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I don't think I ever said that we needed a "simple" conversion factor. I used the example of simple "units of measure" only as an analogy and/or simple example of the sort of problem that I see. Hopefully my previous post gives a slightly more involved (although still very simplified) example of what I'm looking for. For any given explanation to seem adequate (and even in the hardest-core sciences, different people still argue over what is or is not a successful explanation because different people have different intuitions about what is adequate), a set of concepts is required, and these concepts generally have to be applied in complicated ways. Generally speaking, a breakthrough in explanatory power requires more than a simple conversion factor - although sometimes some surprisingly simple new conversion factors could play a role.
What will probably happen is that when we can see the state of the brain we will be able to say the person is most likely feeling "this"/"that". and the "other". I wonder if it could be seen in the fluxuation in the em field.
What will probably happen is that when we can see the state of the brain we will be able to say the person is most likely feeling "this"/"that". and the "other". I wonder if it could be seen in the fluxuation in the em field.
Even when we have that, people looking to rationalize feelings that consciousness must be special will break out the "it is only a correlation" mantra. Sure, it is a correlation which is always there every time we look, but that doesn't "logically prove" that it is the same thing as consciousness. Of course this doesn't apply anywhere else - they're fine practically ignoring the problem of induction anywhere else, but in this case it gives them cover to keep on believing there's something magical there that only abstract philosophy will figure out.
I don't think I ever said that we needed a "simple" conversion factor. I used the example of simple "units of measure" only as an analogy and/or simple example of the sort of problem that I see. Hopefully my previous post gives a slightly more involved (although still very simplified) example of what I'm looking for. For any given explanation to seem adequate (and even in the hardest-core sciences, different people still argue over what is or is not a successful explanation because different people have different intuitions about what is adequate), a set of concepts is required, and these concepts generally have to be applied in complicated ways. Generally speaking, a breakthrough in explanatory power requires more than a simple conversion factor - although sometimes some surprisingly simple new conversion factors could play a role.
Sure, the models we have of brain functions are incomplete. I'm still not seeing how that relates to your hope that fundamental physics will need to change to accommodate those models. As you've said, lots of scientific models already handle subjectivity without any problem, so what's the issue here?
Ok, for a simple model of the logical structure that I have in mind, I will define "running" as: a rhythmic motion of mass through space. (Obviously there are a lot more aspects to running, but if you don't get the basic idea from this simple model, then adding other aspects to the definition won't help.)
I doubt you'd be OK with excluding subjective experience from a model of consciousness, so I'm not sure why excluding a huge part of what makes running running is OK here.
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Physics already has terms for mass. We can, for example, measure mass in grams.
Physics already has terms for motion. Newton's equations would be sufficient here.
To get mass into motion, we need something to cause changes in the spatial location of mass over time. Luckily...
Physics already has terms for expressing changes in the spatial location of mass over time. The concept of force is useful here. Once again Newton's equations are sufficient for our purposes. (E.g., F=ma)
Sure, I know what basic units are and how they are related. The question was not what scientists have discovered. It was how you logically derive these, as you expect to be able to do for the science related to consciousness. Wasn't that the whole point of the logical deduction argument you were making? All I'm seeing here is a history of empirical science, which is pretty far away from logical deduction from abstract principles like you were talking about earlier.
The growth of trees correlate to an up field. Why look around, at that bush, at that animal, and the building over there. They can see what happens happen you chop it in half but they can't make the connections.
Even when we have that, people looking to rationalize feelings that consciousness must be special will break out the "it is only a correlation" mantra. Sure, it is a correlation which is always there every time we look, but that doesn't "logically prove" that it is the same thing as consciousness. Of course this doesn't apply anywhere else - they're fine practically ignoring the problem of induction anywhere else, but in this case it gives them cover to keep on believing there's something magical there that only abstract philosophy will figure out.
Yes, philosophers will insist that correlations - even perfectly consistent correlations - do not logically prove identity (or even causation, for that matter). There are various reasons why certain entities might be correlated. One of these reasons might be an underlying identity (e.g., The inverse correlation: Whenever you see Superman, you don't see Clark Kent), but identity is not the only possible reason for correlation, so, logically, to establish identity you need to consider factors beyond just correlation. But, as a matter of fact, this is basically irrelevant to my proposal because I accept the underlying identity between qualia and physical correlates.
But the identity of two things is not always obvious. To Lois Lane it is not obvious that Superman is Clark Kent. The reason is simple: A given entity can appear different under different circumstances. This, in itself, is no big mystery. We live with this basic fact of reality on a daily basis. If identities were always obvious, we'd have no need for science, or criminal investigations, etc.
Part of establishing that A and B are identical involves explaining why A and B appear to be different under different circumstances. If you can give satisfactory explanations for why A and B appear different under various circumstances, then, for all practical purposes, you can use consistent correlations as practical inductive evidence that A and B are, in fact, identical.
We both agree that neural correlations with qualitative experience are signs of an underlying identity. You and your friends can study my neural activity in various ways and judge that I am in pain. I could look at the same data you’re looking at and agree – “Yup, those are textbook examples of the neural correlates for pain!” But I have a unique relationship with the neural process that we agree is an example of a neural correlate of tissue damage. My situation is unique because I am the only one who is composed of this neural activity.
In principle, this unique relationship that I have with this neural process would not have to cause puzzlement of any sort. If none of us ever had any subjective/qualitative feelings of pain, then I would study the data concerning my neural activity and I would conclude, just like you do, that these neural correlates are related to tissue damage or some sort of physiological imbalance, and that would be the end of the story. I would have no special perspective on the neural activity; I would have no insights into the activity that you don’t have. But my proposal is that I do have some insights that you don’t have. I have a type of access to empirical data that you do not have. Indeed, it’s not just that you don’t have access to this particular perspective on the data, rather, you cannot, even principle, have access to this perspective on the data. This is because the unique perspective that I have stems from the recursive, self-referencing mode of my access to the neural activity. You are studying “someone else” and I am studying myself. I am the only one who can stand in a self-referencing relationship to my own neural activity, so I am the only one who can achieve this perspective on the data. I can feel this pain because I am composed of the neural activity that constitutes this pain.
We are both studying the one-and-same neural activity, and we are both dealing with empirical knowledge, but I can take a particular perspective on this physical activity that you cannot. I can access the feeling of what it is like to be composed of this particular activity.
But my proposal is that I do have some insights that you don’t have.
And yet you're just as confused as everyone else about the mechanisms behind your feelings of what it is like to feel an experience. Claims of insight are easy - demonstrating them are an entirely different story. So far all you've given us is someone else's creative writing exercises about imaginary omniscient scientists and so on and statements that you don't have a clue what it is that is missing from current models of brain function. So how exactly is this alleged insight actually benefiting you in your quest compared to everyone else?
Everyone else who by the way also have conscious experiences just like you. Plus years of professional experience studying the subject and doing research first hand.
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We are both studying the one-and-same neural activity, and we are both dealing with empirical knowledge, but I can take a particular perspective on this physical activity that you cannot. I can access the feeling of what it is like to be composed of this particular activity.
Yeah, and we know for a fact that those feelings provide misleading information about the details of actual brain function. So while they will have to be explained by a model of brain function, having them doesn't give one special insight into what that model will be, no matter how hard you sit and think about the problem.
I have a type of access to empirical data that you do not have. Indeed, it’s not just that you don’t have access to this particular perspective on the data, rather, you cannot, even principle, have access to this perspective on the data.
I take this back. Technically, there is a way in which you can access this perspective. Given a type of technology that allows different brains to form a unified composite neural net, there might be a way in which "you" could feel "my" qualitative sensations of pain. But there is a catch. I put "you" and "my" in scare quotes because, in this case, the standard borders between "you" and "me" would dissolve. Actually, to be honest, I don't believe that there ever is any actual barrier between "you" and "me." Not every boarder is necessarily a barrier (e.g., a political border between nations does not have to be a barrier). So to "dissolve" a border between individuals could be appropriately be described as "lifting barriers of amnesia." In other words, the borders between my identity as an individual and your identity as an individual are not absolute metaphysical barriers (we are not eternally individuated "souls" in the Christian sense). The border between you and me is a type of "amnesia" imposed by the fact that our neural nets are separated. (We are, in some sense, sorta like Roger Sperry's "split brain" patients, only in our case the "split" is the seemingly complete separation of your neural net from mine.)
Thus, what I should have said was something along these lines: "...you cannot, even in principle, have access to this perspective on the data, so long as our neural nets are functionally isolated."
This also suggests a means by which we might someday be able to test our theories of consciousness in a fairly direct fashion. If/when we ever have technology that allows us to connect our neural nets to other brains (be they natural brains, or AI systems), we could determine by direct inspection whether or not the system "feels things".
I take this back. Technically, there is a way in which you can access this perspective. Given a type of technology that allows different brains to form a unified composite neural net, there might be a way in which "you" could feel "my" qualitative sensations of pain. But there is a catch. I put "you" and "my" in scare quotes because, in this case, the standard borders between "you" and "me" would dissolve. Actually, to be honest, I don't believe that there ever is any actual barrier between "you" and "me." Not every boarder is necessarily a barrier (e.g., a political border between nations does not have to be a barrier). So to "dissolve" a border between individuals could be appropriately be described as "lifting barriers of amnesia." In other words, the borders between my identity as an individual and your identity as an individual are not absolute metaphysical barriers (we are not eternally individuated "souls" in the Christian sense). The border between you and me is a type of "amnesia" imposed by the fact that our neural nets are separated. (We are, in some sense, sorta like Roger Sperry's "split brain" patients, only in our case the "split" is the seemingly complete separation of your neural net from mine.)
Thus, what I should have said was something along these lines: "...you cannot, even in principle, have access to this perspective on the data, so long as our neural nets are functionally isolated."
This also suggests a means by which we might someday be able to test our theories of consciousness in a fairly direct fashion. If/when we ever have technology that allows us to connect our neural nets to other brains (be they natural brains, or AI systems), we could determine by direct inspection whether or not the system "feels things".
been said already. you are just rewording it.
just how is your net isolated? when they are almost the same from structure to connections to the surroundings as mine? now you and kc are connect through the computer interNET. The pathway may be different but what is going on is the same in the internet and nueronet.
it is just like telling you if this "up field existed then the trunks of the trees would not have to be as thick". But I guess that extra base is needed to tap into/resonate with the up field.
Yeah, and we know for a fact that those feelings provide misleading information about the details of actual brain function.
Yes, subjective experience can be misleading in some very important ways, but there are limits to the ways in which these introspective insights can be misleading. If, in fact, it seems to me that I am experiencing pain, then the qualitative nature of whatever it is that I'm experiencing just is what it is. I might be wrong about what is causing the experience, and I might use the wrong word to label the experience, but the qualitative experience, at some level, just is what it is.
These qualitative moments are what the neuroscientists are trying to correlate with neural activity, so there better be something informative and reasonably reliable about our subjective experiences - otherwise all of the projects seeking neural correlates is total waste of time.
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I wonder if it could be seen in the fluxuation in the em field.
