of which we are composed, and a system of "memory" by which we experientially "access the past" - that which presumably was, but is seemingly no longer present in our immediate experience. What we basically do is "build a model" of the external world; we theorize different types of "external" entities with various properties in order to help explain the qualitative data constituting our immediate experience. E.g., When I stick this pin in my finger, I feel this sensation that I call 'pain'. (BTW, notice the indexical word "this"). This sensation, along with countless other qualitative experiences form vast patterns of qualitative experience, and we take these patterns as further good evidence for the existence of an external world full of other people who experience similar patterns of experience, which leads us to the concept of "objectivity" - which we see upon reflection is ultimately based on the notion of inter-subjective agreement. In order to confidently label some entity X as "objectively real" we take a vote: We ask a bunch of people "Do you see X?" Each time someone answers "yes" our confidence in the objective reality of X is increased. We publish articles in peer-reviewed journals saying "I did steps 1, 2, and 3 and got X." Other people then follow the same steps to see if they get the same result. The result might be, for example, a certain type of spike on an oscilloscope. This empirical observation of the spike is a subjective qualitative visual experience. ALL data that we can possibly know anything about eventually boils down to our own subjective qualitative experience.
We cannot know "X" if we don't personally experience some pattern of subjective qualitative experiences that we interpret as "indicating the existence of X." Please try not to read anything "extra" into this. It is the simplest logic in the world. In fact, it is so simple that people seemingly can't believe I'm trying to explain something so obvious, so they imagine that I must be talking about something more complicated - something "extra". No, I'm not. What I'm pointing out is the simplest of things: You can't know anything about X unless you personally have some subjective/qualitative experience that you interpret as being "about X."
When we talk about building conscious robots, we are talking about how to build machines who can personally have subjective/qualitative experiences that they interpret as being "about" this or that. But you (I mean each and every one of you who is reading this) cannot correctly comprehend the question unless you personally reflect upon your own experience of "what it is like" for you personally to experience pain, etc. Your own personal experience - THIS qualitative experience HERE and NOW - is the basic data that our model of reality needs to explain if we are going to use this model as a guide to building conscious machines.
I propose that we CAN eventually put together a model of reality that explains this data in terms of physical energy, but only if we acknowledge the data for what it is, namely, the subjective/qualitative experience of "here" and "now" - which is exactly the sort of thing we compare to other people's experience (E.g., when you did steps 1, 2, and 3 did you see X?"), and only if we assign the correct properties to energy in our model. We already know that energy has a bunch of properties; in other words, we already accept property pluralism. We do not think we are engaging in "supernaturalism" just because we accept that energy has many different properties.
In the context of discussing the possibility of consciousness in robots, the point of "property dualism" is not to add "something more" to our ontology. The point is to assign a set of fundamental properties to our model of reality so that our model explains the EMPIRICAL data - i.e., the data of experience - which is ultimately rooted in our individual qualitative/subjective experiences - the very sorts of experience we believe that a conscious robot ought to have if it is to count as being conscious.
Last edited by Gaylenwoof; 08-25-2014 at 11:24 AM..
If property dualism is simply the way things look, then it is not so much a different stuff as no stuff at all. If we are talking about the conceptualisation of things, then that conceptualization in our minds is indeed the same stuff as stuff and a soul (which is implicit in the discussion) has to be something that can exist without the material body and so must be 'stuff' and is therefore the same, really. A property dualism which is merely an idea (not stuff) formed by our mental processes (which is 'stuff') is by definition non existent.
How does that grab you?
P.s.. Don't mean to be flippant - there is much more in your post than that implies, but I'm just running a basic thought or two past you.
Last edited by TRANSPONDER; 08-25-2014 at 01:58 PM..
philosophy used to justify things like what is the better flavor for humans, chocolate vs. vanilla, can really get twisted up. But talking about fats, carbo's, sugar's, and ect makes more sense. and leads to many "good" flavor's. Monism, dualism, or whatever phyilo will fallow and fit the data.
Data should not follow philosophy most times. In fact, if data follows the philosophy, like monism, we tend to lose sight of what is really going on around us. The reality gets distorted by a flawed philosophy. At our level of reality that is.
Ozzy . . . the atheists will always eventually resort to solipsism . . . despite it resounding defeat and refutation. A materialist or empirical reductionist is at heart a solipsist-in-hiding under the atheist label. I have been unable to understand how anyone can actually believe they do not exist as anything but individual chemical processes in a brain. It is something I am unable to have faith in. The only thing I know for certain is that I exist and I am not my brain or my body. Even Gaylen . . . who knows enough about the philosophical issues surrounding our sense of being . . . somehow manages to reconcile himself to such lack of existence. After all . . . when you say something is an illusion . . . you are saying it doesn't exist.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Gaylenwoof
For whatever it's worth: I don't think that "simulated consciousness" is a coherent concept. The problem, if there is one, is the simulation of conscious-like behavior. If consciousness is the first-person perspective of a physical system, then knowing whether an intelligent-acting machine is or is not conscious will be virtually impossible without an adequate theory of consciousness - i.e., without knowing the necessary and sufficient physical mechanisms of conscious. But if we can develop a good theory of consciousness, then we could say with reasonably high confidence (never 100% certainty) whether a certain intelligent machine is actually conscious - which is to say, that it actually experiences pain (verses merely behaving as-if in pain), etc.
Even though the type of "enactive" theory that I've suggested is still, at best, only a rough draft of what a good theory of consciousness might look like, I would say that if we build a machine that behaves as if it is conscious and consists of self-organizing networks that not only model "self and world" but also motivate the machine to predict and evaluate possible outcomes and choose behavior based on its needs, then I think we are fairly safe saying that this machine is conscious.
Quote:
Originally Posted by AREQUIPA
I am no philosopher, but my view on this is that the distinction between substance and property dualism is as much a chimera as the 'difference' between sub atomic particles with mass and those without. They are all the 'same Stuff'. Substance dualism is the claim that there are two fundamentally different kinds of substances in the world. Physical or material substances, which are, according to Descartes, known particularly by that they have spatial extension, and mental substances, which are non-extended in space and thinking.
Property dualism instead claims that there is only one kind of substance, material substance. There are however two different kinds of properties, physical properties and mental properties. The mental properties in this view cannot be reduced to physical states.
I am no philosopher, but my view on this is that the distinction between substance and property dualism is as much a chimera as the 'difference' between sub atomic particles with mass and those without. They are all the 'same Stuff'.
I am pleased that you are at least trying to deal with these issues, Arq. In a way we agree about the "same Stuff." That "Stuff" is field and it manifests in various vibratory "event" forms as energy/mass using our "measures." It is your reluctance to consider the "dark" manifestations that dominate our reality as the mental versions. I do not fool myself that your resistance is to my scientific knowledge or views. It is largely due to my spiritual views as reflected in my Christian posts. The anathema that is Christianity to you evokes a significant bias within you that seems to prevent you from parsing my scientific and philosophical views from my spiritual beliefs. It is the worst kind of guilt by association causing you to denigrate and demean my views and their intellectual legitimacy largely on the basis of my spiritual experiences and views. You are not alone in this . . . but it is very frustrating.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Gaylenwoof
The logical implications of substance and property dualism are significantly different. Christianity - and basically any form of religion that talks about disembodied souls (surviving the death of the body, transferring from one body to another, etc.) requires substance dualism. A "substance" (in philosophical lingo) is a type of thing that can, in principle, exist all by itself - its existence does not necessarily depend on other things. If consciousness is a different type of substance than physical entities, then consciousness could presumably exits without the physical world. Substance dualism, therefore, is not logically compatible with physicalism.
Property dualism, on the other hand, is consistent with physicalism - although things get complicated because people have radically different ideas about what "properties" are. (The classic division is said to be between Plato and Aristotle. My own view is more like Aristotle's.) When I talk about properties, I'm thinking of energy as the primary "substance" of reality, but I think of energy as having a variety of fundamental properties - brute properties that just "are what they are." You cannot have energy without these fundamental properties (the properties basically just define what energy "is" in essence) and you cannot have these properties without energy.
The Cheshire cat happens to be smiling. You could have the cat without the smile, but you can't have the smile without the cat (according to me). This is essentially the "Aristotelian" notion of properties (in contrast to Plato's notion of eternal "Forms".)
If, per chance, you find that the cat is smiling, then you can use your knowledge of the smile to help you "reverse engineer" the cat (so to speak). If you want to model the fundamental elements that constitute reality, then you need to build you model in such a way so that you can explain the possibility of smiling in terms of the model. If your model cannot explain the known data, then your model is incomplete at best, and it might be completely wrong.
In recent discussions the phrase "something more" has been popping up. With substance dualism (and with Platonic Forms), yes, there is "something more," but with a Aristotelian type of property dualism, then no, there is nothing more. If you think property dualism implies "something more" then you are missing the point of property dualism of the Aristotelian sort that I'm advocating (which is why I generally prefer other terms like "dual aspect theory" or "neutral monism" - the word "dualism" in "property dualism" throws people off and causes unnecessary confusion). We know that we are conscious - which is to say: we experience the world qualitatively. This is the basic data that we start with. This is the basic data from which we "reverse engineer" reality. Logically, we have no choice about starting with this immediate empirical data. The qualities of our "here/now" experience are the only data that we know without resorting to hypothetical "stuff" existing "in the past" and/or existing "out there" serving as the cause of our immediate experience.
Based on this immediately-known data, we have lots of good logical reasons to infer the existence of a "material world" out of which we are composed, and a system of "memory" by which we experientially "access the past" - that which presumably was, but is seemingly no longer present in our immediate experience. What we basically do is "build a model" of the external world; we theorize different types of "external" entities with various properties in order to help explain the qualitative data constituting our immediate experience. E.g., When I stick this pin in my finger, I feel this sensation that I call 'pain'. (BTW, notice the indexical word "this"). This sensation, along with countless other qualitative experiences form vast patterns of qualitative experience, and we take these patterns as further good evidence for the existence of an external world full of other people who experience similar patterns of experience, which leads us to the concept of "objectivity" - which we see upon reflection is ultimately based on the notion of inter-subjective agreement. In order to confidently label some entity X as "objectively real" we take a vote: We ask a bunch of people "Do you see X?" Each time someone answers "yes" our confidence in the objective reality of X is increased. We publish articles in peer-reviewed journals saying "I did steps 1, 2, and 3 and got X." Other people then follow the same steps to see if they get the same result. The result might be, for example, a certain type of spike on an oscilloscope. This empirical observation of the spike is a subjective qualitative visual experience. ALL data that we can possibly know anything about eventually boils down to our own subjective qualitative experience.
We cannot know "X" if we don't personally experience some pattern of subjective qualitative experiences that we interpret as "indicating the existence of X." Please try not to read anything "extra" into this. It is the simplest logic in the world. In fact, it is so simple that people seemingly can't believe I'm trying to explain something so obvious, so they imagine that I must be talking about something more complicated - something "extra". No, I'm not. What I'm pointing out is the simplest of things: You can't know anything about X unless you personally have some subjective/qualitative experience that you interpret as being "about X."
When we talk about building conscious robots, we are talking about how to build machines who can personally have subjective/qualitative experiences that they interpret as being "about" this or that. But you (I mean each and every one of you who is reading this) cannot correctly comprehend the question unless you personally reflect upon your own experience of "what it is like" for you personally to experience pain, etc. Your own personal experience - THIS qualitative experience HERE and NOW - is the basic data that our model of reality needs to explain if we are going to use this model as a guide to building conscious machines.
I propose that we CAN eventually put together a model of reality that explains this data in terms of physical energy, but only if we acknowledge the data for what it is, namely, the subjective/qualitative experience of "here" and "now" - which is exactly the sort of thing we compare to other people's experience (E.g., when you did steps 1, 2, and 3 did you see X?"), and only if we assign the correct properties to energy in our model. We already know that energy has a bunch of properties; in other words, we already accept property pluralism. We do not think we are engaging in "supernaturalism" just because we accept that energy has many different properties.
In the context of discussing the possibility of consciousness in robots, the point of "property dualism" is not to add "something more" to our ontology. The point is to assign a set of fundamental properties to our model of reality so that our model explains the EMPIRICAL data - i.e., the data of experience - which is ultimately rooted in our individual qualitative/subjective experiences - the very sorts of experience we believe that a conscious robot ought to have if it is to count as being conscious.
Yet again an excellent exposition . . . but on the distinction between substance and property dualism we seem to disagree, Gaylen. You have not fully accepted and internalized the "vibratory event" nature of reality. You acknowledge the qualitative as essential and fundamental to reality so we agree on that aspect. I also detect the recognition of some aspect of it in your use of "self and world" as intrinsic to modeling a machine that not only behaves as if it is conscious but actually is conscious. (I see that goal as quixotic, btw.)
Reality is comprised of "vibratory events" and any permanence is derived from the aggregate "standing wave" aspects of them. Ask yourself what distinguishes the "reality" of the wave that "wipes you out" when surfing from the other waves. Does it ever cease to be real? Does your experience of it as an essential aspect ever cease to be real? Is there any way to extricate you as real from the experience? Events like the creation of our conscious awareness take time. The measurement of anything using that awareness takes time and acknowledgement of them takes time. It is this unavoidable "passage" of time involved in the event nature of reality that creates all the confusion about impermanence and what is real.
Christianity - and basically any form of religion that talks about disembodied souls (surviving the death of the body, transferring from one body to another, etc.) requires substance dualism.
I've just noticed a mistake in what I said here. What I should have said was:
Christianity - and basically any form of religion that talks about disembodied souls (surviving the death of the body, transferring from one body to another, etc.) requires substance dualism or idealism (a form of monism in which something like "Mind" or "Consciousness" is the basic "stuff" of reality).
I think this would be closer to what MysticPhD would want to say. My own view (dual-aspect theory) could be seen as a form of idealism since it takes "proto-qualitative aspects" as fundamental to reality (qualia as the contents of conscious experience emerge as "what-it's-like-to-be" certain kinds of physical processes - specifically: I would model qualia as "dynamic attractors" emerging in self-organizing physical processes, such that these attractors represent "goals" that the system intends to achieve via acting in the world.
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