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Don't be silly! Comparison in one area between two persons isn't a total comparison of personality in all areas. Learn to think for crying out loud!
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Patton was also known for controversial speeches. One such was so blood-thirsty and it may have fueled the Biscari Massacre, when American troops killed 73 German prisoners of war. http://www.hyperhistory.net/apwh/bios/b4pattong.htm
Just a reminder that you aren't dealing with a saint when you mention Patton. In any case my comparison applies to all generals in general and not just between patton and Stalin. BTW Pun not intended.
As for killing retreating troops? This was Stalins Order 270 which he wrote and signed which I quote in full. " I order that anyone who surrenders should ne regarded as a malicious deserter whose family is to be arrested as a family of the breaker of the oarh and betrayer of the Motherland. Such deserters are to be shot on the spot. Those falling into encirclement are to fight to the last otherwise are to be destroyed by all available means while their families are to be deprived of all assistance." What this order did was it created a body of men with nothing to gain ny continuing their allegiance to the USSR, either as their homeland or in the ideals of communism. This was manpower that Stalin doubly lost, as the Germans used Soviet prisoners on the Eastern Front to do work that othetwise would have had to be done by their own men. So what Stalins order meant was that soldiers who escaped the Germans and made their way back into Soviet territory were incarcerated and shipped off to prison camps. They were considered "stragglers" by Stalin which of course is exactly what they were not. Not only did the order feprived the Red Army of experienced many power but it also tied up the transportation system as well as keeping large numbers of able bodied men in the sercurity service so they could transport, guard, and investigate these unlucky soldiers.
You did not quote the order in full and are confusing two separate orders issued at different times.
Order 270 was issued in August 1941 at the height of the German initial offensive. The order contained three sections:
1. Any COMMANDER or COMMISSAR "tearing away their insignia and deserting or surrendering" are to be treated as malicious deserters. Commanders were ordered to shoot these people on the spot and their families were subject to arrest. The order only applied to military and political officers.
2. Any troops that are encircled are to fight until the end and demand that their commanders do the same. Anyone attempting to surrender was to be killed and their families deprived of state aid and welfare.
3. Superior officers were ordered to demote or if necessary to execute any commander who did not directly lead his troops in the field of battle.
This order is the source for the famous "There are no Soviet prisoners of war, only traitors".
Order 227 was issued in July 1942 and was directed to holding the line against the expected German assault. The order contained three important sections:
1. No commander had the right to retreat without an express order. Anyone who ordered a retreat would face a military tribunal.
2. Each front was to create 1-3 penal batallions, separate ones for privates and NCO's. These were to be comprised of troops with discipline issues and used in the most dangerous sectors of the front to lead assaults. The Soviet penal brigades were based on similar units used by the Germans. These brigades were also not permanent sentences as many soldiers assigned to them later rejoined other units after proving themselves, most famously Vladimir Karpov who went from serving in a penal brigade to becoming a Colonel in the Guards and being awarded the status of "Hero of the Soviet Union".
3. Blocking detachments were to be formed that would shoot any cowards and fleeing troops. These detachments were also used by the Germans during their retreat from Moscow (sense a trend, the Soviets were studying and emulating the German tactics). This order was very unpopular among commanders and many refused to follow it citing the waste of manpower. The requirement of maintaining these units was dropped after 3 months and disbanded entirely in 1944. Truly the image of commissars machine gunning fleeing troops is far more fantasy then it was reality.
This order was also the source for the famous "Not a step back!" slogan.
So, what did these orders actually do, not much. They were far more rhetorical and focused on galvanizing the Army and the citizens at a time of impending collapse. Notice how most of the provisions were directed at officers. There is little to no evidence that any of the provisions of order 270 were ever used against families.
Also, the idea that prisoners were traitors was never practiced. Fully over 90% of Soviet POW's liberated by the Red Army were immediately processed back into the Red Army. Even members of the NKVD who were taken prisoner were sent back to serve in the NKVD. Those not fit to serve were sent to work at factories or other military installations. Very few, less than 3% were ever re-improsined in the Soviet Union and I think a careful study would see it was done with just cause as most of those were marked by their fellow soldiers as people who collaborated with the Germans while imprisoned.
I have to ask though, what is the thesis we are discussing here? Are you attributing high Soviet casualties to Stalin alone?
Briefly;
One of Stalin's sons has been captured by Germans. Later on Germans wanted to exchange him for one of their generals. Stalin's response to the offer? "I don't exchange generals for soldiers."
Yes, the German's wanted to exchange Yakov for von Paulus. Reportedly so that Hitler could personally execute Paulus for disobeying him and surrendering at Stalingrad. Stalin's exact reply was "I will not trade a Marshal for a Lieutenant". There was apparently another attempt at a swap for Hitlers nephew Leo Raubal, but that was rejected as well.
Apparently the Germans never realized that Stalin wasn't exactly fond of his son. He referred to him as a "mere cobbler" and when Yakov was wounded trying to shoot himself after Stalin became enraged over his engagement to a Jewish girl, he apparently remarked, "he can't even shoot straight".
Yakov reportedly died trying to escape from the Sachsenhausen concentration camp.
Yes, the German's wanted to exchange Yakov for von Paulus. Reportedly so that Hitler could personally execute Paulus for disobeying him and surrendering at Stalingrad. Stalin's exact reply was "I will not trade a Marshal for a Lieutenant". There was apparently another attempt at a swap for Hitlers nephew Leo Raubal, but that was rejected as well.
Apparently the Germans never realized that Stalin wasn't exactly fond of his son.
True that.
But would the answer had been different if it were his other son? ( Or daughter for this matter?)
Quite honestly I have hard time understanding who/what Stalin really was.
He is too controversial of a figure, starting from his days in a seminary.
Actually what I said was that the order not to retreat contributed to the higher casualty rate. Why? Because certain battle situations demand a strategic retreat in order to avoid getting mowed down like grass as was happenning in Stalingradwith the units shuttled accross the Volga. Also, because any soldier who advances unarmed is tantamount to a helpless civilian who can't fire back and gain time that way. Additionally, pausing to pick up a rifle or having to scramble for one and even struggle with a fellow soldier for it makes you even more vulnerable.
While not retreating certainly increases casualty rates, in the case of the Soviets at the beginning of the war up through Stalingrad, it actually makes pretty good sense.
In the early stages of the war standing ground served two important functions. First, it delayed the German advance. Sometimes by several weeks like in the case of Smolensk and Kiev. The Germans could not continue their advance and leave large pockets of Soviet troops behind them. They had to take the time to remove these troops and then continue the advance. Secondly large numbers of retreating troops sow panic as they withdrawal. In the inexperienced Red Army leaning heavily on conscription and civilian volunteers to build defences large numbers of retreating troops would have caused panic and large scale logistical issues. This is greatly magnified by the inability of Soviet commanders and soldiers to execute an orderly retreat. Chances are the armies would have dissolved organically while withdrawing. Throwing these troops away was a better option strategically.
At Stalingrad, not retreating was again the correct strategic and tactical move. The Soviets did not yet have the ability to engage the Germans in open mobile warfare. By drawing the Germans into fighting for the city they negated the German armor, air and mobility advantages and reduced the battle to a small arms fight. The Germans had to secure their left flank if they were going to move into the Caucasus, part of that was taking or neutralizing Stalingrad do to its position on the Volga. The Soviets picked the one place they could stand and fight on semi-equal terms. Look at a map. Had the Soviets withdrawn from Stalingrad, there was no other natural defensive terrain for hundreds of miles to try and mount a defense. The Germans would have had the advantage completely tipped in their favor and the Soviets would have lost the oil fields at Baku and been left trying to fight further German advances in wide open terrain.
You did not quote the order in full and are confusing two separate orders issued at different times.
Order 270 was issued in August 1941 at the height of the German initial offensive. The order contained three sections:
1. Any COMMANDER or COMMISSAR "tearing away their insignia and deserting or surrendering" are to be treated as malicious deserters. Commanders were ordered to shoot these people on the spot and their families were subject to arrest. The order only applied to military and political officers.
2. Any troops that are encircled are to fight until the end and demand that their commanders do the same. Anyone attempting to surrender was to be killed and their families deprived of state aid and welfare.
3. Superior officers were ordered to demote or if necessary to execute any commander who did not directly lead his troops in the field of battle.
This order is the source for the famous "There are no Soviet prisoners of war, only traitors".
Order 227 was issued in July 1942 and was directed to holding the line against the expected German assault. The order contained three important sections:
1. No commander had the right to retreat without an express order. Anyone who ordered a retreat would face a military tribunal.
2. Each front was to create 1-3 penal batallions, separate ones for privates and NCO's. These were to be comprised of troops with discipline issues and used in the most dangerous sectors of the front to lead assaults. The Soviet penal brigades were based on similar units used by the Germans. These brigades were also not permanent sentences as many soldiers assigned to them later rejoined other units after proving themselves, most famously Vladimir Karpov who went from serving in a penal brigade to becoming a Colonel in the Guards and being awarded the status of "Hero of the Soviet Union".
3. Blocking detachments were to be formed that would shoot any cowards and fleeing troops. These detachments were also used by the Germans during their retreat from Moscow (sense a trend, the Soviets were studying and emulating the German tactics). This order was very unpopular among commanders and many refused to follow it citing the waste of manpower. The requirement of maintaining these units was dropped after 3 months and disbanded entirely in 1944. Truly the image of commissars machine gunning fleeing troops is far more fantasy then it was reality.
This order was also the source for the famous "Not a step back!" slogan.
So, what did these orders actually do, not much. They were far more rhetorical and focused on galvanizing the Army and the citizens at a time of impending collapse. Notice how most of the provisions were directed at officers. There is little to no evidence that any of the provisions of order 270 were ever used against families.
Also, the idea that prisoners were traitors was never practiced. Fully over 90% of Soviet POW's liberated by the Red Army were immediately processed back into the Red Army. Even members of the NKVD who were taken prisoner were sent back to serve in the NKVD. Those not fit to serve were sent to work at factories or other military installations. Very few, less than 3% were ever re-improsined in the Soviet Union and I think a careful study would see it was done with just cause as most of those were marked by their fellow soldiers as people who collaborated with the Germans while imprisoned.
I have to ask though, what is the thesis we are discussing here? Are you attributing high Soviet casualties to Stalin alone?
No, I am not saying Stalins keep attacking without establishing defensive positions doctrine is the only reason for high Soviet casulties. As I stated earlier there are many different reasons one being inexpieranced Red Army troops fight against seasoned battle hardened Whermacht veterans. I am simple saying that Stalins attack,attack,attack doctrine was the reason whole Soviet armies were encircled and destroyed in the first months of the attack. Couple that with Heinz Gurdarians brilliance at performing the double pincer movment, and you have German divisions destroying whole Soviet armies. Stalin had no concept of military doctrine and I think he was a big reason why the Red Army became very close to losing the war in the beginning of Borborossa. Just my opinion.
Thanks for clarifying. Of course the half-truths didn't originate with you. The history of the Great Patriotic War is unfortunately a confused affair in large part due to failure of the Soviet Government to be open about. From the very beginning, access to information was severely restricted, and the history books released by the government hid certain facts and embellished others. Difficult questions such as why the Red Army, which was touted as the best in the world in the Soviet Union, did so badly in the first stages of the war were not really answered, and the answers kept changing. When Khrushchev came to power after Stalin's death, for political reasons he needed to portray Stalin in the worst possible light. He also came out with a "new and improved" official history of the GPW, highlighting Stalin's idiocy and incompetency. Some things were blamed on Stalin which were not really his fault, other things were plainly made up. Successive Soviet leaders continued to politicize the topic for their own purposes. Towards the later years of the Soviet Union, cynical dissidents rejected all the "official" histories and came out with their own version of events. However, not having access to all the facts or only fragments of information, their efforts resulted more in conspiracy theories than actual history. Many dissidents also had an ax to grind and were not as objective as one would have hoped.
Western understanding of the GPW basically comes from two sources. One is those contradictory and politicized "official histories" that the were published by the Soviets and the other is German sources. While German sources were more trustworthy, they obviously lacked perspective and detail about what was happening on the other side.
It is only recently in the mid 90's, with the opening of the Russian military archives and greater freedom of the press, did a serious study of the war in the east begin. Both eastern and western historians (notably David Glantz and Anthony Beevor), amateurs and people interested in history began poring over documents and piecing together what really happened.
Still, even today, much of the misinformation is out there, even in Russia. Every successful lie has an element of truth to it, such the case with soldiers going into battle with only 1 rifle for 2 or 3 people. Did it happen? Yes. Was it common? No. Was the lack of arms the cause of Soviet defeats? No. In fact it was the opposite. As millions of Soviet troops were killed or captured, the Soviet Union was forced to quickly form hundreds of new divisions of fresh troops. Arming them was a challenge. These new divisions suffered form much greater shortages of artillery, for example, than rifles. Also, the Soviets switched their production from rifles to sub-machine guns. They were much less accurate than rifles but had greater firepower at short ranges and required less training to use. For the close quarter combat of Stalingrad, this weapon was suited much better.
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Obviously the encirclement and capture of hundreds of thousands during the initial stages of the Barbarossa offensive proves that they generally held their ground as ordered. Two reasons were,
1. Disatisfaction with the Soviet system
2. They expected humane treatment from the Nazis
Once they realized their mistake-however, it was either gettin **** forv desertion if they retreated or ekse falling into the hands of the Nazius which was a death sentence.
This is not true. In most cases, the Soviet troops did not surrender while they still had the capacity to resist. In many cases they fought to the bitter end, trying to break through to east or to fight a guerrilla war in the German rear. Most surrendered only after their ammunition, fuel and food ran out, and organized resistance was no longer possible. The idea that the troops were dissatisfied with the regime is a western projection not dissimilar to the one where American troops were expected to be greeted as liberators in Iraq.
This is not true. In most cases, the Soviet troops did not surrender while they still had the capacity to resist. In many cases they fought to the bitter end, trying to break through to east or to fight a guerrilla war in the German rear. Most surrendered only after their ammunition, fuel and food ran out, and organized resistance was no longer possible. The idea that the troops were dissatisfied with the regime is a western projection not dissimilar to the one where American troops were expected to be greeted as liberators in Iraq.
I agree that the first casualty of war is truth. Citizen moral has to be kept high. In fact, that's one reason why the media is no longer allowed the free access it once had during the Viet Nam War since the American public slowly turned against government policy based on what was being graphically shown on TV and reported via the press at that time.
However, if indeed we have been misinformed in reference to the initial mindset of the Russian soldiers during the initial stages of Barbarossa, then can you please provide the sources upon which you base this conclusion so we can evaluate whether they are trustworthy, biased, accurate, objective and are to be given greater weight than the other sources that your sources contradict? Thank you.
I could not disagree with this more. Although the ultimate cause of the disaster that began to unfold on June 22 was Stalin, it must be said that once the sttack became evident, there was really not much he or anyone in the Kremlin could do about the situation. It was far too late to move troops back and although much is made about his refusal to authorize the Red Army to shoot back in the first hours of the offensive, it is highly doubtful that this would have done much good. In 1941, surprize tactical air to ground attacks were unstoppable since most of Stalins air force were destroyed on the ground in the first days of the attack. Stalin for a long time after the initial attack actually did not direct military operations and ceased to do anything whatsoever. He returned to active leadership only when a delegation visited him and told him thats steps must be taken immediately to improve the situation at the front. Antoine Rivarol once famously stated that "To do nothing is a terrible advantage, but it must not be abused." Stalin definitly abused it. As for the rifle situation I will quote a Soviet general. "At the outbreak of war we did not even have sufficient numbers of rifles to arm the mobilized manpower. I recall that I telephoned fron Kiev to comrade Malenkov and told him that you must send us arms. Malenkov answered me, "We cannot send you arms. We are sending all our rifles to Leningrad and you jave to arm yourselves." Such was the armament situation.
There are records of Stalin meeting several generals and other members of the government on the first day after the invasion. That Stalin did nothing is has no basis in fact. Nor did he refuse to authorize the troops to shoot back. His order on the night of the German attack actually informed the troops that was was imminent and that an attack was expected at any order. The troops were to occupy their positions and be put on full alert. Only the last point of a long message stated not to give in to provocations - Stalin to the very end wrongly believed that a diplomatic solution was still possible and that war not a foregone conclusion. Hindsight is 20/20. But an order not to give in to provocation is not the same as forbidding troops to shoot back - there is an obvious difference between a provocation and an invasion of your homeland.
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