Please register to participate in our discussions with 2 million other members - it's free and quick! Some forums can only be seen by registered members. After you create your account, you'll be able to customize options and access all our 15,000 new posts/day with fewer ads.
That was interesting steve - its always fasinating to hear from those who served in a conflict.
Vietnam, according to the historians - I was never there- saw very different weapons and tactics than either Korea or WWII. Part of that was terain, part of that changes in the army, and part of it technological change.
The US military in Vietnam, like the country generally in the sixties had this almost mystical faith in technology. Commonly we underestimated an enemy without these as well as paying too little attention to our human resources. My favorite story on that involves the development of new riverine craft that the military felt would make a major contribution to combat in the delta. They were tested for years in the US.
Then they sent them to the Delta, which is far more gunked up then any US body of water. They immediately sank - and the military just left them there. Technology isn't always the solution
My dad has a story from his days flying a gunship in Vietnam concerning new technology...
Someone wanted to know how much fire our gunships were taking so someone came up with some type of electronic fire detector. I guess they still have no idea if it worked or was accurate or not, because the first night they used it, when it was saying there was something like 15,000 rounds per minute coming their direction, someone (I guess the EWO) smashed it with a wrench. Dad said it was a case where ignorance was bliss...It was the only time they had any such machine on one of his flights.
I knew a fighter bomber navigator who could never get port and starboard straight. Flying over Cambodia he warned the pilot that an ememy plane was approaching - but again confused these. The pilot reacted, incorrectly tactically, based on this and as a result totally confused the enemy. He credited it with his being alive today.
Here's something I'd like some opinions on. In 1950, the USA was forced to deal with the fact that North Korean forces crossed the 38th Parallel and attempted to take over the entire Korean Peninsula. The United States poured its military forces into this conflict and eventually obtained a ceasefire with the North Koreans. The result today: A very prosperous nation known as South Korea is a member of the modern community of nations. Compared to other Asian countries, the people in South Korea enjoy a relatively high standard of living and some political freedom. In essence, the US won in Korean Conflict.
Contrast this with Vietnam. The United States poured its military forces in the Vietnamese conflict and fought for over a decade. We made a larger, longer, and more expensive effort than we did in Korea. The result? The North took over South Vietnam within a short period after we ended active military support. The US clearly lost in the Vietnam Conflict.
What were the differences in the two conflicts that lead to two utterly different results? I have some ideas, but I would like to hear yours.
I think geography was a big difference. In Korea, the south only had to defend a short border due to the fact that it's a peninsula. They were able to keep out northern communist infiltrators.
South Vietnam had a long border with Laos and Cambodia through which the North Vietnamese infiltrated, so the south was never really able to control its own territory.
The black and white nature of the Korean conflict was also different. The north blatantly invaded in a conventional assault. In Vietnam, it was much murkier. There was a lot of support in the south for the communist Viet Cong, and Ho Chi Minh had positioned himself as a nationalist while the US started out supporting the colonialist French. And many of the South Vietnamese leaders had served on the side of the French, which damaged their credibility as legitimate Vietnamese nationalists.
Duration was also an issue. The Vietnam War dragged on for too long without success. The American people generally don't like war, and if the US gets into a war, it has to win quickly before public opinion sours on it. The gradualist approach in Vietnam virtually guaranteed failure, because by the time we started to achieve a small measure of success, the public had soured on the war and wanted out.
A central difference dazzlemen was that while most S Koreans supported the government, the S Vietnamese government never managed to win broad support for long (although it made signficant gains after TET when communist attrocities and VC loses turned the public against the NLF). They were also hopelessly incompetent and corrupt, which the Korean government was not.
Vietnam was a civil war, Korea was not for the most part.
A central difference dazzlemen was that while most S Koreans supported the government, the S Vietnamese government never managed to win broad support for long (although it made signficant gains after TET when communist attrocities and VC loses turned the public against the NLF). They were also hopelessly incompetent and corrupt, which the Korean government was not.
Vietnam was a civil war, Korea was not for the most part.
Yes, definitely. Ironically, I think more South Vietnamese came around to supporting the government in the south later in the war, when the brutal nature of the communists became more clear. After the horrific 30-day occupation of Hue during the Tet offensive in 1968, the population of Hue was stauchly anti-communist, whereas before then, they were more guided by the fact that the mostly Buddhist population of Hue resented the mostly Catholic leadership of the Saigon government.
I agree. Tet (and later CORDS including the much maligned Phoneix program) badly crippled the VC. By 1972 they were a shadow of their former self - the war was essentially conventional (including armor in the Easter offensive) by then. But the shear incomptence of the SV government crippled the ARVN making it vulnerable to NV attacks.
The basic blunder of the US in Vietnam occured very early and was not the military tactics chosen - as often asserted. It was the decision to essentially ignore the ARVN in terms of training and equipment and to accept loyal (but incompetent and corrupt) leaders rather than try to find a charismatic nationalist reformer.
Once we made that decision we had lost, regardless of our tactics, because the US public was never going to stay in Vietnam forever, and the SV government could not stand on its own. Even if we had totally defeated the NVA, they would just have waited a few years and returned. So the US would have had to keep a quarter million or so troops in Vietnam forever. Something that was never going to occur.
I agree. Tet (and later CORDS including the much maligned Phoneix program) badly crippled the VC. By 1972 they were a shadow of their former self - the war was essentially conventional (including armor in the Easter offensive) by then. But the shear incomptence of the SV government crippled the ARVN making it vulnerable to NV attacks.
The basic blunder of the US in Vietnam occured very early and was not the military tactics chosen - as often asserted. It was the decision to essentially ignore the ARVN in terms of training and equipment and to accept loyal (but incompetent and corrupt) leaders rather than try to find a charismatic nationalist reformer.
Once we made that decision we had lost, regardless of our tactics, because the US public was never going to stay in Vietnam forever, and the SV government could not stand on its own. Even if we had totally defeated the NVA, they would just have waited a few years and returned. So the US would have had to keep a quarter million or so troops in Vietnam forever. Something that was never going to occur.
Exactly. The Americanization of the war, sweeping aside the South Vietnamese in the defense of their own country, was a terrible mistake. They never learned to stand on their own.
Under LBJ, the only logical end point of the strategy was for the war to go on forever. His strategy was not to win, but simply to avoid defeat.
I think geography was a big difference. In Korea, the south only had to defend a short border due to the fact that it's a peninsula. They were able to keep out northern communist infiltrators.
South Vietnam had a long border with Laos and Cambodia through which the North Vietnamese infiltrated, so the south was never really able to control its own territory.
The black and white nature of the Korean conflict was also different. The north blatantly invaded in a conventional assault. In Vietnam, it was much murkier. There was a lot of support in the south for the communist Viet Cong, and Ho Chi Minh had positioned himself as a nationalist while the US started out supporting the colonialist French. And many of the South Vietnamese leaders had served on the side of the French, which damaged their credibility as legitimate Vietnamese nationalists.
Duration was also an issue. The Vietnam War dragged on for too long without success. The American people generally don't like war, and if the US gets into a war, it has to win quickly before public opinion sours on it. The gradualist approach in Vietnam virtually guaranteed failure, because by the time we started to achieve a small measure of success, the public had soured on the war and wanted out.
Special emphasis on your last paragraph-----------About 10 years after the Vietnam War ended, a North Vietnam officer was interviewed on PBS
He stated there never was a doubt in his mind that North Vietnam would prevail whether it took 2 years,5 years,10 years,50 years,or 100 years.
Exactly. The Americanization of the war, sweeping aside the South Vietnamese in the defense of their own country, was a terrible mistake. They never learned to stand on their own.
Under LBJ, the only logical end point of the strategy was for the war to go on forever. His strategy was not to win, but simply to avoid defeat.
It was actually Westmorland not Johnson who made this decision. Johnson chose to limit the force applied both to avoid conflict with China and Russia and later to avoid public anger in the US.
One thing easy to miss is that much of the military regarded SE Asia as not the critical area of conflict. They were more worried about Japan and Western Europe which faced massive Russian and Chinese forces. They grew increasingly concerned as Vietnam essentially swallowed the US armed forces. By 1968 the military was so commited to Vietnam that it proved incapable of reacting to the N Korean agression in the Pueblo.
In addition the army, which was extremely good in 1965, was all but destroyed by the conflict,; it took it 15 years to recover.
Please register to post and access all features of our very popular forum. It is free and quick. Over $68,000 in prizes has already been given out to active posters on our forum. Additional giveaways are planned.
Detailed information about all U.S. cities, counties, and zip codes on our site: City-data.com.
Please register to participate in our discussions with 2 million other members - it's free and quick! Some forums can only be seen by registered members. After you create your account, you'll be able to customize options and access all our 15,000 new posts/day with fewer ads.
