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Alistair Horne has written 600 pages of meticulous historical research which is at the same time an excellent read. "To Lose A Battle: France 1940" (1969) takes 200 pages to get to the opening German attack of May 10, 1940. That's a long wind-up but the background is essential to the understanding of what happened.
Of special interest are the portraits of the main French, German, and British leaders, both political and military - their backgrounds, personalities, ideologies, and interactions with each other. Some big World War II names were still relative small-fries during the Battle of France; Montgomery and Rommel were mere division commanders.
France was a deeply divided nation - close to civil war in 1936 - with a deep aversion to war because of her horrible and grievous losses in World War I. This explains why she demurred at military action to stop Hitler when it would have been relatively easy (isn't hindsight great?). The main opportunities were 1) When Hitler re-militarized the Rhineland in 1936 in violation of the treaty of Versailles 2) When Hitler took over part of Czechoslovakia in 1938, and 3) When he attacked Poland on Sept. 1, 1939. The latter was the occasion for Britain and France to declare war on Germany in "support" of Poland. But then they did nothing. Some support. Instead they waited until Hitler attacked France eight months later after building up his military substantially more.
On paper, but not in reality, the French military of May, 1940 was about the equal of the German. But the top military leaders of France were aging, and their ossified thinking was rooted in their experiences of 1914-1918. They could not grasp how fast well-led and well-trained tank forces could move until it was way too late. Their smug self-assurance led them to dismiss various warnings with such reactions as "This is not Poland; that couldn't happen here.", and "The Ardennes Forest is impenetrable." Forward thinkers like De Gaulle were too low on the totem pole to make much difference; he was only a colonel when the battle started.
The German plan of battle was audacious and imaginative but also very risky. (I'll not attempt the details on that but they are fascinating.) Had the French been better led and prepared and had they been able to react more quickly, things could have turned out very differently. In fact some French units fought quite well, but those instances were too isolated. The top French political and military leadership remained in denial until their armies had disintegrated. Despite the stunningly short duration of the Battle of France (about six weeks), its early stages were a much more closely run thing than many people realize.
It's been a few years since I've read it. It was pretty enlightening. With capable senior leadership and a better doctrine, the Germans would have had a much harder time than they did -- not that it was a cake walk to begin with.
It is a great book and extremely detailed for anyone who is interested in the topic. It really overturns a lot of the common myths associated with the battle. Just how risky the German strategy was is something most people don't appreciate and if not for the daring of some commanders like Guderian and Rommel exceeding their orders and pressing the advantage it may have ended very differently. The "dash" across France was not part of the original plan, but was an opportunity siezed upon by the local commanders and against direct orders to stop. It was this "dash" that really threw the French and British commands into disarray and left them paralyzed as to how to react. No one, not even Hitler and the German High Command thought that they would achieve such a rapid victory.
While the Germans were surprised, the defeat of France in 6 weeks is exactly what the Shleiffen Plan called for. So I'm not sure how surprising it actually was to the Germans. The German strategy was a modified Shleiffen Plan with more modern tactics. The biggest change being air support working in conjunction with ground troops and tanks.
France actually had a larger army in troop numbers and more tanks than Germany. The Germans had major advantages in tactics, communications, and organization of their forces. The German strategy of using air support in conjunction with ground troops and tanks was a new concept that was alien to the French. The Germans' superior communication allowed them to divert units quickly to the most needed areas in optimal numbers. The French were inefficient in that regard. France's strategy was a strategic defense in depth- the WW1 German strategy- and they thought the war would be fought like WW1 in a static manner, not a mobile war. The differences in tactics and strategies went heavily in favor of the Germans due to the war being mobile, not static.
What made the German strategy risky was their radical move of a tank spearhead through the Ardennes Forest away from the main body of the German Army. This left the German tank flanks exposed on both sides and vulnerable to a large encirclement and destruction by the French Army. The French however were thrown into disarray by the move and failed to recognize the German vulnerability before it was too late. The Germans cut off a large chunk of the French Army from the rest of France and put the rest of the French into a hasty retreat. The general French panic and confusion is ultimately what cost them the war. Had they recognized the German tank flanks being totally exposed, and organized a quick counter attack, the war would have been much different.
Last edited by Nolefan34; 10-10-2012 at 01:43 PM..
While the Germans were surprised, the defeat of France in 6 weeks is exactly what the Shleiffen Plan called for. So I'm not sure how surprising it actually was to the Germans. The German strategy was a modified Shleiffen Plan with more modern tactics. The biggest change being air support working in conjunction with ground troops and tanks.
The original proposed plans were a lightly modified version of Schlieffen that predicted a French capitulation in 12-18 months and with high casualties. Manstein's plan gained traction because he presented an option that while far riskier do to the dillution of forces, offered a much more rapid victory in the span of 6 months and with much lower casualties. No one in the German High Command was predicting anything nearly as ambitious as the 42 day victory outlined in Schlieffen.
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France actually had a larger army in troop numbers and more tanks than Germany. The Germans had major advantages in tactics, communications, and organization of their forces. The German strategy of using air support in conjunction with ground troops and tanks was a new concept that was alien to the French. The Germans' superior communication allowed them to divert units quickly to the most needed areas in optimal numbers. The French were inefficient in that regard. France's strategy was a strategic defense in depth- the WW1 German strategy- and they thought the war would be fought like WW1 in a static manner, not a mobile war. The differences in tactics and strategies went heavily in favor of the Germans due to the war being mobile, not static.
France's strategy was the Dyle Plan and if the Germans had followed their original slightly modified Schlieffen Plan the French plan had a high probability of working. The French/British plan was all predicated on stopping the German advance in Belgium, which they were semi-succesful in doing. What they didn't predict was the Ardennes move which was the radical part of the plan.
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What made the German strategy risky was their radical move of a tank spearhead through the Ardennes Forest away from the main body of the German Army. This left the German tank flanks exposed on both sides and vulnerable to a large encirclement and destruction by the French Army. The French however were thrown into disarray by the move and failed to recognize the German vulnerability before it was too late. The Germans cut off a large chunk of the French Army from the rest of France and put the rest of the French into a hasty retreat. The general French panic and confusion is ultimately what cost them the war. Had they recognized the German tank flanks being totally exposed, and organized a quick counter attack, the war would have been much different.
This is the "myth" that the book highlights and breaks down in great detail. The German plan that was officially adopted NEVER called for armored spearheads to drive across France to the coast. That was part of Manstein's original proposal, but was tossed out as being too risky. Instead the armored columns with air support were to force the bridgeheads and then wait for infantry support to build up before resuming the offensive in tandem with the infantry.
What ended up happening is that ambitious commanders on the ground, namely Guderian and Rommel, exceeded and ignored orders to execute the drive across France. When they saw the opportunity as the French forces melted from the bridgeheads they asked for permission to perform a "recon in strength". What they ended up doing was taking their entire divisions and steamrolling towards the coast. They were directly ordered by Hitler himself on three separate occasiosn to stop and wait for infantry support and each time they only stopped for a day before resuming the offensive. The High Command and Hitler thought that they were going to see the cream of their armored forces destroyed do to the brazen moves of the commanders.
In hindsight, the commanders made the right decision. Their move threw the French command into a panic and they were unable to respond in anything but piecemeal attacks against the armored columns that never gained much of an advantage. The armored columns only stopped when they ran out of fuel and needed to wait for resupply and the infantry. Once supplied and with their infantry supporting them, they completed the operations, though French resistance was definitely stiffening using improvised "hedge-hog" tactics. Had Guderian and Rommel not exceeded their orders and siezed the initiative, the battle may have played out very differently with the French having time to divert resources to meet the attack.
Great breakdown. Its hard for me to argue with anything you said. You have WW2 nailed down. I have a question for you though. I understand that the bulk of German forces were attacking from Belgium. What % of forces, meaning infantry, tanks, airplanes, etc. were coming to France from Belgium vs. what % were coming through the Ardennes? You said that Rommel and Guderian exceeded their orders by outrunning their infantry supply lines. Where were those infantry coming from? The Ardennes? Or from the main invasion force through Belgium?
What ended up happening is that ambitious commanders on the ground, namely Guderian and Rommel, exceeded and ignored orders to execute the drive across France. When they saw the opportunity as the French forces melted from the bridgeheads they asked for permission to perform a "recon in strength". What they ended up doing was taking their entire divisions and steamrolling towards the coast. They were directly ordered by Hitler himself on three separate occasiosn to stop and wait for infantry support and each time they only stopped for a day before resuming the offensive. The High Command and Hitler thought that they were going to see the cream of their armored forces destroyed do to the brazen moves of the commanders.
The following is a reprint of something I wrote in an earlier thread about the Battle of France:
Actually, all but two orders to Guderian to halt the advance of his Panzer Corps emanated not from Hitler or the OKW, but from the commander of the Panzer Group he was attached to, General Ewald Von Kleist. Kleist was an old cavalryman, who, though having led a Panzer Corps in Poland, was still not exactly convinced having Panzers operating on their own in large groups was a good idea. In fact, before the launch of Fall Gelb, there was a great deal of debate over who exactly would have operational control over the Panzers. Many of the generals involved in the operation wanted them to be subordinated to the infantry, while Guderian, on behalf of the other Panzer Corps commanders as well as himself, argued vigorously for the Panzers to be free to operate with speed and not tied down by infantry. In the end, General Wilhelm List had to broker a compromise. He granted the Panzers the independence they sought but with the understanding if they became bogged down and were overtaken by the infantry, they would then be subject to the control of the commander of that infantry group. So while Guderian and others pushed their Panzers hard to keep pace with the exact timing needed for Fall Gelb to be a success, they were also doing it to keep ahead of the infantry and thus, free from their control.
The first time Kleist ordered Guderian to stop his advance was on the 11th of May for the purpose of engaging a French cavalry force that was supposedly moving toward him. Guderian ignored the order and no French cavalry ever appeared. On the 15th, Kleist tried to stop Guderian at the Meuse, ordering him to consolidate the bridgehead there and wait for the infantry. Guderian had no intention of waiting for the infantry and impressed upon Kleist how critical it was to keep up the advance. Kleist finally gave in and granted Guderian an additional 24 hours to continue his advance. Kleist ordered Guderian to stop again on the 17th to allow General Gustav Von Wietersheim’s motorized infantry to catch up. Guderian was livid and made it clear to Kleist that he was not predisposed to obeying the order. Kleist demanded that Guderian hold his position until Kleist could arrive to speak with him. Once he did, a heated argument ensued between the two men and Guderian asked to be relieved of his command, which Kleist did on the spot. Guderian next sent a message to Von Rundstedt, advising him of what took place. Von Rundstedt told Guderian to stay until General List arrived. List made it clear to Guderian that the halt order originated at the OKW, so Guderian was obliged to obey. He added that Guderian’s request to be relieved of command would not be accepted. But once more, List offered a compromise. Guderian could mount a “reconnaissance in force” as long as Guderian’s headquarters did not move. Guderian decided to interpret “reconnaissance in force” to mean he could take his entire Panzer Corps. And to satisfy the requirement regarding his headquarters, Guderian left it where it was, then ran communication wire between it and his forward command post. Guderian was off and running again toward the Channel coast.
The only stop order that came directly from Hitler was the one issued on May 24th which halted the advance of all German forces on Dunkirk. Many explanations have been offered up as to why this was done. At one point, Hitler stated it was done as a gesture of goodwill to entice the British to the negotiation table, but few believed this to be the true reason. Whatever his actual motivation, Hitler never spoke of the incident for the remainder of the war, so why he really did it has been pretty much lost to history.
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Originally Posted by Nolefan34
While the Germans were surprised, the defeat of France in 6 weeks is exactly what the Shleiffen Plan called for. So I'm not sure how surprising it actually was to the Germans. The German strategy was a modified Shleiffen Plan with more modern tactics. The biggest change being air support working in conjunction with ground troops and tanks.
There are two misconceptions here. To start, the only thing the original plan for an attack in the West developed in October 1939 by OKH Chief of Staff Franz Halder had in common with the so-called "Schlieffen Plan", was calling for an advance through Belgium with the main point of attack being on the right. Halder's plan was designed to capture the Dutch and Belgian channel ports but not invade France itself. It was Halder's belief that the French would advance the bulk of their forces into Belgium and confront German forces there, allowing the Germans to destroy them and take the French out before England could do anything to effect the outcome. This plan left everyone, Hitler in particular, extremely unsatisfied and Halder was sent back to the drawing board. When Manstein, with Guderian's assistance and input, developed the "Sickle Cut" plan (the attack through the Ardennes), Halder actually took great pains to keep the idea from Hitler because he knew Hitler would be drawn to its boldness. When Hitler finally became aware of Manstein's plan and discussed it with him personally, he immediately ordered its adoption and incorporation into Halder's plan "Fall Gelb" or "Plan Yellow". Interestingly enough, Hitler had mused on more than one occasion during Fall Gelb planning meetings about a thrust through the Ardennes toward Sedan. But no one took his idea seriously because of the high risk involved in such a move and they did everything in their power to make Hitler forget about it altogether.
With respect to the Schlieffen Plan, it is mistake to refer to it as a "plan" in the first place. What it really was is just a detailed military study prepared by recently retired German Army Chief of Staff, Alfred von Schlieffen in 1906. Military historians have long labeled it a distillation of the various thoughts he had developed during his fifteen year tenure as chief of staff regarding the best way for Germany to deal with or forestall being embroiled in a prolonged, two front war with France and Russia. The idea Schlieffen enunciated in this study called for the destruction of the French Army in one rapid, massive battle. Virtually the entirety of the German Army would be deployed on the right wing of the German front with the remainder acting as a guard on the left flank to stop a possible French attack through Alsace-Lorraine. The right wing would advance through Belgium and northern France, with a possible move west of Paris, continuously turning the French left flank until the remainder of the French Army was forced into Switzerland. Because Schlieffen imagined this would or could be accomplished with great speed, he left no German forces to guard against a Russian advance into East Prussia. And even if the Russians did move, Germany could use its excellent rail system to quickly move troops from the West to the East to counter the Russians. But if you look at the details carefully you can see how this could not have been or was never intended to be, a legitimate war plan. The best illustration of this assessment is the fact that he called for the deployment of 96 divisions in the West. In actuality, the Germans only had 62 divisions available for use in the West in 1906 and that number had only increased to 76 by the time the First World War started in 1914. Any way you cut it, it was numerically impossible for Germany to execute the "plan" set out in his study of 1906 and Schlieffen was in a position to know that better than anyone.
The truth is, documents that researchers have uncovered in various German archives over the last 15 years indicate that Schlieffen had a completely different idea in mind as to how to deal with Germany's French/Russian problem. Because he knew that the combined military strength of Germany and Austria-Hungary was numerically inferior to the combined force of France and Russia, he envisioned fighting a defensive war against them. Mobility via the German rail system would be the key, and each foe would be taken on one at a time in close proximity to the German border. He did not contemplate or plan on the invasion of either of the two countries to accomplish the task of defeating them.
So while Schlieffen gets all the credit (rightly or wrongly) for being the basis for the German invasion plans of France in 1914 and Halder's first plan of 1939, in both instances they are not a true reflection of what Schlieffen had in mind at all.
Great stuff. What about the Maginot Line? I understand that the French defensive strategy relied on this line being heavily fortified and impossible to penetrate. They mistakenly believed that the Ardennes Forest was a natural barrier and impassible for German forces. What were their thoughts on the Germans coming through Belgium? Did they consider that? Or was that a surprise to the French? If they planned for it, then why concentrate so much on the Maginot Line?
Great stuff. What about the Maginot Line? I understand that the French defensive strategy relied on this line being heavily fortified and impossible to penetrate. They mistakenly believed that the Ardennes Forest was a natural barrier and impassible for German forces. What were their thoughts on the Germans coming through Belgium? Did they consider that? Or was that a surprise to the French? If they planned for it, then why concentrate so much on the Maginot Line?
Well, as NJGOAT pointed out in his post, the French reaction to a possible German invasion was the adoption of "Plan D" or the "Dyle Plan". It was predicated on the belief that Germany would repeat 1914 and attack through Belgium, so it was not a surprise to the French when it happened. As per the plan, a combined French/British force advanced into Belgium and established a defensive line along the Meuse and Dyle Rivers to halt the Germans. The thought was they could contain the Germans at that point and hold them for an extended period until the French and British had built up a strong enough force to launch a counteroffensive. And yes, they were supremely confident that a combination of the Ardennes and the Maginot Line would keep the Germans from entering France in that direction, so no special measures were taken other than to man the Maginot fortifications and put a light scouting force near the Ardennes. Again, as NJGOAT stated, the real surprise to the French was the Germans coming through the Ardennes. This single move threw the whole Allied defense plan into chaos and the French Army began to collapse. Once that happened, it was game over.
I had prepared a response and went to post it just as the forum crashed. Here's my second attempt, but it might not be as thorough.
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Originally Posted by Nolefan34
Great breakdown. Its hard for me to argue with anything you said. You have WW2 nailed down. I have a question for you though. I understand that the bulk of German forces were attacking from Belgium. What % of forces, meaning infantry, tanks, airplanes, etc. were coming to France from Belgium vs. what % were coming through the Ardennes? You said that Rommel and Guderian exceeded their orders by outrunning their infantry supply lines. Where were those infantry coming from? The Ardennes? Or from the main invasion force through Belgium?
First, the Ardennes is in Belgium. It lies in the southern corner with Luxembourg to the east and France to the south and west. So technically, they did all come through Belgium with the excpetion of the forces harassing the Maginot Line. The main forces were broken down into three army groups:
A: Formed the center and contained 45.5 divisions including the 7 armored divisions that formed the cream of the panzer forces. This is the force that attacked through the Ardennes. This is also where the infantry support for the panzers was coming from.
B: Formed the right wing of the German attack and contained around 29.5 divisions. This force attacked directly into Belgium and their goal was to draw in as many Allied forces as possible as far north as possible to facilitate capturing the Allied forces in the pocket formed from A's attack.
C: Formed the left wing of the German attack and was mainly a blocking action to prevent any attacks from France into Germany. It had around 18 divisions and their primary goal was to harass and occupy the forces at the Maginot Line.
There were an additional 42 divisions assigned to the offensive, but they were held in strategic reserve.
The rest was handled astutely by TonyT.
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Originally Posted by TonyT
The following is a reprint of something I wrote in an earlier thread about the Battle of France:
Actually, all but two orders to Guderian to halt the advance of his Panzer Corps emanated not from Hitler or the OKW, but from the commander of the Panzer Group he was attached to, General Ewald Von Kleist. Kleist was an old cavalryman, who, though having led a Panzer Corps in Poland, was still not exactly convinced having Panzers operating on their own in large groups was a good idea. In fact, before the launch of Fall Gelb, there was a great deal of debate over who exactly would have operational control over the Panzers. Many of the generals involved in the operation wanted them to be subordinated to the infantry, while Guderian, on behalf of the other Panzer Corps commanders as well as himself, argued vigorously for the Panzers to be free to operate with speed and not tied down by infantry. In the end, General Wilhelm List had to broker a compromise. He granted the Panzers the independence they sought but with the understanding if they became bogged down and were overtaken by the infantry, they would then be subject to the control of the commander of that infantry group. So while Guderian and others pushed their Panzers hard to keep pace with the exact timing needed for Fall Gelb to be a success, they were also doing it to keep ahead of the infantry and thus, free from their control.
The first time Kleist ordered Guderian to stop his advance was on the 11th of May for the purpose of engaging a French cavalry force that was supposedly moving toward him. Guderian ignored the order and no French cavalry ever appeared. On the 15th, Kleist tried to stop Guderian at the Meuse, ordering him to consolidate the bridgehead there and wait for the infantry. Guderian had no intention of waiting for the infantry and impressed upon Kleist how critical it was to keep up the advance. Kleist finally gave in and granted Guderian an additional 24 hours to continue his advance. Kleist ordered Guderian to stop again on the 17th to allow General Gustav Von Wietersheim’s motorized infantry to catch up. Guderian was livid and made it clear to Kleist that he was not predisposed to obeying the order. Kleist demanded that Guderian hold his position until Kleist could arrive to speak with him. Once he did, a heated argument ensued between the two men and Guderian asked to be relieved of his command, which Kleist did on the spot. Guderian next sent a message to Von Rundstedt, advising him of what took place. Von Rundstedt told Guderian to stay until General List arrived. List made it clear to Guderian that the halt order originated at the OKW, so Guderian was obliged to obey. He added that Guderian’s request to be relieved of command would not be accepted. But once more, List offered a compromise. Guderian could mount a “reconnaissance in force” as long as Guderian’s headquarters did not move. Guderian decided to interpret “reconnaissance in force” to mean he could take his entire Panzer Corps. And to satisfy the requirement regarding his headquarters, Guderian left it where it was, then ran communication wire between it and his forward command post. Guderian was off and running again toward the Channel coast.
The only stop order that came directly from Hitler was the one issued on May 24th which halted the advance of all German forces on Dunkirk. Many explanations have been offered up as to why this was done. At one point, Hitler stated it was done as a gesture of goodwill to entice the British to the negotiation table, but few believed this to be the true reason. Whatever his actual motivation, Hitler never spoke of the incident for the remainder of the war, so why he really did it has been pretty much lost to history.
TonyT, great contribution as always. I had read before that Hitler issued three seperate stop orders on the 17th, 22nd and 24th. If that's not the case with Hitler only issuing the order on the 24th, what was the source of the orders on the 17th and 22nd? Was the source just confusing it and saying OKW=Hitler?
Further, I have read that Hitler was quite upset over the brazenness of the panzer commanders siezing the initiative and driving to the coast. Going so far as to lament that they may cost him the war. Is there anything to that? You have an amazing knowledge of the "behind the scenes" actions, so anything you could add to your contributions on what was going on at that time regarding the panzer commanders and Hitlers and the OKW's view of the situation, would be much appreciated.
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Originally Posted by Nolefan34
Great stuff. What about the Maginot Line? I understand that the French defensive strategy relied on this line being heavily fortified and impossible to penetrate. They mistakenly believed that the Ardennes Forest was a natural barrier and impassible for German forces. What were their thoughts on the Germans coming through Belgium? Did they consider that? Or was that a surprise to the French? If they planned for it, then why concentrate so much on the Maginot Line?
Not much to add to what TonyT already pointed out other then to say that the belief that the Ardennes was impenetrable wasn't outside of reality. It really was a huge gamble by the Germans and not just a gross oversight by the French as many believe. There were only, I believe, two main roads through the Ardennes and the secondary roads were very narrow and poor. The logistics of moving the large body of troops through that area taxed the Germans heavily. When the operation stepped off there was a 3+ day and 30 mile long traffic jam of men, tanks and equipment trying to move through. The analogy is like trying to empty a swimming pool with a garden hose. Had the French been able to organize any major resistance and bottleneck the Germans in the Ardennes things could have gone very differently.
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