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For Minsky, the idea of an "agent" is that it is a specialist. Like, for example, you might hire a travel agent or a financial agent to take care of these aspects of your life. People often think of Minsky's agents as simple things (sub-programs) that collectively compose a complex thing (the conscious mind), but Minsky himself was trying to avoid this. For him, an agent is a "black box." Your travel agent is not necessarily "simple." The point is that you don't know, or don't generally care to know, the details of how your agents accomplish the tasks they are given.
I really like Minsky's approach to all of this, and I think that a conscious being can, in fact, be usefully thought of as a collection of agents and agencies. This is all really cool stuff, but unfortunately it doesn't really get at the hard problem. Minsky is focusing on how to analyze intelligent behavior and someday build machines that can behave in intelligent ways. None of this addresses the notion of qualia - the feeling of being a being who experiences the world as a world; red as red, pain as being sharp or dull, or throbbing, etc. We can program a machine to distinguish between colors, but this behavioral ability does not logically imply that the machine experiences colors. We can program a machine to say "ouch" when we bang on its keyboard too hard, but this doesn't mean it experiences discomfort when you bang on its keyboard. Minsky's agents are "black boxes" - which means they might or might not experience qualia. The concept of "agent" simply does not imply anything about the experience, or non-experience, of qualia. Minsky is thus offering an interesting theory of intelligence, but he's not really offering a theory of mind capable of solving the hard problem.
I wish I could give you an example of a theory of mind that seems to solve the hard problem. Then I could say: "See, this is roughly what a theory of mind should look like." Then I could analyze various aspects of the theory and say: "This theory is wrong because it implies X, but X is obviously implausible," or, "X is logically self-contradictory," etc. But I can't offer you such a theory because we don't have any, and most philosophers would say that we don't even have an intuitive sense of what a theory of this sort might look like. This stands in contrast to, say, a theory for the building of intelligent machines. We can't build intelligent machines right now because we don't have a theory for the general "common sense" sort of intelligence that an intelligent machine needs to exhibit. But we do, however, have a general intuitive sense of how to go about creating intelligent machines. We have this feeling (right or wrong) that we can keep building more and more complex machines that are capable of doing more and more things until one day we can say, with reasonable confidence, that we have built a truly intelligent machine.
Some people want to say that there is no "hard problem" because qualia will just automatically come along with the increasing complexity of the machines that we build. That's fine; I even suspect that this may be true. But it misses the whole point of the hard problem. Sure, you can SAY that qualia will just come along for the ride, but simply saying this doesn't actually explain anything. It also doesn't help us predict much of anything. The problem is this: WHY should increasing complexity give rise to qualia? Personally, I suspect that something more than mere complexity is needed. Maybe we need something like Minsky's agents to produce qualia, but if this is the case, then we need to break into the black box to see exactly how it is that an agent produces qualia. Simply saying "the agent does it" does not really get at the core of the problem.
And there are those that do not believe qualia even exists. Like Daniel Dennett.
So when we see the color blue...the experience is simply refreshing and reaffirming what is already in memory from the first experience seeing the blue and the mutual common ground material understandings in time space and gravity.
I would agree that each time we experience a quale ('quale' is singular, 'qualia' is plural), the experience is infused with memory. I suspect that when I look at the patch of blue at the top of my computer screen, the feeling of what it is like for me to experience this particular blue at this time and in this context is what it is (feels this way rather than some other way) because of the decades of other experiences of the color blue. But, presumably, there was a fist time for me to experience blue. I probably didn't experience the sensation of seeing blue while I was in my mother's womb. Maybe I first saw something blue when I first opened my eyes. In any case, I suspect that what I experience now as blue is probably related in some way to what I experienced on that first occassion. (Or maybe not...anyone want to jump in on this?) Actually, we have some options:
1) The blue light entering my eyes triggered an experience that was roughly like the feeling that I now experience as "the blueness" of blue.
2) The blue light entering my eyes triggered an experience that was nothing like the feeling that I now experience as "the blueness" of blue, but it was, nevertheless, a qualitative experience of some sort.
3) The blue light entering my eyes did not triggered any phenomenal experience at all. The blue light entered my eyes as was processed by my brain, etc., but I was completely unconscious of the blue light - perhaps because I was too busy screaming my little lungs out, or I simply had no mental context for experiencing any sort of visual input at this point.
No matter which of these options we choose, the fact remains that, presumably, there was some point in my life at which I first experienced the qualitative feeling of the blueness of blue, more or less exactly like the way that I currently experience blue. Now a question arises: Why/how did I have that experience? What is it about the nature of reality that determined that I would have that particular qualitative experience at that moment in time? Suppose, for the moment, that options 2 or 3 happen to be true, so that even though I saw plenty of blue object throughout my infancy, I did not actually experience the phenomenal feeling that I now call "blue" until I was, say, two years old. The question would still be: Why this feeling? Why not until this moment at age two? Why didn't I have this feeling when light of the same wavelenght was entering my eyes as I looked at the sky a year earlier?
Presumably, if I had experienced something different at that moment in time, I would have still learned to call that experience "blue," so from a behavioral point of view there would seemingly be no difference. I would point to the sky and say "blue" even though what I actually experience is what I would (being as I am now) call "yellow." (Some of you might notice hints of Wittgenstein here. He pointed out that the actual qualitative experience, whatever it is, is irrelevant. All that really matters is what we learned to call it for the purposes of public language and behavior.)
Now, for the final phase of this little exercise, let's generalize the question I've been asking. Instead of focusing on "Why this particular feeling?" we can ask: "Why do we experience anything at all?" Why don't we just run around unconsciously doing all the stuff we do? Everything that we do could, it seems, be done if we experienced different qualia (e.g., yellow instead of blue) or no qualia at all (complex unconscious behavior). For those of you keeping score at home, this is the infamous "zombie" argument in philosophy of mind.
By applying a theory of gravity to our theories of matter and energy, we can "predict" (in retrospect) the formation of galaxies, stars, and planets. We can mathematically model the early universe before stars existed and "watch" the formation of stars as we run the model forward in time. This is exactly what is so great about having a theory.
There was supposedly a time in cosmological history when blue light existed, but no sentient creatures existed. So presumably there was a time when some sentient creature in the universe became the first sentient creature to experience the phenomenal feeling of blue. Could there be a theory of matter/energy that somehow predicts (in retrospect) the experience of blue based on the nature of the world prior to the existence of any sentient creatures capable of experiencing the blueness of blue? Could we use a model based on our theory to "watch" the emergence of blue qualia at some point in the evolution of the physical universe? This would be a theory of mind.
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Yes, I have more or less the same feeling re: Minsky and his ''agents'', which are interesting if you wanna build more sophisticated ''robots'', or even robot prostheses for humans. But for solving the hard problem of consciousness, not so much. In fact like most reductionists, Minsky is often dismissive of anything outside the ''mechanistic'' approach (which IMHO, is kinda glib and annoying)!
Of course on the other hand, another possibility you may be alluding to is, the theory proposed by philosopher Thomas Nagel, that we can, in principle, never have an objective account of consciousness, as described in his famous essay, ''What is it like to be a bat?”. But more especially, I appreciate his general approach of questioning the assumptions of philosophical naturalism (the belief that science can exhaustively explain the universe).
BTW, Nagel also believes that the Darwinian approaches are irreparably flawed. So ruling out divine intervention or design, evolution, and inexplicability, what reason is there left to explain consciousness? Nagel argues that the only remaining answer, is that on a fundamental level there is an end towards which the cosmos is naturally inclined: a natural teleology. Part of this natural teleology is a tendency for there to be creatures that are conscious. The universe, in a way of speaking, wants to become conscious.
And I might add, perhaps that teleology is simply an innate tendency towards connection with a pre-existing ''Universal Consciousness'' (cosmic intelligence, organizing principle, ''God'', whatever..) of which it's already a part. In other words, perhaps Consciousness is ''God''. Which of course starts to get into tricky areas for which ''science'' still lacks any vocabulary... let alone ''method'' for dealing with!
Last edited by mateo45; 02-28-2013 at 12:12 PM..
Reason: links..
I'm somewhat familiar with the philosophical theory of qualia, but there are neuro-engineers that I guess are more reductionists, though that may not how they may term themselves. I know there are a few that think all brain activity is a series of basic programming (again, such a misnomer on my part as the brain's program is considered to be complex, but the complexity is a function of repetition that builds upon itself. Other algorithmic proponents might include MIT's Breazeal et al whose project Kismet is an emotive AI, though I don't track current developments. Others around the globe are working on replicating various parts of the brain's activity, reproducing movement, cognition and emotion, useful for prosthesis but more importantly to this discussion in the emotive machine. These are the folks that would argue with Chalmers in a practical sense and that the rich inner life is a function of neuroprocesses that are increasingly tracked, understood and reproduced.
I'm not qualified to enter into the discussion, but one problem I have with the concept of qualia is how do you know your blue is the same as another's? I asked about animal consciousness as there are studies that have shown than some animals are actually self-conscious. Some think that animals have qualia. So if the question is a theory of mind that is specifically human and cannot be replicated in other animals and/or AI, I dunno.
Then if I consider the on-going research at places like U of AZ Lab dor Advances in Consciousness and Health that examines the metaphysical/ universal consciousness/ noetics I can't fully support the EE reductionist view as consciousness seems more than just algorithms.
I would agree that each time we experience a quale ('quale' is singular, 'qualia' is plural), the experience is infused with memory. I suspect that when I look at the patch of blue at the top of my computer screen, the feeling of what it is like for me to experience this particular blue at this time and in this context is what it is (feels this way rather than some other way) because of the decades of other experiences of the color blue. But, presumably, there was a fist time for me to experience blue. I probably didn't experience the sensation of seeing blue while I was in my mother's womb. Maybe I first saw something blue when I first opened my eyes. In any case, I suspect that what I experience now as blue is probably related in some way to what I experienced on that first occassion. (Or maybe not...anyone want to jump in on this?) Actually, we have some options:
1) The blue light entering my eyes triggered an experience that was roughly like the feeling that I now experience as "the blueness" of blue.
2) The blue light entering my eyes triggered an experience that was nothing like the feeling that I now experience as "the blueness" of blue, but it was, nevertheless, a qualitative experience of some sort.
3) The blue light entering my eyes did not triggered any phenomenal experience at all. The blue light entered my eyes as was processed by my brain, etc., but I was completely unconscious of the blue light - perhaps because I was too busy screaming my little lungs out, or I simply had no mental context for experiencing any sort of visual input at this point.
No matter which of these options we choose, the fact remains that, presumably, there was some point in my life at which I first experienced the qualitative feeling of the blueness of blue, more or less exactly like the way that I currently experience blue. Now a question arises: Why/how did I have that experience? What is it about the nature of reality that determined that I would have that particular qualitative experience at that moment in time? Suppose, for the moment, that options 2 or 3 happen to be true, so that even though I saw plenty of blue object throughout my infancy, I did not actually experience the phenomenal feeling that I now call "blue" until I was, say, two years old. The question would still be: Why this feeling? Why not until this moment at age two? Why didn't I have this feeling when light of the same wavelenght was entering my eyes as I looked at the sky a year earlier?
Presumably, if I had experienced something different at that moment in time, I would have still learned to call that experience "blue," so from a behavioral point of view there would seemingly be no difference. I would point to the sky and say "blue" even though what I actually experience is what I would (being as I am now) call "yellow." (Some of you might notice hints of Wittgenstein here. He pointed out that the actual qualitative experience, whatever it is, is irrelevant. All that really matters is what we learned to call it for the purposes of public language and behavior.)
Now, for the final phase of this little exercise, let's generalize the question I've been asking. Instead of focusing on "Why this particular feeling?" we can ask: "Why do we experience anything at all?" Why don't we just run around unconsciously doing all the stuff we do? Everything that we do could, it seems, be done if we experienced different qualia (e.g., yellow instead of blue) or no qualia at all (complex unconscious behavior). For those of you keeping score at home, this is the infamous "zombie" argument in philosophy of mind.
By applying a theory of gravity to our theories of matter and energy, we can "predict" (in retrospect) the formation of galaxies, stars, and planets. We can mathematically model the early universe before stars existed and "watch" the formation of stars as we run the model forward in time. This is exactly what is so great about having a theory.
There was supposedly a time in cosmological history when blue light existed, but no sentient creatures existed. So presumably there was a time when some sentient creature in the universe became the first sentient creature to experience the phenomenal feeling of blue. Could there be a theory of matter/energy that somehow predicts (in retrospect) the experience of blue based on the nature of the world prior to the existence of any sentient creatures capable of experiencing the blueness of blue? Could we use a model based on our theory to "watch" the emergence of blue qualia at some point in the evolution of the physical universe? This would be a theory of mind.
Ok ... I agree with the quest and see the reasoning. The idea in the last paragraph is very creative and clever I think. Before some time checking on a few things if you have time to comment it would be great... ( edit...not to argue but info related
Some of above and questions leads me to believe you may have missed my idea of quaila which is ok, or my idea or wording was off..so I will try this:
A fast food restaurant will use red and orange to hurry the customer up , an interior decorator will use the same as only accent color, an artist or interior decorator will use blue as a healing color, they may not know why but intuitively find recourse in the projection for balance and theme. So...and your the expert not me..are you tossing the nature of the colors out , in their uniqueness..? The reason I ask is my thought wraps a personality in nature or state of perseverance in all these different quaila feelings.
So I guess what I'm asking is what is the prof understanding of quaila...IOW because it does invoke what we are discussing, there needs to be a relative association.... if this is ill explained what I will do is attempt to answer the first question in your first paragraph...
The first experience in the exposure to blue is the most important in my thinking. The mind says...oh there is that, and it belongs over here. And now logged into memory. Notice I remarked there is that. Also wondering if its reasonable to believe there is room for some DNA memory re experience blue.. now I know these things are not exactly pointed toward the quest, but didn't think it wouldn't hurt to get some understanding. ( sure you've considered
As mentioned great thread and member entries...wow, and I need to check on a few things, plus enjoy taking time for good organization and so on. If I make a post and its of no use, feel free to pass by. If I don't reply it doesn't mean I missed or other but checking and allowing things to settle in.
Last edited by stargazzer; 02-28-2013 at 09:41 PM..
Stargaszer: "The first experience in the exposure to blue is the most important in my thinking. The mind says...oh there is that, and it belongs over here. And now logged into memory. Notice I remarked there is that. Also wondering if its reasonable to believe there is room for some DNA memory re experience blue."
I await the prof opinions also as you hit the crux of the experience as I understand it from both the EE/bio and my personal observations. It seems very much to be a question of identifying and logging into memory "that" and then learning what the code for "that" is, and that is very much also condensed into DNA memory. To respond to GW's query re initial blue experience, one might wonder since color is a wave length if it can be experienced and memorialized, though not necessarily named, in the womb. As GW closed, IME it is entirely reasonable that the wave blue (whether my experienced blue coincides generally, although most likely not identically, with most) originated before sentient beings in our dimension were around to experience it.
Now is DNA memory confined to direct ancestral history or is there a larger imprint in the realm of higher consciousness that transcends? If it flows from a higher consciousness, is there a reason why it is not more commonly experienced/ acknowledged? What connotes the rich inner life? I suspect that the brain does not generate but in fact filters qualia. Perhaps there are those that can experience a more holistic thought, or alignment of thought, that does not generate solely from self as many expansive thinkers have suggested. The problem remains how can this be empirically mapped. It may be demonstrable but the process is not easily formulaic.
As you (SG) noted, some of this strays a bit from the OP but I think still is very much on quest, though perhaps too unorthodox for some. If so, as you suggested, my questions will likely be passed.
Over the past decade or so I've read numerous books and articles by Dennett. Like most philosopher, I love his writing and agree with him on many things but, like most philosophers, I don't think his arguments against the existence of qualia are convincing. In essence, he is denying the reality of the one and only sort of thing that we are able to know directly and with certainty. Dennett's arguments are complex and interesting, but they ultimately fail (according to me). For the purposes of this thread I have been ignoring Dennett and the various "eliminativists" (e.g. Paul and Patricia Churchland, etc.) If, however, you find Dennett and/or the eliminativists to be convincing, feel free to summarize what you think are the strongest arguments, and I will be happy to give my response. Otherwise I will, as I say, ignore that whole line of thought because I've already been in countless discussion about this and I'm simply not convinced that the "qualiaphobic" arguments hold water.
Briefly: I think that qualia are not only real; they are the only aspects of reality that we can know that we know directly. I could be wrong about the source or nature of the "blue" that I experience when I look at the sky, but whatever else we might want to say about blue, THIS experience right here, right now, as I look at the sky is something that that has to be no less than what I immediately experience it as being. It might ALSO be other things, or it might be knowable under other descriptions - it might, for example, be a pattern of neurons firing in my brain, etc. - but this doesn't change the fact that this immediate feeling is what I immediately know. Everything else that I might know, or think that I know, ultimately stems from my interpretations of the qualia that I immediately experience.
Also wondering if its reasonable to believe there is room for some DNA memory...
DNA is amazing stuff, and I've seen arguments suggesting that DNA might be the only practical basis for life, due to a variety of features that seem to make it (so far as we can tell) the most versatile molecule in nature. DNA also has amazing computational power. As of 2002 we had a DNA computer that could calculate 330 trillion operations/second. As I understand it, however, DNA is limited from a computational standpoint. It is not a "universal" Turing machine, which is to say, there are computable functions that it cannot compute. (In contrast, your laptop computer is universal, so your laptop can, in principle, do computations that your DNA cannot.) This doesn't mean that DNA couldn't play an important role in consciousness, but if it does play a role, it would probably be something at a fairly basic level - perhaps memory, as you suggest - but probably not a big role in cognition.
Speaking of the possible physical foundations of consciousness, I think it is worth considering the possible role of microtubules. Perhaps some of you are familiar with the theory of consciousness proposed by Roger Penrose and Stuart Hameroff. From my point of view, this is the closest that anyone has come to proposing a genuinely plausible theory of consciousness. I don't want to get into the details here, but very roughly: Penrose uses a speculative quantum-level theory of gravity to explain the objective collapse of quantum waves, and each collapse is a quantum moment of conscious experience. Anyway, they propose that microtubules are the physical location of these quantum collapses. Microtubules are like the dynamic "skeleton" of every living cell, including neurons. There are hundreds of microtubules in every neuron, and each microtubule has the sort of complexity that can, in principle, perform computations. Hameroff and others have calculated that the combined microtubule activity within a single neuron is potentially capable of 1000 trillion operations/second. Just for fun, let's put this into perspective:
Here are a few ball-park numbers for comparison:
Supercomputer = 50 trillion operations/second (this was 2008, so probably higher now)
DNA computer = 330 trillion operations/second (in 2002)
Neural firing activity of the human brain = 1000 trillion operations/second
Microtubule activity within a single neuron = 1000 trillion operations/second
In other words, within each neuron there is, potentially, the computing power of the neural activity of an entire human brain! I don't know of any evidence, off hand, supporting the idea that microtubules actually perform any computations that could be of any significance to human cognition, but it's interesting to speculate on the possibilities.
I find all of this to extremely fascinating but, when all is said and done, it doesn't really count as a solution to the hard problem. Multiplying computational complexity, no matter how impressive, does not get to the real core of the problem. The wave-packet collapse concept could potentially get to the core of the problem, if we could make sense of a quantum unit of consciousness, or quantum quale. This is basically what I'm trying to do in my own published and soon-to-be published articles, but I'm still not happy with the results of my efforts to really make sense of micro-qualia. Does it make sense to talk of an experience of blue that is not "someone’s" experience of blue? And whose experience would that be? People will, of course, immediately want to bring up God or some cosmic mind, etc., but once you get into the details (the devil, as you know, likes to hide in the details), its is not at all clear how any God concept is really supposed to help explain the relationship between the physical world and the emergence of qualia. Invoking the concept of God is a great hand-waiving maneuver, but it doesn't provide the sort of theory we want - namely the sort of theory that would allow us to retrospectively "predict" the emergence of sentient (i.e., "qualia-soaked") creatures like us on the surface of a spinning ball of rock a few billion years after the big bang.
Bottom line: I have a variety of amazing tools in my philosophical toolbox for explaining the origins and nature of consciousness. But I'm missing the one tool that I most want - the one that would help me construct a retrospectively predictive theory that ties matter/energy to qualitative experience.
Gee, I apologize in advance but some of you including original poster remind me ancient Greeks who been estimating distance to stars by looking at them.
Wrong question dont give right answer.
Gee, I apologize in advance but some of you including original poster remind me ancient Greeks who been estimating distance to stars by looking at them.
Wrong question dont give right answer.
No need for apologies - except, perhaps, for the fact that you didn't offer any specifics. Can you elaborate? Why is the question wrong?
One good way to identify a "bad question" is to show that the question is based on a misuse of terms. For example: "How many feet equal 1 pound?" Given the definitions of the terms, there is no logical way to convert feet into pounds, so the question is confused and cannot be give a meaningful answer. Another type of problem can be undefined terms. For example: "Do quizzelbubs ever fart during a full moon?" To answer this question we need to know what a quizzelbub is. I'm guessing you will want to say that "qualia" are ill-defined, or undefinable. I've defined 'qualia' as "the elements constituting subjective experience." I pointed out that experiences are complex - typically composed of many colors, sounds, tactile sensations, emotions, and so on. To say that something is complex is to imply that it is composed of parts. The term 'qualia' references the constitutive elements of subjective experience. Perhaps you don't like the concept of 'subjectivity'? The term 'subjectivity' references the unique perspective of a particular person at a particular place and time - especially the notion of "what it's like to be" that particular person at that time. (E.g., "feeling an itch on my left elbow", "noticing the smell of pancakes", "feeling sad about the death of my dog", and so on.
I'm not saying there are no puzzles that could be rooted in this definition, but if you want to criticize the definition, my hope is that you will point to specific problems with the definition. Perhaps it would be helpful if you could give some examples of good definitions of mental terms. It might be interesting, for example, if you could take a moment to define the word 'red' without any reference to subjective experience. In any case, the "hard problem" refers to the question: "How do the qualia constituting experience relate to the physical activity (patterns of neural activity, biochemical interactions, etc.) composing my nervous system?" Does my brain "generate" experience? Or does it "filter" experience? Or is brain activity just a different way of referring to experience (like "Superman" is just a different way of referring to Clark Kent)? Or is there a better way to talk about the relationship between mental properties and physical properties?
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