Consciousness in a robot? (believe, reject, experience, genesis)

[Arach Angle]

I inject one chemical and your "subjective feeling" can be complexly different. That says a lot. It says what we see is directly connected to the "physical". it may not be it all, but when we know more we will find more particles. We are at a cool quite place in the universe. We just don't know if "our cool" is absolutely cool. Like pouring liquid nitrogen on a cool stove looks very similar to pouring water on a hot stove.

[Sophronius]

Yes good point the world wouldn't be cool or ideal , esp alongside biology and so on.

[KCfromNC]

Originally Posted by Gaylenwoof

I'm puzzled by your last sentence because it seems to me that everything you said just prior to this sentence establishes the "cannot":

Not being able to share an explanation using a framework which is inherently unable to share things doesn't mean that there isn't an explanation. It just means that the explanation won't be in these fuzzy subjectivity terms that you hope they will be. That is, a scientific explanation of brain function isn't going to involve getting together and somehow sharing feelings which are defined as the people pimping them as inherently impossible to share.

This doesn't mean that we have to give up on naturalistic explanation and become theists. It simply means that future physics may have to accept another fundamental premise (one that it currently does not address). I can't say exactly what this new fundamental premise has to be; all I can do is point to the general ballpark and say it will need to be "qualitative" or "proto-qualitative".

Again, I can't agree or disagree because this is saying nothing at all.

It simply accepts that self-referencing systems of certain types have subjective properties (phenomenal raw feels) that cannot be fully reduced to objective models.

Something no one has any reason to accept.

Nothing has to be added, ontologically, to the fundamental stuff of the universe. Qualia are not some sorts of things in addition to physical entities; qualia are simply aspects of the physical world that cannot be fully understood purely in terms of objective models.

Again, no reason to think this. This seems to get back to the problem of confusing understanding with having a feeling.

qualia are simply aspects of the physical world that cannot be experienced except subjectively by individuals who experience them directly for themselves, and thus we have an epistemological problem explaining them using purely objective mathematical models or terminology.

Here you're conflating explaining the mechanisms of having feelings with evoking the feelings themselves. Two different things entirely. Explaining the mechanisms of flight doesn't need to create the experience of flight in the listener to be a correct model. Likewise with explanations of brain function.

(We can reference their objective aspects - they are, after all, physical processes - we just have trouble referencing their subjective aspects using objective models and language. The only way we can reference their subjective aspects is subjectively - via our own introspective means.)

Or more simply, we can only feel feelings by feeling them. That seems to be true by definition, but it doesn't really add much to the discussion. It is a fact that will have to be explained by empirical models of brain function but doesn't really have much to do with science as we know it being incapable of creating an explanation.

[Gaylenwoof]

Originally Posted by Arach Angle

I inject one chemical and your "subjective feeling" can be complexly different. That says a lot.

Yes, it does say a lot. This is why I say that qualia are physical processes.

It says what we see is directly connected to the "physical".

In fact, I would use stronger terms. I would say that what we see (or what we qualitatively experience) is not just "connected to" or "correlated with" the physical, but rather, I would say that our experience ARE physical. This is a strong identity claim - a full-tilt form of monism. Sometimes I will use terminology like "the physical correlates of qualia," but what I mean by "correlation" is not a dualistic correlation between two different kinds of things, e.g., physical -->non-physical or physical type A --> physical type B. What I mean by "correlation" in "the physical correlates of qualia" is a correlation between two perspectives. This is a subtle point that people often get confused about. Suppose you and Mary (the super-neuroscientist) are both looking at live footage of a race car filmed from two different perspectives. Your visual data and Mary's visual data are correlated. When you see the car turn, she sees the car turn. The correlation of visual data is explained by the fact that there is only one thing - the car - that you are both viewing.

Something analogous happens when Mary views your neural activity while you touch an ice cube. You feel the sensation of coolness on your fingertips; Mary sees data related to biochemical and biomechanical activity spreading out from your fingertips to your brain. The two perspectives are radically different, but they are nevertheless two perspectives on the one-and-same physical process.

But there is, of course, a profound difference between the race car viewing and the qualia perceiving. In principle, you and Mary can swap perspectives on the race car (you can look at her monitor, and vice versa). This is not strictly possible with qualia. In the case of qualia, you can see what Mary sees in the same way that you can adopt her perspective on the race car, but Mary cannot (even in principle) adopt your perspective - feel your feeling - of the ice cube. (I would say that this is trivial self-evident logic.) Mary can touch an ice cube and feel something that is qualitatively similar to what you feel when you touch the ice cube, but since your qualia is part of a self-referential process for you, and Mary's qualia are a self-referential process for her, she cannot perceive your self-referential process from your perspective, thus she cannot perceive your qualia from your perspective. This ought to seem like an incredibly trivial logical fact.

The jargon term 'qualia' was specifically designed by philosophers to get at - as best as we can - the asymmetrical nature of this way of experiencing qualia. Some philosophers have used this concept to defend substance dualism, but their argument fall apart because the concept of qualia can just as well be used to defend various forms of dual-aspect monism (which is the approach I take).

The mind-boggling problem is to figure out the best why to characterize this epistemologically asymmetrical dual-aspect nature of qualia using only the objective mathematical models and terms of current physics. I say that this simply cannot be done without introducing qualitative concepts in a fundamental way. I do not see anything in current physics (e.g., electron volts, mass, momentum, gravitational field values, etc.) that can do this job. The really hard (maybe impossible?) task I'm pursuing is to figure out how to introduce qualitative concepts into the fundamental theoretical structure of physics. What the heck sort of fundamental property of physics could yield explanatory insight into the subjective/qualitative nature of experience? If I understand KC correctly, I think he's been saying that what I'm trying to do is simply impossible, and thus basically nonsensical. He certainly could be correct. I could be chasing a rainbow. In any case I predict that algorithmically-driven machines will not experience qualitative feelings, even if they can successfully pass a Turing test and compose poetry. The machine might slap words on paper and reader's might interpret these words as expressions of the machine's feelings but, in reality, the machine will not adopt the qualitative feeling perspective and will, thus, not be "conscious" in the common sense of the term. Now, if we start to nano-engineer self-organizing processes capable of self-reference, then machine consciousness becomes a possibility.

[KCfromNC]

Originally Posted by Gaylenwoof

If I understand KC correctly, I think he's been saying that what I'm trying to do is simply impossible, and thus basically nonsensical.

No, I simply have no idea what you think you're trying to add to physics. There's lots of great flowery writing but nothing is described in a way that I could identify it even if you succeeded. Given this, I have no way of knowing if what you're trying to add to science is nonsensical or not - it is at this point so vague you could be talking about anything.

[Arach Angle]

Originally Posted by Gaylenwoof

Yes, it does say a lot. This is why I say that qualia are physical processes. In fact, I would use stronger terms. I would say that what we see (or what we qualitatively experience) is not just "connected to" or "correlated with" the physical, but rather, I would say that our experience ARE physical. This is a strong identity claim - a full-tilt form of monism. Sometimes I will use terminology like "the physical correlates of qualia," but what I mean by "correlation" is not a dualistic correlation between two different kinds of things, e.g., physical -->non-physical or physical type A --> physical type B. What I mean by "correlation" in "the physical correlates of qualia" is a correlation between two perspectives. This is a subtle point that people often get confused about. Suppose you and Mary (the super-neuroscientist) are both looking at live footage of a race car filmed from two different perspectives. Your visual data and Mary's visual data are correlated. When you see the car turn, she sees the car turn. The correlation of visual data is explained by the fact that there is only one thing - the car - that you are both viewing.

Something analogous happens when Mary views your neural activity while you touch an ice cube. You feel the sensation of coolness on your fingertips; Mary sees data related to biochemical and biomechanical activity spreading out from your fingertips to your brain. The two perspectives are radically different, but they are nevertheless two perspectives on the one-and-same physical process.

But there is, of course, a profound difference between the race car viewing and the qualia perceiving. In principle, you and Mary can swap perspectives on the race car (you can look at her monitor, and vice versa). This is not strictly possible with qualia. In the case of qualia, you can see what Mary sees in the same way that you can adopt her perspective on the race car, but Mary cannot (even in principle) adopt your perspective - feel your feeling - of the ice cube. (I would say that this is trivial self-evident logic.) Mary can touch an ice cube and feel something that is qualitatively similar to what you feel when you touch the ice cube, but since your qualia is part of a self-referential process for you, and Mary's qualia are a self-referential process for her, she cannot perceive your self-referential process from your perspective, thus she cannot perceive your qualia from your perspective. This ought to seem like an incredibly trivial logical fact.

Yes, yes and yes. We have to base everything off of this notion because it is all we have. period ... the end. This has been repeated many many times by myself and others.

Originally Posted by Gaylenwoof

The jargon term 'qualia' was specifically designed by philosophers to get at - as best as we can - the asymmetrical nature of this way of experiencing qualia. Some philosophers have used this concept to defend substance dualism, but their argument fall apart because the concept of qualia can just as well be used to defend various forms of dual-aspect monism (which is the approach I take).

Philosophers understand philosophy. Basically they understand the end result of a sum total of events to a degree. They do not, as shown by this discussion understand what engineering is past the definition. I do not mean that to mean...lol ... that's funny. srry. mean to be mean ... lmao. Its just that I have to draw a line when you are telling us this stuff and it does not fit into what is known and it is anchored in what is not known.

Originally Posted by Gaylenwoof

he mind-boggling problem is to figure out the best why to characterize this epistemologically asymmetrical dual-aspect nature of qualia using only the objective mathematical models and terms of current physics.

We can't yet. But to say we never will is not a valid claim. Saying we never will is based on what you don't know. And just because you, or I, don't know doesn't mean impossible. Also, I think you are basing some of this stuff on binary (1s and 0s). It is what you see, not me. You are looking at the outside of the computer. The "body" is not important.

Your brain is not binary. But like 1s and 0s are stored in the state of the transistor (look into electronics) your "information" is stored in molecule states (the 3rd, 4th order of shape is wny we can't reproduce them yet by the way) . It is more complex than binary for one and subtle changes in the protein shape can cause major changes in thoughts.

We may never "make and equation", but we might make the "thoughts". It may not be 1 equation but 100 equations, or 10,000 equations, 10^14 equations per second. Like ch4 + O2 --> CO2 + H2O +E does not describe gas fire place. Or put and equation to a quark. to limit you stance to "equations only" to validate your position is like saying boat can only go where it is anchored. While true, the problem is you have no anchor. likr Kc said you are just floating around, sure it is in a direction, but your just floating.

When you "stop the equations" in the "now" they can look completly different then when "running". Think time lapse and or high speed movies.

Originally Posted by Gaylenwoof

I say that this simply cannot be done without introducing qualitative concepts in a fundamental way. I do not see anything in current physics (e.g., electron volts, mass, momentum, gravitational field values, etc.) that can do this job. The really hard (maybe impossible?) task I'm pursuing is to figure out how to introduce qualitative concepts into the fundamental theoretical structure of physics. What the heck sort of fundamental property of physics could yield explanatory insight into the subjective/qualitative nature of experience? If I understand KC correctly, I think he's been saying that what I'm trying to do is simply impossible, and thus basically nonsensical. He certainly could be correct. I could be chasing a rainbow. In any case I predict that algorithmically-driven machines will not experience qualitative feelings, even if they can successfully pass a Turing test and compose poetry. The machine might slap words on paper and reader's might interpret these words as expressions of the machine's feelings but, in reality, the machine will not adopt the qualitative feeling perspective and will, thus, not be "conscious" in the common sense of the term. Now, if we start to nano-engineer self-organizing processes capable of self-reference, then machine consciousness becomes a possibility.

You can't ... yet. You are too far away to see it. It is like asking an artist to build that impossibly nice building he just drew. It great on paper ... we can't build it yet. In fact, on earth we never can. Its that artist, no matter what he claims, lack of understanding about what he just did.

Mary can't self reference me because she is not me. But you have to understand that "we" are "us" and we can self reference me and Mary. There is data that would support that notion. What you are doing is trying to create an "isolated" me. Nothing is isolated. That's a gap in your understanding not mine.

Do not limit what we will be able to build on binary (1s and 0s) or the present materials you see in your room. If you do then you will not see the possibilities. You will see your room,

If I build a machine. maybe not "metal" and certainly not "binary" that acts exactly like Mary, it is Mary. It is Mary in every way. even quail speaking. If fact, it may argue that the "old Mary" is not the real Mary because that machine was made "now" and the "old Mary" is a different Mary in time and not the same. And it would be correct.

The trick, or key phrase here is "exactly" like Mary. Mother nature can't even make an "exact Mary" again. we dont even know if a singularity is exactly the same even if it has the same mass. It mite be a "volume" and not even a "point".

Back to proteins. It's the key for you. Not philosophy. philosophy is word games not engineering.
engineer the truth, if we can't it is not real. "mute", irrelevant" fairytale", or any other words that float our boats. Aborigines' call it "dream time". "before Coalescence" physics calls it t=0 or 0 energy. Not that kraus's BS zero either, real zero. You are not the exact same now as when you stated reading this.

all of this has been said much better by the others. If I sat with you and did drawlings I think it would be crystal clear.

[Gaylenwoof]

Originally Posted by Gaylenwoof
This doesn't mean that we have to give up on naturalistic explanation and become theists. It simply means that future physics may have to accept another fundamental premise (one that it currently does not address). I can't say exactly what this new fundamental premise has to be; all I can do is point to the general ballpark and say it will need to be "qualitative" or "proto-qualitative".

Originally Posted by KCfromNC

Again, I can't agree or disagree because this is saying nothing at all.

Ok, I'll accept your challenge and draw my sword (actually, it's more like a plastic butter knife, but it will have to do for now). For a while after the nuclear structure of the atom was proposed, there was a profound mystery. Protons are known to repel each other, but the nuclear theory requires that a bunch of protons are packed together in a tiny volume of space. How does that work? Why doesn't the nucleus just fly apart? No one had an answer, but most people felt that the nuclear theory made sense in so many other ways that somehow there must be something holding the protons together. There are a range of possibilities. Maybe some sort of strong "glue" causes them to stick together, or maybe "ropes" that tie them together, or perhaps some sort of outer containing shell - sorta like a pressure cooker - that contains the protons to a small space. More fancifully: Maybe protons are xenophobic and short-sighted, but they are also nymphomaniacs. They flee from each other unless, by chance, they happen to get close enough to see each other clearly, at which point they suddenly get wildly aroused and start having an eternal sexual orgy. All of these options are metaphorical and exhibit varying degrees of silliness, but they all share a basic common idea: Some mysterious process X keeps protons in the nucleus, despite their otherwise manifest tendency to stay the hell away from each other. Relative to explaining the "raw feel" nature of qualia, we are in roughly the same position as people were prior to the theoretical development of what we now call the "strong force." From our current vantage point, we can see how the strong force fits together with the rest of physics, and we can talk about how the strong force "condensed" along with the other fundamental forces in less than a second after the Big Bang, etc., but before our understanding of the strong force, we just had this placeholder concept - some sort of force, or process, or whatever, needs to do this job.

The term "proto-qualitative" is just a quick way of saying that "some mysterious force or process, or whatever" - some theoretical "X" - does the job of explaining how it is that, once a bunch of atoms get together in certain kinds of arrangements, they start to "feel" things like "pain", "visual sensations", "auditory sensations", "emotions", etc. Now, for any given phenomena - let's say "P" - that you want to explain, your explanation will need to somehow mention the phenomena. Even if you reduce P to some lower-level phenomena, the reduction itself needs to mention P because otherwise you have no idea what it is you are reducing/explaining. Even if P turns out to be some sort of illusion or hoax - say, P = Bigfoot - your explanation still needs to incorporate the concept of Bigfoot. E.g., "Bigfoot = gorillas," or "Bigfoot = guys-dressed-in-furry-costumes." The reductive explanation cannot entire ignore the concept of Bigfoot, and it cannot completely disregard the phenomenal qualities of that which is being explained. You're explanation, for example, can't just be "Guys wearing circus clown outfits." Even if, in fact, Bigfoot is guys wearing clown outfits, the explanation can't stop here. You need to go the extra step to explain how it is that guys in clown outfits can be mistaken for big hairy creatures.

The tricky problem with qualia is that some aspects of qualia are indexical perspective-dependent properties. Pain qualia are objectively real phenomena that can be studied scientifically (neural correlates), but the "correlative" nature of "neural correlates" points to a correlation of data from different perspectives, and, in the case of qualia, one of these perspectives is indexical ("here and now" which cannot be completely shared with "there and then"). In other words, "P" in this case, is a phenomena that has a subjective component.

Most of the "higher level" sciences like psychology and neuroscience have embraced subjective phenomena and are able to deal with it reasonably well via verbal reports from people, or certain behaviors of animals. Current theories in fundamental physics, however, don't explicitly deal with subjective data - although QM comes close insofar as the math has a rather magical "collapse of the waveform" (or theoretical equivalents in non-collapse interpretations). The concept of an "observer" is required to make the math work, but "observer" is not a well-defined component within the math itself. The QM "observer" has roughly "the right stuff" to fill the role of "subjective/qualitative" in physics insofar as the observer impacts the event that is observed, and the event that is observed impacts the observer. This leaves theoretical room for self-referential feedback loops, and I've been arguing that qualia are intrinsically self-referential processes. This isn't the whole ballgame, but it is at least a point or two on the scoreboard. It about like saying "Bigfoot = guys dressed in clown suits." Ok, it's a step that gets us in the ballpark - ontologically we think we are dealing with "guys dressed up" - but "clown suits" can't quite be the end of it. Somehow "furry" or "the appearance of furry" has to get accounted for. You can't explain the furry aspect without mentioning the concept of furry. Even if the appearance of furry is just an illusion (it's "really a clown suit"), you can't explain the illusion of furry unless your explanation somehow mentions the concept of furry.

What exactly might a proto-qualitative concept in fundamental physics look like? I can't say much at this point. I can say that is does not need to "do the impossible" - it does not need to make me (here & now) "feel your feelings" (there & then). It basically needs to do what qualitative data does in the higher-level sciences, which is to say, it needs to ultimately track back to the verbal reports of experimental subjects who are referring to their indexical perspective-based feelings of pain, sensations of red, etc. in such a way that certain measurable physical processes are logically tied to these reports. I know this is vague - it's not saying much, but it's not "saying nothing." The first step toward solving a problem is to recognize that there is a problem. A good next step is to roughly outline a conceptual ballpark wherein the problem might be solved. I'm pointing at the ballpark. I don't think it's an impossible ballpark. If we can conceive of a "neural correlate" for qualia at the level of neuroscience, then it seems plausible that we might be able to do something equivalent at the level of physics. An H2O molecule has no liquid properties, but it has "proto-liquid" properties insofar as chemical bonding and geometry logically imply the possibility of liquid dynamics.

A "proto-quale" presumably won't be a conscious experience (it won't be "something it is like to be an electron"), any more than an H2O molecules is a liquid. But once we have the proto-qualitative elements built into fundamental physics, we will then be able to say that collections of atoms of type A are conscious, whereas collections of type B are not, because process X is present in A and missing in B. Furthermore, we will be able to track the potential for process X back to the early moments of the Big Bang, just as we track electromagnetism, gravity, etc., back to the beginning.

[Sophronius]

The analogy with introducing chemicals to what is already there in the first place, doesn't have to do with creating what is already there. Altering something which already exists doesn't have to do with creating the essence and form ( foundation to begin with ) of what was altered .

The analogy for all intent and purpose could be a can of sweet pop . Its an altering .

When the energy from live food is introduced the structures from the live food help support already formed structure, its already there. A scientist can't feed anything a food and expect the something to understand and negotiate the structures because it is not there in the first place as a common ground for the supposed association.

Yes that's a great point Arach the engineers or the practice of a theory is what confirms scientific hunch's to be on target and possibly useful.

Everything in the universe is in motion subject to gravity and motion through time and space. The behav of matter and other things through the universe is the study from what I understand.

So we don't need to guess a hunch that consciousness feeling or raw feel would be physical, the universe is in a turned on state and physical. Maybe the binary idea alongside some biology has some possibilities as well don't know too much about it. Edit, they can do it with vegetation and apple trees and so on because introducing the building blocks are already there and its an altering not a creating, an apple tree has the essence ( form ) of an apple tree and not something else . If its not an assoctiating building block ( protein) it won't build anything in allegiance with the form. It may alter to give systems a chance to repair. They are studying frozen frogs now but there is reasoning to what is going on chemically and also interesting. The experts are interested in creating a mind altering protein for these reasoning's.

[KCfromNC]

Originally Posted by Gaylenwoof

The term "proto-qualitative" is just a quick way of saying that "some mysterious force or process, or whatever" - some theoretical "X" - does the job of explaining how it is that, once a bunch of atoms get together in certain kinds of arrangements, they start to "feel" things like "pain", "visual sensations", "auditory sensations", "emotions", etc.

So it is entirely possible that proto-qualitative is just normal objective-type physics at work in a particular way? If so, why all the calls for a fundamental change in the way science works to account for this particular process? And if it is a placeholder for the unknown, why the loaded term for it? Seems like lots of mysticism hiding in that alleged "whatever".

Pain qualia are objectively real phenomena

I don't even know if qualia are universally accepted as meaningful to the discussion, much less that one can make sweeping claims about them like this. And what exactly is objective about them? How are feelings objectively observable by third parties without redefining them into externally visible behavior - which is what they're explicitly defined not to be.

Most of the "higher level" sciences like psychology and neuroscience have embraced subjective phenomena and are able to deal with it reasonably well via verbal reports from people, or certain behaviors of animals. Current theories in fundamental physics, however, don't explicitly deal with subjective data

Yep, it works at a different level of abstraction. There's lots of macro-level behaviors that basic physics doesn't explicitly deal with - that has nothing to say about the necessity for fundamental change in the way science works.

although QM comes close insofar as the math has a rather magical "collapse of the waveform" (or theoretical equivalents in non-collapse interpretations). The concept of an "observer" is required to make the math work, but "observer" is not a well-defined component within the math itself. The QM "observer" has roughly "the right stuff" to fill the role of "subjective/qualitative" in physics insofar as the observer impacts the event that is observed, and the event that is observed impacts the observer.

The problem here is that many types of "observers" in the QM sense have absolutely no subjective point of view, being inanimate machines and all, so at best I think this whole line of thought is incorrect.

This leaves theoretical room for self-referential feedback loops, and I've been arguing that qualia are intrinsically self-referential processes.

If so, this devolves into infinite regress - the feeling of what it feels like to feel like something having a feeling about what an experience is like, and so on all the way down into the abyss. As typically defined, though, qualia are the feeling of what it is like to experience something, so the feeling refers to something other than the feeling.

What exactly might a proto-qualitative concept in fundamental physics look like? I can't say much at this point.

Yes, my point exactly. For all of the creative writing you have here, you're not actually saying much other than people have feelings and we currently don't have a complete model of brain function. OK, no surprise there. What's missing is any sort of reason to think that requires a fundamental change in how science works.

But once we have the proto-qualitative elements built into fundamental physics, we will then be able to say that collections of atoms of type A are conscious, whereas collections of type B are not, because process X is present in A and missing in B.

The fact that we can already do this seems to put a damper on your calls for a necessary fundamental addition to science in order to talk about consciousness.

Furthermore, we will be able to track the potential for process X back to the early moments of the Big Bang, just as we track electromagnetism, gravity, etc., back to the beginning.

I'm not sure why you think the potential for a system to exist is somehow comparable to a fundamental force of nature. Seems like a category error to me. Can we track the potential for a justice system back to the Big Bang? If not, does that mean we need to change science to include proto-justice as a fundamental property? Heck, I'm not even sure what that means much less how to answer it, but it seems to be the same sort of thing you're proposing here.

In general, it seems like you're putting the cart before the horse. If we learn enough and discover that subjective experience is just one of the things that normal atoms do when arranged in certain ways, then your question is already answered - the potential for consciousness is explained by there being those atoms with the potential to be arranged in those patterns. Why are you jumping the gun and assuming this is impossible before we've even barely scratched the surface of the subject?

[Arach Angle]

Originally Posted by Sophronius

The analogy with introducing chemicals to what is already there in the first place, doesn't have to do with creating what is already there. Altering something which already exists doesn't have to do with creating the essence and form ( foundation to begin with ) of what was altered .

The analogy for all intent and purpose could be a can of sweet pop . Its an altering .

lmao sweet poop. Funny you should say that. I used to say that to me daughter.

Think of it like this. You can swap out a wall of brick for a wood stucco side. What that means is that although you did not create the building or even understand how the bricks were made you do have an understanding that "materials" are an important part. And that the arrangement of those materials is integral to the function of the building. What we are saying is that the arrangement and type of material seems to be the most important part ... until we learn more that is. And that quali can do nothing to dislodge that base right now because it is based on what is not known. That in no way means it will be wrong forever.