Could the Costly Pacific WWII Island Campaigns been Avoided? (WW2, war, bomb)

[John Walmsley]

Unfortunately, the American sacrifices in the Pacific WWII theater have never quite received the attention of the larger-scale European conflict. As they say, hindsight is often 20-20, but I've read that perhaps the island battles like the poorly planned Tarawa landing, where hundreds of American troops were required to walk several hundred-yards in low-tide water under withering Japanese fire could have been avoided. Likewise, the terrible cost in Marine lives to take Iwo Jima, a 10-square mile of rock and dirt that took five weeks to almost literally dig out 1083 survivors of approximately 23,000 fanatical Japanese defenders. (BTW, this incredible battle reminds one of the fierce Russian resistance of the Sevastopol fortress in the Crimea.) Richard Humble, author of Famous Land Battles, quotes one source as saying that had Iwo Jima been invaded at the time of the Mariana Islands invasion it could have been "...occupied in one or two days." All of this is conjecture, but would it have been possible to bypass these remote islands and more directly and earlier engage the Japanese forces in the Philippines and Okinawa?

[Grandstander]

The assault on Iwo Jima was for the purpose of capturing an air base that could be used to land B-29's which were in trouble and unlikely to make it back to the Marianas' bases. In Japanese hands, Iwo also served as as an early warning lookout post which could alert the home islands that a B-29 raid was on its way, as well as having an airfield from which fighters could be launched against the Superfortresses.

It wasn't a question bypassing it, there was genuine strategic value associated with capturing it. Whether what was gained justified the high casualties endured, would be another debate.

[Irishtom29]

Well Tarawa was a learning experience and the Navy did take the lessons to heart.

It can be argued that the invasion of the Palau Islands was a wasted effort as the war had swept by and the invasion of Leyte and American carrier dominance made it unneccesary.

One can argue (as King did) that the invasion of the Phillipines itself was a wasted effort and that even granting the need to take Luzon that MacArthur's sending Eichelberger to retake the southern Philipines was a strategic dead end and poor use of resources.

[cpg35223]

Really, compared to the United States' European campaigns, the Pacific war was run on a shoestring. So I think the U.S. really got a great deal for a relatively small expenditure.

[nitroae23]

Liberation of the Phillipines was a definite for two reasons.Postwar,we needed to show that we kept our (or Macarthurs) promise.Two,southern thrust Solomons,New Guinea and the P.I.'s was an army show.Whereas the central pacific campaign Gilberts,Marshalls was a navy responsibility.Navy and Army were like oil and vinegar back then,and we had the resources to conduct both operations.However,make no mistake about it,the lack of seaborne resources in the ETO killed us at Anzio, and our lack of air transport due to U.S. commitments to the CBI doomed Market Garden.

[harry chickpea]

IIRC, there were at least a couple of Japanese held islands that were bypassed. They held no airbase or significant offensive capabilities, and were allowed to rot without supplies when nearby more important ones were taken.

[brassbin]

do they really hate each other like some documentary say?

[68vette]

There is a great show on the History channel all this week. It's called WW2 in HD. They discuss this topic in some detail and describe the importance of taking many of the islands because of the airfields on these islands. They were important not only to get our air power closer to Japan and to support our naval operations, but also to protect the shipping lanes to Australia. The topic was brought up about the number of lives some of these islands cost and that maybe we should have just bombed the daylights out of them, but as we have learned in modern air combat, bombing alone doesn't always work.

[texdav]

Originally Posted by cpg35223

Really, compared to the United States' European campaigns, the Pacific war was run on a shoestring. So I think the U.S. really got a great deal for a relatively small expenditure.

Yep'it was decided by FDR and Churchill that europe would get the msot support and be concentrated on since it really endanger more of western society really.Its rewlly atonishing when you look at the war prodcution of teh USA compared to any other power in the war to fight on two fronts.

[Irishtom29]

Originally Posted by 68vette

They were important not only to get our air power closer to Japan and to support our naval operations, but also to protect the shipping lanes to Australia.

But those lanes are only important if you make the decision that Australia is worth defending which in hindsight in probably wasn't as the Japanese were incapable of taking much of it anyway.

Our can argue sensibly that our main drive should've been the old Plan Orange, straight across the central Pacific and only going south far enough to guard the flanks of such a drive. Concentrate on the center and let the Japanese fritter away their strength in useless operations.

Of course on the other hand the southern operations did kill a great many Japanese soldiers, sailors and airmen and as such served us well. And it was in the southern operations that the Navy gained the fighting and operational skills it needed, often at great cost.

I think it was a mistake to kill Yamamoto though; I think he's as overrated as Rommel and served us better by being in command than by being dead.