Why were WWII Soviet casualties extremely high? (colonies, Spain, United States)
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Soviets took the full force of the Nazis head-on. They had no choice in it. The Germans were able to slaughter Russians in their own cities, AND kill the Russians in combat as Soldiers...
Comparing the US casualty rate to the USSR is a joke. The US, when it finally did land in Normandy was a late comer to the war. The war was already over by that time, the Germans were in retreat to Berlin and the war was going to end with a Russian victory regardless of whether the US helped or not.
All the US landing did, was deny the Russians from claiming France, Italy and some other European nations as becoming part of the USSR.
If however, the Germans did defeat the USSR I highly doubt the Normandy landing would have been successful. The Germans "only" had 20% of their troops in Western Europe - the other 80% was fighting the Russians. And that 20% German force still posed a massive challenge for the Uk and the US...A full 100% offensive from the Germans would have steamrolled any Allied landings.
Soviets took the full force of the Nazis head-on. They had no choice in it. The Germans were able to slaughter Russians in their own cities, AND kill the Russians in combat as Soldiers...
Comparing the US casualty rate to the USSR is a joke. The US, when it finally did land in Normandy was a late comer to the war. The war was already over by that time, the Germans were in retreat to Berlin and the war was going to end with a Russian victory regardless of whether the US helped or not.
All the US landing did, was deny the Russians from claiming France, Italy and some other European nations as becoming part of the USSR.
I often suspect it was a case. As I used to say, liberating Europe from Germans was already not a question for Russians, the question was who the heck would be liberating Europe from Russians afterwords?
Without allied aid the Russians would of lost the war. Millions of tons of supplies were shipped to Russia from the U.S. and Britian. I truly believe Hitlers interferance in military affairs is why Germany lost on the Eastern Front. Let us look at the dire mistakes he made. 1. Bailing out Italy. Operation Barbarossa was delayed by about 2 months because Hitler decided to bail out Mussolini. German military resources had to be diverted to the Balkans and the invasion of Russia put off. 2. Over ambitious. Hitler insisted the invasion to be on three fronts. One Leningrad, one towards Moscow, and one towards the Caucacus. This was simply to much territory with not enough troops or supplies. Had Hitler concentrated on drivin to Moscow he would of had more success. 3. Splitting up his army group to attack Stalingrad instead of keeping his forces consolidated to attack the oilfields in the Caucasus which supplied 90% of Soviet oil. Stalingrad had no military significance except for a T-34 tank factory but Hitler wanted to occupy the city simply because of its namesake. 4. Delaying operation Citadel so the Whermacht could deploy the new Tiger tank. This allowed the Soviets to turn Kursk in to a fortified fortress with anti tank ditches and mines. Even with the delay the Germans almost broke through in the south at Prokhorovka before Hitler cancelled the operation to send his troops to Italy. So as I stated before, had Hitler let his generals direct the fronts then the Germans would of won the war in the East.
Not so. 80% of the Lend-Lease supplies went to the UK and only 20% went to the USSR. And the vast majority of the small amount of Lend-Lease aid that did go to the Russians, was received after Stalingrad and Kursk were settled with the Germans defeated...And those two conflicts are considered the decisive point for when the Germans were in full retreat and on their way to defeat, especially Kursk. Kursk was a nail in the coffin after Germany lost at Stalingrad, and Kursk was over long before "D-Day". So with or without the help of Lend-lease its clear that the Germans were going to lose from the get go.
The only hope the Nazis had was either not invading Russia to begin with [which is what doomed them] or choosing a plan that didn't involve getting bogged down in city street fighting [Leningrad and Stalingrad].
Just to put it into perspective, the US lost 400,000 men total in WW2 - in both Europe and the Pacific combined.
478,741 Russians died in Stalingrad alone, and 750,000 Germans died there. So more Germans and Russians died in 1 ongoing battle alone than the US lost in the entire war...Clearly the US's role in Europe was minor.
Kursk was 54,000 Germans killed and 177,000 Russians killed...Berlin saw 1,000,000 Russian soldiers dead in combat and atleast 1million Germans dead. The Eastern Front completely dwarfed anything in the West.
Thats not even counting the Battle for Leningrad which lasted aslong as Stalingrad, or the many many other battles which each dwarfed the battle of the Buldge...
Not so. 80% of the Lend-Lease supplies went to the UK and only 20% went to the USSR. And the vast majority of the small amount of Lend-Lease aid that did go to the Russians, was received after Stalingrad and Kursk were settled with the Germans defeated...And those two conflicts are considered the decisive point for when the Germans were in full retreat and on their way to defeat, especially Kursk. Kursk was a nail in the coffin after Germany lost at Stalingrad, and Kursk was over long before "D-Day". So with or without the help of Lend-lease its clear that the Germans were going to lose from the get go.
It seems in terms of Lend-Lease and its impact on the Russian war effort, there are two camps. The Western camp that says it was critical and the Soviet camp that says it was of no consequence. Personlly I believe the facts fall somewhere in the middle.
If we break it down into four groups, I think it illustrates the critical sections of the Soviet economy that were supported directly by Lend-Lease:
1. Vehicles
The U.S. and Britain supplied over 22,800 AFV's (armored fighting vehicles) to the Soviets from 1941-1945. Of that approximately 9,000 were tanks of all types (the Sherman was most common) with the rest being infantry carriers. The aid had impact as early as the winter battles in 41/42 where several entire Soviet armored units were equipped with Lend-Lease tanks. This trend continued throughout the war. You of course need to compare this to Soviet production which totalled 105,000+ AFV's during the same time. So, tanks and AFV's were not the critical component.
The Allies also supplied 450,000 trucks and 78,000 jeeps. Compare this to Soviet production that amounted to no more than 197,000 trucks. The Soviet forces gained mobility throughout 42/43 largely do to Lend-Lease trucks. U.S. trucks were so common in Eastern Europe in 44/45 that the locals took the letters U.S.A. stamped on the trucks to mean Ubiyat Sukinsyna Adolfa, or kill that SOB Adolph.
2. Aircraft
The Allies provided 15,000 combat aircraft to the Soviets. The Soviets themselves produced over 157,000 planes of which around 120,000 were combat aircraft. The key to the planes is that many arrived in the crucial time period from late 41 to late 42 with Lend-Lease aircraft representing up to 40% of Soviet combat airpower.
3. Railroads
The Soviet rail system was virtually completely destroyed by the Germans during the invasion and required extensive rebuilding and regauging as the Soviets pushed west. This one area was one of the most critical supply functions of Lend-Lease. Fully 93% (623k) of rails used were supplied by Lend-Lease. The Allies also supplied 82% (2k) of the locomotives used by the Soviets and 81% (11k) of the rail cars. The entire Soviet rail system was rebuilt by Lend-Lease supplies.
This rail component was extremely critical as it was absolutely necessary to rapidly move troops and supplies along extended supply lines.
4. Raw Material
The Allies provide the following percentage of raw materials to the Soviet war effort:
Aviation Fuel: 59%
Automotive Fuel: 3%
Explosives: 33%
Copper: 45%
Aluminum: 55%
Tires: 30%
Machine Tools: 28% (understated do to the flexibility and quality of these tools)
Sugar: 30%
Meat: 15%
Grain: 25%
****
Taken altogether it paints a complex picture. Allied Lend-Lease allowed the Soviets to focus almost entirely on building tanks, guns, planes, ammo, etc. while the shortfalls and raw materials were filled in by Lend-Lease. This is why I say the truth is a balance. Looking at one area doesn't paint a true picture. The aid was desparately needed, but it is not the sole reason the Soviets won. Also, the type of aid sent is why looking at it in gross dollars shows a huge imbalance versus what was sent to Britain. Britain was buying massive amounts of completed equipment, ships, planes, tanks, etc. The Soviets biggest aid areas were trucks, rail stock and raw material, all much cheaper in dollar terms, but critical nonetheless.
The aid had its largest impact in terms of mobility with the trucks and rail stock assets and you can see the tactics of the Soviets shifting thought 1943 as they gained mobility.
Of the 660k motor vehicles the soviet union had by the end of the war 420k were supplied by western allies, according to Keagan, in his book "The Second World War".
It is highly doubtful that the soviet union would have been able to have stormed across europe with out the help of western allies.
I truly believe Hitler’s interference in military affa irs is why Germany lost on the Eastern Front. Let us look at the dire mistakes he made.
Just a couple of points regarding your original post:
Quote:
1. Bailing out Italy. Operation Barbarossa was delayed by about 2 months because Hitler decided to bail out Mussolini. German military resources had to be diverted to the Balkans and the invasion of Russia put off.
While the above point has been cited for decades in World War II history books as the reason Operation Barbarossa was delayed, it simply isn’t true.
To start with, Hitler’s decision to invade Yugoslavia on April 6, 1941 was in reaction to the overthrow of the pro-fascist government of Prince Paul and had nothing to do with Mussolini. Hitler had been in negotiations with Prince Paul to bring Yugoslavia into the Axis to bolster Germany’s southern flank in anticipation of Operation Barbarossa. On March 27th, just two days after formally joining the Axis, Prince Paul was deposed in a coup launched by anti-Fascist/pro-Serbian military officers. Hitler was infuriated by this turn of events and put into motion an invasion plan that had been prepared in case negotiations with Prince Paul had failed.
At the same time, the military situation in Greece had become one of stalemate with neither the Italians nor Greeks being able to make much headway against each other. The only way to swing the balance in Italy’s favor was for Germany to become directly involved. The necessity of this became more acute when the Greek government reached an agreement with the British which would allow British troops to operate and set up bases on Greek soil. Hitler was alarmed by this, primarily because British bombers launched from Greece could easily strike at the Romanian oil fields which Germany was so dependent upon. So Hitler decided to strike against Yugoslavia and Greece simultaneously.
The Yugoslavian portion of the operation was over by April 17th and the Greeks surrendered on April 24th. Units which were to participate in Barbarossa were being withdrawn from Yugoslavia for refit and resupply before all the fighting had even ended. In some cases, units were turned back to their Barbarossa staging areas while in route to Yugoslavia when the invasion was still underway because they were deemed unnecessary. In all, only three infantry divisions slated for the Barbarossa invasion force remained in Yugoslavia. This situation was repeated in Greece as well, where only two mountain divisions and one infantry division were left behind. Given the rapidity of victory and small number of troops left in each country, the impact on the timing and execution of Operation Barbarossa was non-existent.
The actual reason Operation Barbarossa was delayed was not in fact due to the Balkan sideshow but rather to something very basic; bad weather. The original launch date for Barbarossa was May 15th. However, spring arrived late in 1941 and heavy rain persisted well into early June. The rains in combination with the annual flooding caused by snow melt not only made rivers along significant portions of the invasion route impossible to cross, but also saturated the ground to the point where large scale, rapid movement of armor would be difficult at best. So really, the Germans had no choice other than to wait until these conditions cleared, which in the end turned out to be the latter part of June.
Quote:
2. Over ambitious. Hitler insisted the invasion to be on three fronts. One Leningrad, one towards Moscow, and one towards the Caucasus. This was simply too much territory with not enough troops or supplies. Had Hitler concentrated on driving to Moscow he would of had more success.
The idea of advancing on three fronts or using three army groups for the invasion of Russia did not originate with Hitler, but with General Friedrich Paulus of Stalingrad fame. Paulus became Quartermaster General of the German General Staff in early September 1940, and one of his first acts was to prepare a study regarding his thoughts on the Russian invasion plan currently being developed by the OKH. Paulus envisioned three army groups (North, Center, and South) advancing into Russia in direct axis toward Leningrad, Moscow, and Kiev, with the main weight of the attack resting with Army Group Center. This same basic idea was reiterated in a plan put together by Lieutenant Colonel Bernhard von Lossberg for the OKW in mid September 1940. Von Lossberg too placed the main objective as Moscow but he did call for a shift of some forces from the center to the north to bolster that army group should they run into difficultly on their drive toward Leningrad.
On December 5, 1940, General Halder presented his invasion plan to Hitler at a conference for the chiefs of the OKH and OKW. The employment of three army groups and the capture of Moscow were key elements in his plan as well. Although Hitler was in general agreement with Halder’s overall proposal, he would not commit to Moscow being the end goal of the operation. Instead, he thought the focus should be on the Baltic region, Leningrad, and the Ukraine. On December 18th, Hitler signed “Directive 21†which from that point forward would be referred to as Operation Barbarossa. Halder’s plan was left essentially intact but Hitler made one modification to it, namely allowing for a possible diversion of part of Army Group Center to help Army Group North take Leningrad. Halder and the OKH staff were not in agreement with this and insisted the operational objective should be Moscow. Hitler’s answer was to defer all final decisions on what the primary targets for Barbarossa were until the operation was underway. And this is how things remained until July 19, 1941 when Hitler issued “Directive 33†which halted Army Group Center and switched the emphasis of Operation Barbarossa to the north and south.
So while Hitler can be faulted for several decisions which had a negative impact on the chances of success of Operation Barbarossa, invading Russia on three fronts is not one of them. If anything, because of the size of the Soviet Union and the disposition of Russian forces along the western frontier, attacking at three different points was the only approach the Germans could take which made any sense. One need only look at what the Germans achieved in the first two weeks of Barbarossa to see the correctness of this decision. The real problem was in launching an operation before a specific objective had been settled on. Logically speaking, the primary target should have been Moscow since the strongest element of the German invasion force was Army Group Center. Had the OKH been able to persuade Hitler to their way of thinking, the campaign in the east may well have turned out differently or the end result might have been the same. Unfortunately, we will never know for sure.
The Allies also supplied 82% (2k) of the locomotives used by the Soviets and 81% (11k) of the rail cars. The entire Soviet rail system was rebuilt by Lend-Lease supplies.
This rail component was extremely critical as it was absolutely necessary to rapidly move troops and supplies along extended supply lines.
This is a perfect example of how statistics are manipulated to give a completely false picture.
The Soviet Union had 30,000 locos and 600,000+ rail cars in 1941
The US provided 2,200 locos and 11,000 railcars.
The locos were not shipped until 1944 and did not arrive until late 1944.
LL Locos and railcars were too little and too late to be of any real advantage to any of the 1941-1944 battles.
Because the Soviets stopped building locos diring the war then of course LL suplies were a high % of wartime production.
This is a perfect example of how statistics are manipulated to give a completely false picture.
The Soviet Union had 30,000 locos and 600,000+ rail cars in 1941
The US provided 2,200 locos and 11,000 railcars.
The locos were not shipped until 1944 and did not arrive until late 1944.
LL Locos and railcars were too little and too late to be of any real advantage to any of the 1941-1944 battles.
Because the Soviets stopped building locos diring the war then of course LL suplies were a high % of wartime production.
The number I have seen on Soviet loco's goes anywhere from 20,000 - 28,000. The 1935 records show a confirmed 20,000 and the 5 year plan begun in 1938 called for an additional 8,000. How many of those that were actually built is anyone's guess.
Additionally, there is no statement as to the breakdown of those numbers between line engines and yard dogs, nor are there any numbers relating to the percentage that were actually in use, there must be some percentage of loco's that were unavailable do to breakdown or being used for parts. There is also no determination made between modern engines versus older models. The 1935 census stated many of the loco's were pre-Revolution and of a "great variety". So, while the numbers are correct, the effective numbers are pretty much unknown.
Additionally, the Soviets listed approximately 15% of losses among their locomotives in the German invasion. That is 15% of the total, only a small number were captured and used by the Germans, so most of that 15% were destroyed in the invasion. The question then becomes what types of loco's were lost. Was it mainly the more modern trains built beginning in 1938, or was it mostly older rolling stock? No one seems to know.
I will give you that the locomotives themselves were not overly critical, but the added railcar rolling stock and rails themselves were. The railcars were needed to service the Iran and Vladivostok lines carrying in the LL supplies and the rails themselves were absolutely critical in expanding and rebuilding the lines. While the LL loco's didn't arrive until 1944, they were almost universally used in the west to support the advance owing to the larger capacity of those trains.
Overall, though, you are correct that statistics don't always tell the whole story. For instance, the automotive fuel supplies look incredibly small, but they had a big impact. The Allied automotive fuel was 100 octane and when mixed with the Soviet stocks allowed them to reach an 80-87 octane range, providing a higher quality fuel. Also, not shown was tetraethyl lead or TEL, a critical octane boosting element that the Soviets were very short on, allowing them to produce aviation and higher quality fuels.
As I said in my post, I think the truth about the impact of LL is overstated by one side and understated by the other. Certainly, the LL supplies were critical in supporting facets of the Soviet economy (raw materials and machine tools) and war machine (trucks and rails). Would they have lost without it? I doubt it, but it certainly made a contribution to their victory.
Soviets took the full force of the Nazis head-on. They had no choice in it. The Germans were able to slaughter Russians in their own cities, AND kill the Russians in combat as Soldiers...
Comparing the US casualty rate to the USSR is a joke. The US, when it finally did land in Normandy was a late comer to the war. The war was already over by that time, the Germans were in retreat to Berlin and the war was going to end with a Russian victory regardless of whether the US helped or not.
All the US landing did, was deny the Russians from claiming France, Italy and some other European nations as becoming part of the USSR.
If however, the Germans did defeat the USSR I highly doubt the Normandy landing would have been successful. The Germans "only" had 20% of their troops in Western Europe - the other 80% was fighting the Russians. And that 20% German force still posed a massive challenge for the Uk and the US...A full 100% offensive from the Germans would have steamrolled any Allied landings.
You hit the nail on the head. Fighting on the western front was pretty much a joke compared to what happened on the eastern front. It was all out war. It is to bad American movies ignore this piece of history.
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irs is why Germany lost on the Eastern Front. Let us look at the dire mistakes he made. 1. Bailing out Italy. Operation Barbarossa was delayed by about 2 months because Hitler decided to bail out Mussolini. German military resources had to be diverted to the Balkans and the invasion of Russia put off. 2. Over ambitious. Hitler insisted the invasion to be on three fronts. One Leningrad, one towards Moscow, and one towards the Caucacus. This was simply to much territory with not enough troops or supplies. Had Hitler concentrated on drivin to Moscow he would of had more success. 3. Splitting up his army group to attack Stalingrad instead of keeping his forces consolidated to attack the oilfields in the Caucasus which supplied 90% of Soviet oil. Stalingrad had no military significance except for a T-34 tank factory but Hitler wanted to occupy the city simply because of its namesake. 4. Delaying operation Citadel so the Whermacht could deploy the new Tiger tank. This allowed the Soviets to turn Kursk in to a fortified fortress with anti tank ditches and mines. Even with the delay the Germans almost broke through in the south at Prokhorovka before Hitler cancelled the operation to send his troops to Italy. So as I stated before, had Hitler let his generals direct the fronts then the Germans would of won the war in the East.
