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It is the section in bold that seems to cause you some intellectual distress.
If that is what you want to imagine then go for it. I feel no distress. Rather you seem stressed whenever we try to pin you down on this. You simply ignored it the last time for example.
Your bit in bold says nothing at all. It just has a lot of "would seem to" and I responded directly to it. So perhaps it is my response that is causing you this distress.
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Originally Posted by MysticPhD
Perhaps you simply do not understand its implications for the concept of "Being."
Or perhaps you do not understand my reply to it - or you do not want to consider alternatives that suggest consciousness is not what _you_ really want it to be (as you yourself indicated given you did not comment on the truth or falshood of the idea - merely that you personally can not abide it - which is less than irrelevant - as what you can personally emotionally accept or "abide" has no bearing on what actually IS) - or perhaps you are merely over stating or inventing those implications for effect. A lot of "perhaps".
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Originally Posted by MysticPhD
You seem to be willing to accept that YOU do not exist . . . something I cannot abide.
I said nothing even remotely like that at all. Is "seem" a word you insert when you are wholesale inserting things into the mouths of others?
You seem to have an issue with the observer and the system doing the observing being the same thing - and appear to be unable to explain why - choosing instead to hide behind posts with no content that simply accuse others of a lack of understanding for no reason.
Again - what is the issue with the observer being part of the system?
Errr that is because they are objects. All you are doing is showing that DVDs are not sentient or conscious. That says nothing about whether or not it is possible to build a machine that is.
Pointing to an example of a machine that is not concious says nothing at all about the thread topic as to whether a machine _could_ be built to be conscious.
Says you. But on what basis? Are we not just machines too - albeit biological ones. How do you know what parts do - or do not -result in conciousness?
Uhhh, because I game program in my free time. I understand code and programming. Even glitches are usually in the programming.
When you write a code, you give the thing instructions. To be able to turn on independently has yet to be done by any program we've written (the best we can do is having an electrical timer to the plug, and setting it to turn on when we want it). To decide to ignore the instructions is not only not something programmers generally do, but I wouldn't even begin to know if it's even possible. Granted you don't program, so you don't have a good sense of why not, but it's like this.
Nothing we've built since human existence (no object at all) has ever demonstrated consciousness. Humanity has been around for roughly 200k years. If something did, it would probably be a cursed object.
Could it be built to be conscious? Possibly, by a programmer who had a very high level of talent. But you wouldn't be programming code anymore, you'd be creating life.
We're not just machines. We have a design, but we don't have to do anything in this life. I could literally sit on my ass from when I graduate college until I die of starvation, playing video games. I could become a CEO. I could be a gardener. Or I could get myself locked in a mental ward by acting crazy. Human beings do not have pre-written code defining their behavior.
You know what genes are? They're more a personal history than a rule of behavior. As in, I've assigned you these parents which makes you look like this, events in your life might affect your genes. But the rest? Nope, there's no plan. Humans are not organic machines, they can decide to follow rules, but that's kinda stupid given they have all the options in the world.
Last edited by bulmabriefs144; 10-13-2014 at 10:10 AM..
This is one of the strangest ideas I have heard atheists state. That human consciousness is no different than something which could evolve into being inside a man-made machine or computer.
Do some really believe that a machine can have conscious feelings?
I don't think one can replicate feelings in a machine.. so can we produce robots with consciousness? Likely not.
But, we do have the modern equivalent of humans who are like robots without a conscious.
And, a reverse question: if we placed robotic machinery into humans (like microchips placed in the brain that supposedly fight depression), can a human being still have consciousness if they are built with robotic hardware?
It is the section in bold that seems to cause you some intellectual distress. Perhaps you simply do not understand its implications for the concept of "Being." You seem to be willing to accept that YOU do not exist . . . something I cannot abide. It is neuroscientific nihilism. We are NOT illusions. That is simply preposterous on its face.
I would sooner abide the idea that human beings are the dream images of some higher being, than I would that humans are machines, objects without an ability to make choices.
I'm unclear how this is any different from how science works now.
That's good to hear. I was trying to offer a scientifically testable speculation.
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This seems like run of the mill science in action to me - collect data, including 3rd party reviews of what subjects report, and try to build a model to fit the data and predict the future.
Again you should keep in mind that I see myself as being a physicalist, so I am agreeing with you that the subjective feeling of pain essentially IS a physical process that can be mathematically modeled and thus explained, for all practical purposes, scientifically. (And, in this light, I think that machines can be built to have subjective feelings.) What I'm insisting upon is the philosophical observation that a model of X should not be confused with X itself. Fully comprehending the mathematical details of a model of pain does not logically imply that you will personally feel pain as such, and, furthermore, the subjective feeling of pain, a such, is an extremely important part of the meaning of 'pain.' Understanding a mathematical model of pain is one way of understanding pain, but it is not the only way to understand pain. Another way to understand the concept of pain is to live through the process of personally being in pain.
Another way to think of this: Empirical research will be required to see whether or not understanding a model of pain triggers first-person feelings of being in pain. Maybe it does; maybe it doesn't. The only way to know, for certain, is to develop some really good models of pain and then see, for yourself, if studying the model of, say, toothache pain causes you to personally experience the pain of a toothache. The need for empirical investigation in this matter underscores the fact that we are dealing with two different modes of understanding, namely, the mode of understanding a mathematical models that perfectly predicts pain behavior, and the mode of understanding the qualitative experience of living through the process of personally being in pain.
You could, of course, have faith in the testaments of other people regarding the subjective painfulness of studying mathematical models of pain. Maybe someday some highly respected researchers will say with confidence that studying the pain of a toothache causes them to experience the pain of a toothache. Let's call this claim "CAPT" for "a Claim About the Pain of a Toothache." Since they are highly respected scientists, you could accept CAPT and, if the claim is, as a matter of fact, true, then you could say that you KNOW ("justified true belief") that comprehending the model of a toothache means experiencing the pain of a toothache. But the fact that the empirical research was needed before you could have a justified belief in CAPT suggests that multiple important ways of knowing are at work. When you study the pain models yourself and personally experience the pain of a toothache, you should believe the truth of CAPT with higher certainty than you believed it, based on the testimony of others.
Now, if we do eventually discover that CAP (a more generalized version of "CAPT" dealing with generic models of various types of pain) is true, and if we use our models of pain to build machines that instantiate these models, then I'd say we can claim, with reasonably high confidence, that these machines feel pain (say, "9" on a scale of confidence from 1 to 10). If we find that CAP is false, we might still have good reason to believe that the machines feel pain, but we ought to feel somewhat less confidence in the claim (maybe, "7" on the confidence scale). Ultimately, the only beings who can have complete confidence in our ability to build pain-feeling machines are the machines themselves. A machine can know with confidence level 10 that it personally feels pain; it might believe, with confidence level 9, that other machines who are built to the same specifications feel pain. If we have found that CAP is true, then humans might believe, at confidence level 8, that machines feel pain, whereas if we find that CAP is not true, we might believe with confidence level 7 that machines feel pain.
The point of all of this is that the direct personal experience of pain matters when it comes to judging the existence or non-existence of pain in other people, or in animals, or in machines. If we can personally discover the truth of CAP by experiencing model-induced pain for ourselves while studying a model of pain, then our confidence should be higher than if we cannot.
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I was certain you said that science is somehow missing something vital, but I still don't see what that might be.
It's not so much that science is "missing something" - it's just that the scientific method is one way of knowing, but it is not the only way of knowing. If science were the only significant way of know about the world, then personally validating or dismissing CAP should make no difference to our level of confidence concerning our beliefs about the pain (or lack of pain) in machines. But I think we are justified in ranking degrees of certainty based on the empirical evidence either confirming or disconfirming CAP:
(1) You personally study a model of pain and confirm the truth of CAP by feeling pain yourself: Really high confidence that machines feel pain.
(2) You read the results of empirical research by respected scientists who claim the truth of CAP: Slightly lower confidence that machines feel pain.
(3) Empirical evidence reveals that CAP is not true: Slightly lower confidence that machine feel pain.
In all three cases, it could be that a theory of pain seems so convincing that you believe with high confidence that machines built in accordance with this theory feel pain, but you should still have gradations within the range of "high confidence" depending on your own (and/or other peoples') personal experiences of pain (or no pain) when studying the theory.
Last edited by Gaylenwoof; 10-13-2014 at 11:05 AM..
Another way to think of this: Empirical research will be required to see whether or not understanding a model of pain triggers first-person feelings of being in pain.
Why would you even expect it to in the first place? I don't see the connection. Understanding a model of stellar formation doesn't make a star appear in a theorist's mind - why would studying pain be any different?
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mode of understanding the qualitative experience of living through the process of personally being in pain.
What does understanding a qualitative experience even mean, as distinct from explaining the reports of others of their qualitative experiences?
A few people seem to have commented on this. So I think we know which poster is _actually_ doing the "ignoring" here.
Why for example can it not by the system itself? What is so wrong with a self referential system to your mind? Your _only_ reply to this so far has been to simply declare that it is not possible because the input into the system - changes the system - and noticing that change - also changes the system - which notices that change - which is a change. And so on.
And you appear to have merely asserted that this is not possible. But why not? Why can such a system not be iterative on a continuous basis to a point where the iterative change goes from negligible to none?
Why? Simply because you want it to be ridiculous? Or because you have some basis for declaring it to be so? Or is this one of the times where you preface something with IMO so you do not have to defend it in any way - but allowing you to throw out words like "amusing" and "ridiculous" to disparage all the same?
Not sure I am saying what you think I am saying at all here, sorry.
Thanks for everything.
Last edited by Sophronius; 10-13-2014 at 03:54 PM..
Quote:
Originally Posted by Gaylenwoof Another way to think of this: Empirical research will be required to see whether or not understanding a model of pain triggers first-person feelings of being in pain.
Quote:
Originally Posted by KCfromNC
Why would you even expect it to in the first place? I don't see the connection. Understanding a model of stellar formation doesn't make a star appear in a theorist's mind - why would studying pain be any different?
I would not expect it, but I am allowing for the possibility. You've said that color-blind Mary could fully understand the qualitative experience of seeing red by studying the neuroscience of people who experience red. I say that she won't fully understand the experience of red unless she, herself, somehow experiences red (e.g., by looking at a red object, or imagining red, or having a false memory of having seen red, or hallucinating a red object, etc... the basic point being that she has to have some sort of first-person qualitative experience of red if she is to fully understand the qualitative character of red). If she studies a mathematical model of seeing red, but doing this does not trigger her own first-person experience of seeing red, then despite her best efforts, she does not fully grasp the experience of seeing red.
Studying qualia is different than studying stellar formation because I am not a stellar-formation process, but I am a qualia-experiencing process. A stellar formation process cannot "study" or "represent" or "think about" other stellar formation processes, but a qualia-experiencing process can study other qualia-experiencing processes. At this point we don't have a good enough theory of qualia-experiencing to say whether studying qualia would or would not evoke qualitative experience.
Okay, look people, simple code. I want a system to change a number based on conditions. A strict code asserts:
If (x = 10)
x+1
No choices, the code always adds 1 if X is 10.
A sentience code basically codes for a choice. Like this:
If (x = 10 or x = 5)
x+1
or
x-1
(Basically, given either condition, the computer can make either reaction. Usually though, the ability to make "decisions" is based on something stupid, like a random number generator)
Now, to answer the questions above, no, science has not produced consciousness. Consciousness is... different.
Look at the two codes above. One is cause-effect, the second is sentience. We could probably program sentience with a basic AI. But no matter how we code, generally, when we turn the machine off we expect it to stay off. When we expect it to perform an action, it usually does. Being conscious means being aware of the conditions around you, and acting based on input. The closest thing to that was the Jeopardy supercomputer, and it was at best case, still only sentience, not consciousness.
Soulless beings given consciousness. This is what I mean. And no, it hasn't been done.
Since you guys still won't understand...
The one robot in I, Robot had consciousness. It was aware of its programming but able to decide.
The other robots were sentient. They were able to make choices, but was not able to deviate from how they were programmed.
Last edited by june 7th; 10-14-2014 at 04:44 AM..
Reason: Insulting.
I have been entertained by Gaylen's attempts to elucidate the main philosophical problem with believing that we are simply neural activity (like the hard problem of consciousness) to his compatriots. It is amusing because all the while everyone is ignoring the elephant in the room . . . WHO is doing all this rumination??? IMO it is beyond ridiculous to assume that simple neural activity is the actor here. The composite nature of the perspective of an actor (ruminator) would seem to require a consolidation beyond the individual neural activity that comprises it. Unfortunately because each individual IS the composite doing the ruminating . . . it is relegated to the penumbra of factors being considered without really considering its role in the phenomenon being dissected. That is why I keep trying to get you to answer the question . . . WHO is doing the ruminating??? It seems all your efforts are bent toward eliminating the existence and reality of the WHO. I find that amusing . . . and rather foolish.
Quote:
Originally Posted by MysticPhD
It is the section in bold that seems to cause you some intellectual distress. Perhaps you simply do not understand its implications for the concept of "Being." You seem to be willing to accept that YOU do not exist . . . something I cannot abide. It is neuroscientific nihilism. We are NOT illusions. That is simply preposterous on its face.
Quote:
Originally Posted by monumentus
I said nothing even remotely like that at all. Is "seem" a word you insert when you are wholesale inserting things into the mouths of others?
You seem to have an issue with the observer and the system doing the observing being the same thing - and appear to be unable to explain why
Again - what is the issue with the observer being part of the system?
We exist because we ARE the system and the observer . . . NOT a part of a system. That is what the phenomenon of "Being" means. A machine no matter how cleverly programmed will never "Be." It just runs programs. There is no "there" there. You can pretend to be obtuse and not GET it . . . but that is just your schtick. You criticize my posts and knowledge . . . and denigrate and disparage me. That sort of ad hominem would seem to be your entire raison d'etre.
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