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I think there's a pretty strong predisposition to believe our conscious mind provides an accurate reflection of how our brain really works.
I don't see introspective knowledge as providing "an accurate reflection of how our brain really works," and I certainly agree that conscious impressions can be misleading. But I also think that you're missing an important fact of life if you don't realize that every shred of scientific knowledge ultimately depends on assumptions made about the nature of conscious qualitative experience. I'm not saying that the common-sense assumptions are wrong - in fact, I'd say that most of them are essential for basic sanity and wisdom - but I think we should not entirely forget that these assumptions are assumptions.
One of these inductive leaps is the concept of an external world that exists independently of the workings of your own mind. I'm not arguing in favor of solipsism, but I am trying to point out that you can't completely distrust the qualitative reflections of your conscious mind. Even if you tried your best to think in purely quantitative, mathematical, logical terms, you would still, in fact, be depending on the qualitative aspects of your experience of trying to be purely mathematical.
Quantitative concepts are essentially qualitative experiences. It feels like the number 2 exists whether anyone is thinking about it, or not. Without feelings of something being "out there" - or something being "not me" - or something "persisting through time" - or something "existing" in some way or another, etc. - without these types of feelings, how would the mind have any concept of the number 2? Indeed, WHY would the mind even bother "trying to think logically"? We DO things because in some way or another we are motivated to do things - either to advance toward some goal or to avoid some perceived pain. Motivation is fundamentally wrapped up with feelings and qualitative judgments concerning what is or is not worth our time to think about, or do. And, of course, it is seemingly impossible to think about anything without having some intuitive sense of some "I" who is doing the thinking (which relates to the point that Mystic wants to make). I think that the "I" could be part of the illusory aspects of feelings that you refer to - at least insofar as the "I" is felt to be an isolated or independent being - but my central point is that you can't avoid "feelings" no matter how purely quantitative or abstract you try to be. You cannot avoid or overcome feelings in any thought - no matter how abstract the thought feels; all you can do it cherry-pick the feelings that feel like they are of value to you. For most of us, logic feels right; math feels right; the feeling of the existence of an external world feels right; the scientific method feels right; and so on.
So, yes, our intuitive qualitative concepts can be misleading, but ultimately they are the only game in town. It is not a matter of choosing to believe or not believe in the immediate qualitative aspects of our experience - all we can really do is pick and choose which qualitative aspects to focus on, and try our best to interpret their meanings in light of our values. I'm fully convinced that, to a great extent, our concept of a "physical" world that evolves via "rules" of some sort (more or less natural laws) is a valuable concept, and I believe that a good way to study the qualitative flow of our experiences is to study brains (or brain/body/world processes). I just don't think it is realistic to try to model brain activity in purely third-person terms (abstract/mathematical models) and then say "and that ALL the mind is - it's JUST these quantitative concepts. NO. I'd say that our models are just models. The reality that we are trying to models is, ultimately, qualitative. It can be helpful to use quantitative terms to model qualitative reality, but it's crazy to then turn around and say "These quantitative concepts are the only concepts that reveal the nature of reality." No! Our quantitative concepts are tools for constructing an understanding of qualitative reality. It is misguided to think that we can totally reduce the building to the tools that we used in order to build the building.
I'll be happy to jump over to your side just as soon as you use something else to generate a useful model of brain function that isn't explained using traditional science. Until then, I'm kind of stuck with the feeling of "so what" after reading through your posts. Yeah, there are lots of mysteries in how brains work, and we can make up all sorts of clever riddles and word games based on this lack of knowledge, but what does it actually get us?
One implication of my speculative proto-theory of consciousness is that a true "theory of everything" will eventually require some "bridge terms" to qualitative experience. [Quick review, cuz I'm aware how long-winded and confusing my posts can be: My basic ontological proposal is that Reality - in the most fundamental/primordial sense - can best be modeled (mathematically - for the purposes of science) as a qualitative chaos. Aside from Mystic, most of you have not been taking me to task for the chaotic/self-organizing aspect of my theory, but you've been raking me over the coals for my use of the notion of "qualitative" - you see it as unnecessary, or meaningless, or utterly impractical, or blatantly mystical, or just too confusing to make any sense of, or whatever. What I'm about to offer will probably seem like yet another failure, but it might at least prompt some intuitive hint of how I think the notion of "bridge terms" between the current quantitative concepts of physics and the qualitative concepts of a new theory might work.]
One critical step would be the development of a "qualitative map" of brain functioning - some conceptual structure that plays a role roughly like the Periodic Table of Elements in chemistry.
Comparison: Without a Periodic Table in chemistry, you have thousands of facts, but no obvious pattern. The Periodic Table shows the larger patterns, and if there are holes in your Table, you can predict the properties of the element that fits in these spots because the theory of electron orbits explains why the pattern exists. And then, of course, the Pauli Exclusion principle helps explain why we have electron orbits, etc., so we can connect chemistry down to physics. In neuroscience we will presumably start to collect thousands of correlations between neural activity and qualitative experiences. Without something to play the role of "Periodic Table" (so to speak) we probably won't have any explanation for why a given type of neural activity correlates with a given qualitative feeling. We will have a bunch of seemingly brute facts without a good way to organize them or make predictions for finding future correlations. I'm using the term "qualitative map" for whatever it is that plays the role of organizing our facts about neural correlates.
Along with the qualitative map, we will need some equivalent to the theory of electron shells to explain why the neural correlates fits whatever patterns they do. And, eventually, we would also need some deeper theory to play something equivalent to the role of the Pauli Exclusion principle that allows us to reduce the higher-level patterns to natural self-organizing processes of quantum systems.
The critical thing to notice is that qualia are implicit in this new physical theory. The functional patterns in the qualitative map would be represented in the math of the new fundamental physical theory. Devising the new mathematical framework without first assembling the qualitative map would be like devising the math of quantum theory without anyone ever doing chemistry at any point along the way.
Chemistry "constrains" physics in the sense that every proposed theory in physics must be logically and empirically consistent with the known principles of chemistry, and these principles were discovered via experiments. What I'm suggesting is that, eventually, physics will need to be constrained by the correlations of the qualitative map, and these correlations will need to be discovered by experiments involving intuitive access to the qualitative aspects of experience. But you can't explain why process X correlates with the visual sensation of red without implicitly acknowledging the qualitative sensation of red. The correlations of neural processes to qualitative states can't be meaningful if the qualitative states themselves are not meaningful. To talk meaningfully about neural correlate X, you need to comprehend what it is you are correlating X to - namely, the qualitative aspect of experience.
We are foolish to try to "eliminate" qualia from our conceptual schemes and technical language. Rather, we should be jumping through whatever hoops are necessary in order to incorporate qualia into our mathematical models of physics, and my suggestion of a "qualitative map" of neural correlates seems like an obvious first step. The net result would be a physical theory that is built upon introspective access to the qualitative aspects of experience. The neural correlates of "red" will not be - and cannot be - discovered by a society of blind people. Somebody somewhere along the way has to see red and understand that they are "seeing red" in order to discover meaningful neural correlates for "seeing red."
nobody is removing "how you feel about it" from the equation. It most certainly has an effect on what pathways we use while thinking. What we are saying is that we need to stay closer to what we do know. Maybe your right, the universe wants to "know everything about red" so it made a gazillion types of "receivers" like single celled animals to humans, and other life forms elsewhere using different chemistry processing mech for the units. But we don't know that yet.
I kind of understand you I think. knowing what red is and knowing what red can do to other units means we know more about red. That is ok with me.
One implication of my speculative proto-theory of consciousness is that a true "theory of everything" will eventually require some "bridge terms" to qualitative experience. [Quick review, cuz I'm aware how long-winded and confusing my posts can be: My basic ontological proposal is that Reality - in the most fundamental/primordial sense - can best be modeled (mathematically - for the purposes of science) as a qualitative chaos. Aside from Mystic, most of you have not been taking me to task for the chaotic/self-organizing aspect of my theory, but you've been raking me over the coals for my use of the notion of "qualitative" - you see it as unnecessary, or meaningless, or utterly impractical, or blatantly mystical, or just too confusing to make any sense of, or whatever. What I'm about to offer will probably seem like yet another failure, but it might at least prompt some intuitive hint of how I think the notion of "bridge terms" between the current quantitative concepts of physics and the qualitative concepts of a new theory might work.]
One critical step would be the development of a "qualitative map" of brain functioning - some conceptual structure that plays a role roughly like the Periodic Table of Elements in chemistry.
Comparison: Without a Periodic Table in chemistry, you have thousands of facts, but no obvious pattern. The Periodic Table shows the larger patterns, and if there are holes in your Table, you can predict the properties of the element that fits in these spots because the theory of electron orbits explains why the pattern exists. And then, of course, the Pauli Exclusion principle helps explain why we have electron orbits, etc., so we can connect chemistry down to physics. In neuroscience we will presumably start to collect thousands of correlations between neural activity and qualitative experiences. Without something to play the role of "Periodic Table" (so to speak) we probably won't have any explanation for why a given type of neural activity correlates with a given qualitative feeling. We will have a bunch of seemingly brute facts without a good way to organize them or make predictions for finding future correlations. I'm using the term "qualitative map" for whatever it is that plays the role of organizing our facts about neural correlates.
Along with the qualitative map, we will need some equivalent to the theory of electron shells to explain why the neural correlates fits whatever patterns they do. And, eventually, we would also need some deeper theory to play something equivalent to the role of the Pauli Exclusion principle that allows us to reduce the higher-level patterns to natural self-organizing processes of quantum systems.
The critical thing to notice is that qualia are implicit in this new physical theory. The functional patterns in the qualitative map would be represented in the math of the new fundamental physical theory. Devising the new mathematical framework without first assembling the qualitative map would be like devising the math of quantum theory without anyone ever doing chemistry at any point along the way.
Chemistry "constrains" physics in the sense that every proposed theory in physics must be logically and empirically consistent with the known principles of chemistry, and these principles were discovered via experiments. What I'm suggesting is that, eventually, physics will need to be constrained by the correlations of the qualitative map, and these correlations will need to be discovered by experiments involving intuitive access to the qualitative aspects of experience. But you can't explain why process X correlates with the visual sensation of red without implicitly acknowledging the qualitative sensation of red. The correlations of neural processes to qualitative states can't be meaningful if the qualitative states themselves are not meaningful. To talk meaningfully about neural correlate X, you need to comprehend what it is you are correlating X to - namely, the qualitative aspect of experience.
We are foolish to try to "eliminate" qualia from our conceptual schemes and technical language. Rather, we should be jumping through whatever hoops are necessary in order to incorporate qualia into our mathematical models of physics, and my suggestion of a "qualitative map" of neural correlates seems like an obvious first step. The net result would be a physical theory that is built upon introspective access to the qualitative aspects of experience. The neural correlates of "red" will not be - and cannot be - discovered by a society of blind people. Somebody somewhere along the way has to see red and understand that they are "seeing red" in order to discover meaningful neural correlates for "seeing red."
I'm unclear how this is any different from how science works now. This seems like run of the mill science in action to me - collect data, including 3rd party reviews of what subjects report, and try to build a model to fit the data and predict the future. I was certain you said that science is somehow missing something vital, but I still don't see what that might be.
It is amusing because all the while everyone is ignoring the elephant in the room . . . WHO is doing all this rumination???
A few people seem to have commented on this. So I think we know which poster is _actually_ doing the "ignoring" here.
Why for example can it not by the system itself? What is so wrong with a self referential system to your mind? Your _only_ reply to this so far has been to simply declare that it is not possible because the input into the system - changes the system - and noticing that change - also changes the system - which notices that change - which is a change. And so on.
And you appear to have merely asserted that this is not possible. But why not? Why can such a system not be iterative on a continuous basis to a point where the iterative change goes from negligible to none?
Quote:
Originally Posted by MysticPhD
IMO it is beyond ridiculous to assume that simple neural activity is the actor here.
Why? Simply because you want it to be ridiculous? Or because you have some basis for declaring it to be so? Or is this one of the times where you preface something with IMO so you do not have to defend it in any way - but allowing you to throw out words like "amusing" and "ridiculous" to disparage all the same?
Quote:
Originally Posted by Sophronius
Oh really ? how is your idea not suggesting people are color blind ?
Not sure I am saying what you think I am saying at all here, sorry.
Sentience means the ability to think. Easy, you can program robots to the be aware and make decisions (with a couple trillion lines of code).
Consciousness is a different story it involves having an identity, having feelings, etc. It'd be what everyone else calls a "soul." This might be impossible for anything built to be able to do this. Or so I'd say. Robots may be able to develop quirks resembling consciousness.
This might be impossible for anything built to be able to do this. Or so I'd say. Robots may be able to develop quirks resembling consciousness.
Of course it "might" - but right now I have not seen an argument as to why we would think so or expect it to be. Really this "might" does not add to the conversation - you are merely restating what the thread is about without adding anything to it.
Okay, it's like this. Things built generally behave as objects.
I plop in a DVD and don't expect it to be playing something different the second watching. Sentience is while it's on, given preprogrammed information, it can make choices from a list. On the other hand, to be conscious means to have one's own will.
This would be like, programming a machine to do cleaning, and with an on/off switch. The machine suddenly overrides this, and turns itself on. Not only that, instead of cleaning, it does light carpentry or painting. A sentient machine can decide to clean left first or right first (hell, a Roomba can do that) but not this. It's not really built that way. We'd pretty much have to build machines like they were living things to do that one. And we'd probably have to treat it like a human. And it would be a miracle nonetheless, since there is nothing in those parts to really give it that ability.
Okay, it's like this. Things built generally behave as objects.
Errr that is because they are objects. All you are doing is showing that DVDs are not sentient or conscious. That says nothing about whether or not it is possible to build a machine that is.
Pointing to an example of a machine that is not concious says nothing at all about the thread topic as to whether a machine _could_ be built to be conscious.
Quote:
Originally Posted by bulmabriefs144
We'd pretty much have to build machines like they were living things to do that one. And we'd probably have to treat it like a human. And it would be a miracle nonetheless, since there is nothing in those parts to really give it that ability.
Says you. But on what basis? Are we not just machines too - albeit biological ones. How do you know what parts do - or do not -result in conciousness?
I have been entertained by Gaylen's attempts to elucidate the main philosophical problem with believing that we are simply neural activity (like the hard problem of consciousness) to his compatriots. It is amusing because all the while everyone is ignoring the elephant in the room . . . WHO is doing all this rumination??? IMO it is beyond ridiculous to assume that simple neural activity is the actor here. The composite nature of the perspective of an actor (ruminator) would seem to require a consolidation beyond the individual neural activity that comprises it. Unfortunately because each individual IS the composite doing the ruminating . . . it is relegated to the penumbra of factors being considered without really considering its role in the phenomenon being dissected. That is why I keep trying to get you to answer the question . . . WHO is doing the ruminating??? It seems all your efforts are bent toward eliminating the existence and reality of the WHO. I find that amusing . . . and rather foolish.
Quote:
Originally Posted by monumentus
A few people seem to have commented on this. So I think we know which poster is _actually_ doing the "ignoring" here.
Why for example can it not by the system itself? What is so wrong with a self referential system to your mind? Your _only_ reply to this so far has been to simply declare that it is not possible because the input into the system - changes the system - and noticing that change - also changes the system - which notices that change - which is a change. And so on.
And you appear to have merely asserted that this is not possible. But why not? Why can such a system not be iterative on a continuous basis to a point where the iterative change goes from negligible to none?
Why? Simply because you want it to be ridiculous? Or because you have some basis for declaring it to be so? Or is this one of the times where you preface something with IMO so you do not have to defend it in any way - but allowing you to throw out words like "amusing" and "ridiculous" to disparage all the same?
It is the section in bold that seems to cause you some intellectual distress. Perhaps you simply do not understand its implications for the concept of "Being." You seem to be willing to accept that YOU do not exist . . . something I cannot abide. It is neuroscientific nihilism. We are NOT illusions. That is simply preposterous on its face.
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