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"...though I have had to try to grapple with the concepts being argued, i have to ask whether they pose any significant question about the validity of science, the materialist default and in the end atheism.
Validity of science: The subjective nature of qualia is not necessarily inconsistent with the current methods or theories of science, but the question of how to build conscious machines does force us to confront the epistemological puzzle of how to empirically confirm that our machines actually experience "what it is like" to feel pain, etc. This will be a problem because there is an important distinction to be made between (1) Feeling pain and (2) "Behaving as if" feeling pain. The key point is that we need a theory of consciousness that allows us to predict which kinds of physical systems will feel pain, and which will only "behave as if" they feel pain. This will require qualitative research - roughly in the way that cognitive psychology employs qualitative research (i.e., you stimulate a part of the brain and ask "What does that feel like?") Generally speaking, physics in its current form does not handle qualitative research very well. The current theories of physics are focused explicitly on abstract quantitative models. I believe that the "bridge" between the qualitative research of psychology and the quantitative theories of physics will be the principles of dynamical systems (self-organization, etc.) plus (probably) a few other fundamental concepts that are yet to be found. (I predict that these "other fundamental concepts" will link the principles of self-organization with the brain dynamics and then, via cognitive psychology, brain dynamics will link to "qualia.") One thing to keep in mind: Scientific theories are models of reality. Logically, this always leaves some room for doubt. Any given theory could be wrong. Based on a seemingly good theory, scientist might say "This type of robot feels pain" and thus we would feel morally obligated to pass laws to ensure that we don't torture this type of robot. Later, a newer, better theory might imply that this type of robot does not feel pain after all. All empirical theories have to deal with various sources of uncertainty; a theory of consciousness will be no exception. In this case, I'm simply identifying one of the sources of uncertainty that will always plague theories of consciousness, namely: The subjective nature of qualitative experience.
The materialist default: Materialism is not a scientific theory, it is a philosophical position. As such, it is not the job of science to prove or disprove materialism. Philosophers will argue over it, but scientists and the general public don't need to argue over it unless they want to wade into the realm of philosophy (which is exactly what happen here when you folks want to frame questions in terms of theism vs. atheism or you want discuss whether or not there are limits to scientific knowledge).
Atheism: Almost all of the major philosophical theories of mind & reality (materialism, idealism, substance dualism, property dualism, etc.) are fully consistent with atheism. None of these positions logically imply the existence of any sort of "God" except for "theism" itself, insofar as someone might want to offer some version of theism as a "theory of mind." (I would say that this is essentially what MysticPhD's version of a "consciousness field" amounts to.) I previously suggested that property dualism is the best position for atheists because it avoids the logical problems with strict materialism, while still ruling out the existence of disembodied souls or a God made of "pure spirit" etc.
God is generally posited as supernatural. Supernatural is an inherently useless concept, for reasons we've gone into elsewhere -- the sound-byte version of that argument is that if it's above nature, it's outside of nature, and therefore nothing useful or interesting can be asserted by us natural beings, much less falsified or proven, so it's a waste of time to discuss.
As soon as you bring god into the natural world you make him subject to natural laws and therefore not god. .
I think I see.
I just don't see god being out side of nature. The universe may be alive and it may have been "born". In a natural way that is.
I think atheist and theist may both be correct and incorrect as humans often are. Theist have it right in that We are part of a larger system and some people can "feel it" more than others. Atheists have it right too in that "this god" is part of the natural evolution of the universe and did not go "poof there it is" or send anybody to hell.
If there is a god. To talk about it using things we don't know is a waste of time. I agree with that. But if a person does believe why wouldn't they describe it with what we do know?
Validity of science: The subjective nature of qualia is not necessarily inconsistent with the current methods or theories of science, but the question of how to build conscious machines does force us to confront the epistemological puzzle of how to empirically confirm that our machines actually experience "what it is like" to feel pain, etc. This will be a problem because there is an important distinction to be made between (1) Feeling pain and (2) "Behaving as if" feeling pain. The key point is that we need a theory of consciousness that allows us to predict which kinds of physical systems will feel pain, and which will only "behave as if" they feel pain. This will require qualitative research - roughly in the way that cognitive psychology employs qualitative research (i.e., you stimulate a part of the brain and ask "What does that feel like?") Generally speaking, physics in its current form does not handle qualitative research very well. The current theories of physics are focused explicitly on abstract quantitative models. I believe that the "bridge" between the qualitative research of psychology and the quantitative theories of physics will be the principles of dynamical systems (self-organization, etc.) plus (probably) a few other fundamental concepts that are yet to be found. (I predict that these "other fundamental concepts" will link the principles of self-organization with the brain dynamics and then, via cognitive psychology, brain dynamics will link to "qualia.") One thing to keep in mind: Scientific theories are models of reality. Logically, this always leaves some room for doubt. Any given theory could be wrong. Based on a seemingly good theory, scientist might say "This type of robot feels pain" and thus we would feel morally obligated to pass laws to ensure that we don't torture this type of robot. Later, a newer, better theory might imply that this type of robot does not feel pain after all. All empirical theories have to deal with various sources of uncertainty; a theory of consciousness will be no exception. In this case, I'm simply identifying one of the sources of uncertainty that will always plague theories of consciousness, namely: The subjective nature of qualitative experience.
The materialist default: Materialism is not a scientific theory, it is a philosophical position. As such, it is not the job of science to prove or disprove materialism. Philosophers will argue over it, but scientists and the general public don't need to argue over it unless they want to wade into the realm of philosophy (which is exactly what happen here when you folks want to frame questions in terms of theism vs. atheism or you want discuss whether or not there are limits to scientific knowledge).
Atheism: Almost all of the major philosophical theories of mind & reality (materialism, idealism, substance dualism, property dualism, etc.) are fully consistent with atheism. None of these positions logically imply the existence of any sort of "God" except for "theism" itself, insofar as someone might want to offer some version of theism as a "theory of mind." (I would say that this is essentially what MysticPhD's version of a "consciousness field" amounts to.) I previously suggested that property dualism is the best position for atheists because it avoids the logical problems with strict materialism, while still ruling out the existence of disembodied souls or a God made of "pure spirit" etc.
Great summation.
I agree, they will link atoms, to molecules, to awareness in the future. The chemist will describe the atom interactions within the brain that makes you. Biology will describe the physiology of the brain that makes the "you" in you. But we will most certainly need psychology to mange those interactions to a degree.
Validity of science: The subjective nature of qualia is not necessarily inconsistent with the current methods or theories of science, but the question of how to build conscious machines does force us to confront the epistemological puzzle of how to empirically confirm that our machines actually experience "what it is like" to feel pain, etc. This will be a problem because there is an important distinction to be made between (1) Feeling pain and (2) "Behaving as if" feeling pain. The key point is that we need a theory of consciousness that allows us to predict which kinds of physical systems will feel pain, and which will only "behave as if" they feel pain. This will require qualitative research - roughly in the way that cognitive psychology employs qualitative research (i.e., you stimulate a part of the brain and ask "What does that feel like?") Generally speaking, physics in its current form does not handle qualitative research very well. The current theories of physics are focused explicitly on abstract quantitative models. I believe that the "bridge" between the qualitative research of psychology and the quantitative theories of physics will be the principles of dynamical systems (self-organization, etc.) plus (probably) a few other fundamental concepts that are yet to be found. (I predict that these "other fundamental concepts" will link the principles of self-organization with the brain dynamics and then, via cognitive psychology, brain dynamics will link to "qualia.") One thing to keep in mind: Scientific theories are models of reality. Logically, this always leaves some room for doubt. Any given theory could be wrong. Based on a seemingly good theory, scientist might say "This type of robot feels pain" and thus we would feel morally obligated to pass laws to ensure that we don't torture this type of robot. Later, a newer, better theory might imply that this type of robot does not feel pain after all. All empirical theories have to deal with various sources of uncertainty; a theory of consciousness will be no exception. In this case, I'm simply identifying one of the sources of uncertainty that will always plague theories of consciousness, namely: The subjective nature of qualitative experience.
That is certainly a relevant point - how can we verify that a machine really has consciousness - not that it reacts like a human, but that it is conscious and thinking. The philosophy asks the question and science has to provide an answer. I would imagine that it isn't too hard to see that the machine is thinking, asking questions and suggesting answers.(1)
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The materialist default: Materialism is not a scientific theory, it is a philosophical position. As such, it is not the job of science to prove or disprove materialism. Philosophers will argue over it, but scientists and the general public don't need to argue over it unless they want to wade into the realm of philosophy (which is exactly what happen here when you folks want to frame questions in terms of theism vs. atheism or you want discuss whether or not there are limits to scientific knowledge).
A philosophical position or as I tend to say a logical position. But is is a position we take on the basis of what science has been able to tell us. The problem with Russel's teapot is that he took the philosophical position and rather overlooked the scientific improbability of a teapot in orbit.
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Atheism:
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Almost all of the major philosophical theories of mind & reality (materialism, idealism, substance dualism, property dualism, etc.) are fully consistent with atheism. None of these positions logically imply the existence of any sort of "God" except for "theism" itself, insofar as someone might want to offer some version of theism as a "theory of mind." (I would say that this is essentially what MysticPhD's version of a "consciousness field" amounts to.) I previously suggested that property dualism is the best position for atheists because it avoids the logical problems with strict materialism, while still ruling out the existence of disembodied souls or a God made of "pure spirit" etc.
I agree. The whole Hard question arose because Mystic argued that dualism discredited materialistic naturalism as the logical default and thus atheism lost its logical basis. That everything was as it was through natural causes (so far as evidence and what we knew told us) and there was no reason to suppose that a 'god' was involved in any of it.
Your very patient and helpful teaching helped me to get a rather improvised handle on the subject, and I have to say that I thought a lot of what came up had some answers in biology and ignoring that aspect left philosophy with questions that had answers or were really not in the realm of philosophy - the how and why of the reaction of the (Chalmer) zombie at the waterfall, you remember.
The basic of science not having an answer now did not mean that it could never ever have an answer, which was the nub of Mystic's case for discrediting the materialist default. That was when I knew that his argument had no sound basis.
As I said, I have thought a bit further and, being a rather practical rather than philosophic thinker, I am thinking of the universe of (illusory - but reliable) matter rather than philosophic questions, it occurred to me that the dualists, monists and modified dualists were arguing about a difference that was no difference.
Or at least seemed to me to make no difference to the materialist default, because I take your point about the questions of the nature of experience rather than the atoms of sweetness passing over the tongue.
Maybe I should go back and read the objections to Searle's theory, but I have to keep focussed on what relates to the atheist mission statement and having seen that the hard question does not really help tilt probability away from from a universe of nature to a universe of 'God' I am willing to leave questions about the nature of experience to the philosophers. or perhaps, in due time, the biologists.
(1) Enterprise to the rescue. (If you can use Klingon technology, I can use this ) "That thing isn't really intelligent, Spock! It can't love!"
"Irrelevant doctor. Love is merely an evolved biological urge to reproduction. It is nothing to do with consciousness, let alone intelligence."
(McCoy's response cannot be printed being now classified as racist hate -speech)
Last edited by TRANSPONDER; 08-27-2014 at 03:05 AM..
I agree, they will link atoms, to molecules, to awareness in the future. The chemist will describe the atom interactions within the brain that makes you. Biology will describe the physiology of the brain that makes the "you" in you. But we will most certainly need psychology to mange those interactions to a degree.
That is what I'd expect based on previous work. They may find evidence of 'Something more' but there is no good reason why we should look for it, other than some people with a Bible in hand looking for 'Spoor of God'. Philosophy will ask questions that science probably wouldn't think of, but it can't provide the answers (I have reservations about philosophy that tries to do the job of scientific research with Mind Experiments) and it is the job of science to find those.
I mean wow! I couldn't agree more. I guess I am so pragmatic that it hinders my ability to talk about philosophy not anchored in the standard model and other things measured in science.
For example. I believe, at the very least the earth can be looked at as a large "cell" and "we" may be its brain cells. But this "crazy philosophy" of mine is anchored in something. Why can't Christians say "He didn't rise like they said a gazillion years ago. But that's not the point anyway." I would find that statement a valid stance. And refreshing for many philosophical reasons.
I think that we have "unseen" things interacting with "us" that may be effecting what we do. For example neutrino's. Also, Although I am not sold on all the takes on dark matter yet. If it is around us then there could be a earth "around" or "on" us. And some of us feel "it" and misinterpreted it as 'an infinite god". This feeling may not be wrong in that it is big, so big in fact they call it "infinite". For example: Sitting a computer on a large metal plate for static discharge considerations. The "ground" for static electrically (small potentials) only has to be something much larger than the object your grounding. "the ground" looks infinite to the small groups of moving electrons. But it's not a magical "poof there it is" god.
Back to the OP, using things I stated above. I think we will put "awareness" in a "computer". "awareness" just may need complexity in a small volume and many interactions over short time frames. It will not be A.I. in that it is not "artificial" at all. We were made by "proteins" in fact we can be looked at as a bag of proteins. And these "bags of proteins" made another life form.
The new life form may not think like us because the brain "we gave it" works a little differently. The pathways and chemical massagers may be different so the thought processes may be different. But "it is" us for many reasons.
Bla bla bla.
Sorry for the poor writing skillz. I hpe it makes some sense.
Last edited by Arach Angle; 08-27-2014 at 06:03 AM..
Reason: same ol same ol
I previously suggested that property dualism is the best position for atheists because it avoids the logical problems with strict materialism
Wait, how does it avoid the logical problems you've mentioned again? Physicalism is perfectly OK saying that we don't understand everything about how the brain works - isn't that all that property dualism has to offer as well? Or does property dualism actually try to explain anything?
I mean wow! I couldn't agree more. I guess I am so pragmatic that it hinders my ability to talk about philosophy not anchored in the standard model and other things measured in science.
For example. I believe, at the very least the earth can be looked at as a large "cell" and "we" may be its brain cells. But this "crazy philosophy" of mine is anchored in something. Why can't Christians say "He didn't rise like they said a gazillion years ago. But that's not the point anyway." I would find that statement a valid stance. And refreshing for many philosophical reasons.
I think that we have "unseen" things interacting with "us" that may be effecting what we do. For example neutrino's. Also, Although I am not sold on all the takes on dark matter yet. If it is around us then there could be a earth "around" or "on" us. And some of us feel "it" and misinterpreted it as 'an infinite god". This feeling may not be wrong in that it is big, so big in fact they call it "infinite". For example: Sitting a computer on a large metal plate for static discharge considerations. The "ground" for static electrically (small potentials) only has to be something much larger than the object your grounding. "the ground" looks infinite to the small groups of moving electrons. But it's not a magical "poof there it is" god.
Back to the OP, using things I stated above. I think we will put "awareness" in a "computer". "awareness" just may need complexity in a small volume and many interactions over short time frames. It will not be A.I. in that it is not "artificial" at all. We were made by "proteins" in fact we can be looked at as a bag of proteins. And these "bags of proteins" made another life form.
The new life form may not think like us because the brain "we gave it" works a little differently. The pathways and chemical massagers may be different so the thought processes may be different. But "it is" us for many reasons.
Bla bla bla.
Sorry for the poor writing skillz. I hpe it makes some sense.
Yes. All these are possibilities, more or less feasible. The atheists reservation of belief position allows me to note them without the problem of having to either reject or buy -in. I know that was a real problem for me in the pre -atheist days when all sorts of way out theories were being propunded and I was faced with a believe or not choice which was actually a false one. Oddly, interested and even sympathtic non -belief does not come naturally and has to be learned.
Unless the theory fails on the basis of what we know, it can be put in the pending tray until some tests can be devised. NDE's and OOB's are in this category, much though the Believers would like us to buy in NOW - not only to the reality of the experience but the religious implications they attach to them.
NDE's ... Some would say theoretically we may/could take a 250 ml beaker of a colored water solution and determine how the drops were added. This notion can easily be extended to our lives in the 250 mega mega light liter universal beaker. I am a "human experience" in a "spiritual universe". "spiritual" here being used as a metaphor. Sub in any word that floats our boat. because in reality, there is no water.
Wait, how does it avoid the logical problems you've mentioned again? Physicalism is perfectly OK saying that we don't understand everything about how the brain works - isn't that all that property dualism has to offer as well? Or does property dualism actually try to explain anything?
A strict materialist has to find some way to deny that Mary - the futuristic neuroscientist who knows every third-person-accessible fact that there is to know about brain science, but who has never had the first-person visual experience of seeing "red" - doesn't gain any new understanding of "red" when she finally sees the color directly for herself. According to strict materialism, Mary's first-person experience of what it is like to see red is completely reducible to the objective information that she learned about red by studying the brains of other people who can see red, so there is nothing new for her to learn if she ever sees red with her own eyes. Perhaps it is obvious to you that Mary gains no new understanding of red when she sees it for herself, but it is not obvious to me. In fact, I think that all materialist attempts to explain this away end up with one of 3 results:
(1) Absurd (eliminative materialism)
(2) Property dualism, or a hidden form of property dualism (no longer "strictly" materialist)
(3) Completely unhelpful (the "promissory note" saying "I don't have a clue how this can be done, but I have faith that future science will somehow be able to completely reduce qualia to third-person facts.") To me, the third option seems structurally too much like "God works in mysterious ways." Sure you can pick that option, but I don't see it as being the best we can do.
Property dualism (like materialism) is not a scientific theory, and it doesn't actually "solve" the engineering problem of how to build brains that are capable of seeing "red" or "feeling pain," but I think it does serve as the most reasonable philosophical position to take. Basically I'm saying that strict materialism is not the best metaphysical "default" position - rather, property dualism is the best default position because it identifies "seeing red" with a physical process (pretty much what materialists want to do), but it also explains why Mary understands something new about "red" when she finally sees it with her own eyes. She learns what it is like to BE a physical system experiencing the visual sensation of "seeing red." When she was studying other people's brains, she was learning everything that can be learned objectively about "seeing red" but she was not learning everything there is to know about seeing red because she was not learning what it is like to subjectively BE an "experiencer of "red". To actually experience "red" she had to go beyond what she could learn via purely objective means. She had to become a red-seeing subject. To me this is so trivially obvious that I can't understand why I should even have to explain it.
Based on other posts in various threads, I suspect you want to pick option #3, but you've said a few things that make me think that, if you really studied the philosophical arguments in detail, you'd end up supporting option #2 - but that's just a guess.
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and having seen that the hard question does not really help tilt probability away from from a universe of nature to a universe of 'God' I am willing to leave questions about the nature of experience to the philosophers. or perhaps, in due time, the biologists.
) "That thing isn't really intelligent, Spock! It can't love!" 
