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You readers are aware that two battles are shaping up, one on the York/James Peninsula as the Army of the Potmac begins landing at Fortress Monroe, and another in SW Tennessee where both the Union and Confederates were consolidating their armies for an offensive strike.
There was a third.
One hundred and forty miles long, averaging twenty five miles in width, sheltered by mountain ranges on either side and watered by the twin forks of a river, the Shenandoah Valley produced about 20 % of Virginia's food crops and livestock. Its SW to NE orientation made it an arrow pointed at Maryland and Washington DC, providing a shielded approach to Union territory, while an invading Northern army using it would be headed away from Richmond. The land rose for South bound travelers, thus the Southern end was known as the Upper Valley while the less elevated Northern end was called "Lower." At Staunton in the Upper Valley, the tracks for the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad passed, a vital connection between Virginia and Mississippi.
When General Joseph Johnston had withdrawn the main rebel army behind the Rappahannock River, General Stonewall Jackson had continued to protect his western flank by withdrawing "up" the Valley. Cautiously tracking his movements were elements of three seperate Federal forces under the overall command of political general Nathaniel Banks.
At this point Jackson commanded four brigades, a total of about 5000 infantry and cavalry. He was under orders from Johnston to do whatever he could to prevent any of Banks' forces leaving the Valley and coming to join McClellan's army in its march on Richmond. As with the theatrical Magruder on the Peninsula, the South had the right man on the scene for the demands of the job. Jackson saw no reason to wait queitly until the Union hosts united and fell upon his command, nor did he deem being badly outnumbered a reason not to go over to the attack. He awaited only an opportunity.
150 years ago today Jackson received intelligence which informed him that the Union forces were pulling back from their more advanced positions in the Valley. Jackson correctly guessed that this meant that the Union was transferring some elements of the Valley armies to support McClellan's efforts on the Peninsula. Jackson also concluded that the forces left to pursue his command would be greatly reduced in strength. That guess was going to be proved wrong.
Jackson decided on a lightining strike against General James Shields command at Kernstown. He would take 3500 of his men on a forced rapid march North and surprise the Union command there which Jackson's cavalry commander, Colonel Turner Ashby, was estimating to be about the same size as Jackson's. Shields actually had 9000 fit for duty.
Jackson's men had 40 miles to cover and Jackson wanted them in position to attack the morning of the 23rd. So off they marched at a killing pace, the first of numerous such exhausting movements which would result in their being nicknamed "Jackson's Foot Cavalry."
Jackson's boldness was astonishing. Though the three forces arrayed against him numbered 35,000, and though two of those armies would be on his flanks as he headed North, he was confident that his superior knowledge of the Valley geography would allow him to vex the others while he struck at them one at a time.
The red circle by Jackson's name marks the start of the march on Kernstown..look at the potential trap Jackson was marching into..fully aware that they are there. If Rosecrans (soon to be replaced by our old friend the Pathfinder) or McDowell were to move through the southern passes of the mountains behind Jackson, he would be caught in a three sided vise.
After their exhausting high velocity march to the scene, at 11 am 150 years ago today, General Thomas J. Jackson and around 3500 of his men arrived at Kernstown before a Union force he believed to be no larger than his own.
Jackson was deeply troubled by a decision that he had made after searching his conscience . As described by Robert L. Dabney, Jackson's chief of staff (and a Presbyterian minister) :
Quote:
It was the Sabbath day; and if there was one principle of General Jackson's religion, which was more stringent than the others, it was his reverence for its sanctity. He had yielded to the demands of military necessity, so far as to march on the sacred morning, that he might not lose the advantages which opportunity seemed to place within his reach; but now a more inexorable necessity was upon him.
That necessity was the discovery that his opponent General Shields actually outnumbered him by two and a half to one, a fact which became evident went Jackson launched his attack blindly and his commanders on the scene began sending back reports of coming upon regiment after regiment of fresh Union troops which beat back the assaults. After recognizing the true situation, Jackson determined to fight it out anyway under the theory that while victory today was not going to be possible, a spirited attack would deceive the enemy about his numbers and allow for an unmolested retreat when the time arrived for that.
At the center of Jackson's line was the Stonewall Brigade, Jackson's original command at Bull Run before he was promoted to leading a division. Now led by General Richard B. Garnett, they gave a good account of themselves throughout the afternoon until about 6 pm when they exhausted the last of their ammunition. Garnett felt that this justified pulling them out of the line and he did so without getting Jackson's permission.
The rebel flanks were forced back by Garnett's evacuation of the center and Jackson was infuriated to see his army retreating from the battlefield without being ordered to do so. He had Garnett arrested, angering Garnett's brother officers and men who knew that he had fought bravely all day and had not fallen back until the means to fight on had evaporated. Garnett was removed from command and held for court martial, a process that was just beginning the following August when General Lee ordered him released and restored to command in time to participate in the Second Bull Run campaign. Garnett fought to have his good name restored and conducted himself with reckless bravery at Gettysburg the following year, heroism which resulted in his death.
Jackson's severity was a product of his warrior philosophy, a code described by Dabney thusly:
Quote:
His disapprobation was strongly expressed against its brave General, Garnett, nor was he willing to accept the justification, that their ammunition was expended. A regiment of reserves was at hand, and the bayonet, his favorite resource, yet remained to them; he did not consider all the means of victory as exhausted, until the naked steel was employed.
With Jackson the above was not tough talk designed to boost morale, but an expression of a very real victory or death ethic when it came to battle. Many officers and soldiers were to feel Jackson's wrath throughout his short but spectacular Civil War career.
The Union command held the field, and inflicted more casualties (718-590) on the Confederates than they sustained, so it was a tactical victory for the North, the only such tactical loss Jackson was to experience during the war. However it was a huge strategic victory for the South in that Jackson's incredible aggression sent alarms clanging in all the places General Johnston hoped that they would. With the bulk of the Army of the Potomac now disembarking at Fortress Monroe, President Lincoln became concerned that Jackson would march on Washington and he ordered Banks to recall the untis which were being transferred to the Peninsula. He also ordered General McDowell's huge 5th Corps to turnabout on their march to join McClellan overland, and take up the pursuit of Jackson in the Valley.
This was Lincoln's first command decision after taking over the conduct of the war from McClellan, and it was a poor one. Not only were the troops retained in the Valley completely ineffective against Jackson, but denying McClellan the use of McDowell's Corps provided Mac with just the excuse he needed to claim that he could not make direct attacks since he was outnumbered....if only he had McDowell.
While General George McClellan is remembered for his faults and failures during the Civil War, he was a man of considerable talent and there were numerous things that he had done well. The organization of America's largest armada had been a monumental task and Mac had produced a highly efficient operation. Since March 17th, it was delivering a division a day to Fortress Monroe on the Peninsula. Along with the Union Navy vessels in use, 113 additional steamers had been leased at a cost of $24,000 a day. They plied the waters between Alexandria and Fortress Monroe, towing some 276 barges and canal boats with them.
McClellan should have been happy about the smooth operation of his plans, but of course this was McClellan and instead he was still angered by having run afoul of the Congressional Committee on the Conduct of the War. Dominated by radical Republicans, the committee had been suspicious of McClellan simply because he was a Democrat. When Mac had failed to launch any offensive operations in 1861, the Committee's suspicions grew worse. When Mac declined to appear before them voluntarily to explain his strategies, they were offended.
Then when Mac had sent a broadside address to all of his troops announcing their movement and bucking up their morale, he had called for a quick conclusion to "this sad war." The Committee elected to interpret those words as a manifestation of McClellan's absense of commitment to winning the war and freeing the slaves. The Committee tried to ram through a censure of McClellan in the Senate, but it fell short by a small margin.
Coupled with having General McDowell's 35,000 man Corps withheld to defend Washington, McClellan was already developing a theme in his mind....that there was a fire in his rear, that there were radicals who were working to see him fail, and then be replaced by someone with the sort of South punishing, slave freeing mentality which they deemed proper. Some historians view McClellan as paranoid, and while he did show signs from time to time, it is fair to remember that there were indeed powerful people in the Republican government who wished him ill.
Another thing that McClellan had done well was keeping the lid on his plans. The Confederacy was still in the dark as to the ultimate destination and distribution of the immense force gathered at Alexandria. 150 years ago today they got their first hint. A telegraph arrived from a concerned General Magruder informing Richmond that an alarming number of ships were arriving at Fortress Monroe and disembarking troops and cargo.
General Joseph Johnston's army was still guarding the Rappahannock line well North of Richmond. Should they pull back and head for the Peninsula, or were these arriving troops a feint masquerading a large blow struck elsewhere? Was the target Richmond or Norfolk? Were they going to be forwarded to North Carolina to reinforce Burnside for a big inland push? Were these troops designed to lure Johnston to the east while the bulk of the Union army advanced overland from the North?
For an answer to this, President Davis turned to General Robert E. Lee whose war fortunes to date had not been the stuff of legends. He had been given command in Western Virginia just in time to preside over the failures of the bickering rival generals in that region. He had been chased from his headquarters in Charleston by the big fire, had then been placed in charge of coastal fortifications, with his reputation not helped by the Union landings and occupations in North Carolina and Georgia. At the start of this month, Lee had been called to Richmond and given a blank portfolio as Davis' war adviser.
Lee advised no reaction at all until the Union plans were made clear. Johnston remained in the North, and Prince John Magruder was told that he would have to make do with what he had for the time being.
When we last looked in on General Henry Hopkins Sibley and his Confederate invasion of New Mexico, he was defeating General Edward Canby's force in the field, but failing to capture Fort Craig. Since Sibley's grand vision went beyond New Mexico and also included the conquest of California for the South, he decided to ignore this first objective and instead march around it, continuing on his campaign, targeting Albuquerque and Santa Fe.
Sibley had lost a large number of horses in his battle with Canby and one regiment of cavalry had to be dismounted and converted to infantry so that their horses could be used to pull the wagons and artillery. And even with this measure there still wasn't enough transportation to carry all the wounded, so many of them had to manage on foot. The going was slow. Albuquerque wasn't reached until March 2nd, Sante Fe on the 13th. In both cases, the slow approach of Sibley's force had provided such ample forewarning that the residents of those towns were able to pack up most of their supplies and fade into the countryside, denying Sibley's men the food on which he was relying to feed his army.
The glacial advance had also allowed time for Colonel John P. Slough and his regiment to arrive at Fort Union to the North, reinforcing the garrison there and assuming command of them all. Slough wasted no time in setting out after Sibley's army, this despite orders from Canby to remain in Fort Union and harrass the enemy. 150 years ago today, the advance forces of both armies converged on Glorietta Pass, the only passage through the Sangre de Cristo mountains in the area. Sibley had sent 350 men forward under the command of Charles L. Pyron to secure the pass, and they encountered 418 Colorado militiamen under Major John Chivington at a point called Apache Canyon.
Chivington's force was not ordinary militia, but a unit composed of rugged mountainmen, miners and Indian fighters. Chivington was himself an outlandish figure, a religious warrior whose career as a Methodist minister was marked by his having been asked to leave every parrish in which he had been active. Chivington was an eye for an eye zealot who blurred the lines between politics, theology and military affairs. He had led his men on a forced march of 400 miles across the mountains to reach this battlefield, a distance they covered in just two weeks. Now with little rest, they plunged into combat.
Chivington's men surprised the Confederates who fell back on their artillery line which was able to keep the Yankees penned back for a time. Then Chivington split his command in two, sending each half up the sides of the pass until they were in a position to deliver a plunging enfilade fire on the rebels. The Confederates began an orderly retreat which was turned into a rout when a Union cavalry charge went forward to encourage their flight.
Not knowing how close Sibley was with the main army, Chivington was satisfied in occupying the pass while not attempting pursuit. Both sides had about 20 killed and wounded, but the Union captured 75 rebel prisoners while losing none
Both sides now began to rush reinforcements to the scene as the decisive battle of Sibley's campaign approached.
On the map you can see that Sante Fe and Fort Union are separated by the Sangre de Cristo mountain range. Sibley had to force his way through Glorietta Pass if his campaign was to continue at all.
He was born in New York in 1828, moved to Pennsylvania when he was 18 to teach school, and finally relocated to the Shenandoah Valley in the 1850's where he opened his own academy. He taught all subjects, but his own specialty was geology. He supplemented his income by frequently hiring himself out as a mining geologist and in that capacity, explored nearly every corner of the Valley. This contributed greatly to his personal hobby, mapmaking.
When the war began he offered his services as a teamster to the Confederates trying to hold on to western Virginia, and when his mapmaking skills were discovered, they began to employ him as a cartographer. He soon developed typhoid and had to return home to recuperate, but in March rejoined the army and was assigned to General Jackson's command.
150 years ago today Jackson was retreating up the Valley after his tactical setback at Kernstown. Jackson's mind was still on resuming the offensive as soon as it was possible, and to that end he summoned to his tent Jedediah Hotchkiss and told him that he wanted a map of the entire Valley, charting every single feature which aided or hindered military operations. If Jackson couldn't overwhelm his opponents with numbers, then he would befuddle them with maneuvers. Hotchkiss produced maps which were immensely more detailed and accurate than those being used by the Federals, and Jackson was to take full advantage of this. Most of the lightning moves and surprise appearances to come by Jackson's Valley Corps, were direct products of the superior knowledge of the terrain which Jackson enjoyed.
Hotchkiss was to remain with Stonewall throughout the rest of his battles, charting the famous flank march that Jackson was to make 15 months later at Chancellorsville which ended with his death. Hotchkiss then provided his services to General Lee for the remainder of the war. After the conflict, Hotchkiss wrote one the the twelve volumes of "Confederate Military History", the first exhaustive historical study of the Southern rebellion strategy and tactics. Hotchkiss wrote the volume on the war in Virginia, all 1,295 pages. He died at the age of 71 in the last year of the Century.
Below is an example of the stunning work that Hotchkiss produced. It charts the positions for both sides as well as the surrounding terrain at Spotsylvania during the 1864 battle.
Last edited by Grandstander; 03-26-2012 at 05:23 PM..
After day taken to bring up reinforcements, both sides were ready to resume the struggle for control of Glorieta Pass. The 300 rebels who had participated in the skrimish at Apache Canyon were now swollen to 1100, and under the command of Lt. Colonel William Read Scurry. Colonel John Slough had arrived to reinforce Chivington's 400, bringing the Union total to about 1300.
Both commanders had determined that their opponent was most likely to remain on the defensive, so both planned to attack. Slough divided his command, sending Chivington's battalion on a flanking march across the sides of the canyon, with instructions to descend on the Confederate flank once the main attack had been launched.
This plan went out the window when instead of waiting to be attacked, Scurry's men arrived and launched themselves at Slough's reduced command. Throughout the day the two sides attacked and counter attacked, and late in the afternoon the advantage began to swing the Confederate's way. Slough had been pushed back from one position to the next, and finally ordered a retreat to Kozlowski's Ranch, from where they had begun their day.
The rebels had left their supply train at Johnson's Ranch, and expecting to be on the offensive, felt it was safe from attack despite being guarded by just a small detachment. As the day had unfolded, Chivington's men were left waiting to make their flank attack on a flank which failed to materialize. One of the scouts sent out to determine what had gone wrong came back and reported coming across Johnson's Ranch and the weakly guarded rebel supply depot. Chivington decided that this was a better goal than waiting around until dark, so he marched his men to the ranch, spent an hour snooping around to make sure it wasn't a trap, and then led his men whooping downhill to claim their loot. The tiny guard scattered at their approach and Chivington's men fanned out and began their destruction. Horses and mules were either requisitioned for Union use, or stampeded out into the desert. All eighty wagons and their contents were ignited and left blazing. The cannons of the artillery reserve were spiked, the powder supply blown up.
Word of this disaster reached Scurry as he was regrouping his men for pursuit of the retreating Federals. He instantly recognized that not only was the battle over, so was the entire campaign. Sibley was going to have to march back to Sante Fe to find something for his army to eat, and back to Texas to re-equip it with arms and powder. The conquest of New Mexico and California would have to come some other time. The fight had cost each side about 45 dead and 80 wounded.
This was one of the decisive battles of the war because there never was another time. No further attempts on New Mexico were made by the South.
Chivington emerged a hero for his key blow, and he didn't seem to rush to correct the impression that he had planned this movement against the supplies from the start.
The violence minded Methodist minister had now gained fame for himself. In two and a half years, he will be gaining infamy.
John Charles Fremont's 1846 expedition to California, where he became involved in siezing that state for the US, ended with his conviction at a court martial for insubordination, refusing the orders of a superior officer, and styling himself governor of California even after General Kearny arrived and assumed that office.
Fremont's appointment as supreme commander in the west in 1861 had ended when President Lincoln fired him for declaring his own personal emancipation proclamation for the slaves of Missouri, a border state which Lincoln was deperately trying to keep loyal.
Fremont was too well connected politically to be kept down. He had been one of the founders of the Republican Party, its first candidate for president in 1856 when it had featured a radical abolitionist platform, and he remained the darling of the radical Republicans who controlled Congress. Pressure was being placed on Lincoln to find a new command for The Pathfinder and an opportunity opened.
General William Rosecrans had been commanding the Union forces which kept the Confederates from retaking western Virginia. During the long inactive lull after General McClellan had taken command, Rosecrans crafted a plan to take Winchester, Virginia via a flanking movement. He went to McClellan for permission to carry out the operation. McClellan of course found an array of reasons why inactivity on Rosecrans part was the better part of valor for the moment. Rosecrans was already nursing a grudge against Mac because the latter had received all the credit for the successful western Virginia campaign, while it had been Rosecrans who had actually commanded the troops in the field.
Word got back to Mac that Rosecrans was badmouthing him behind his back, so Mac decided to teach him a lesson in the powers of rank. He transfered 20,000 of Rosecrans 22,000 man force to the Army of the Potomac, leaving Rosecrans with an inconsequential command. When he complained about this, Mac had him transfered to a staff position in Washington, advising Secretary of War Stanton.
What remained of of Rosecran's former command was redesignated "The Mountain Army", was reinforced and given a new General....and 150 years ago today...guess who?
This was to be Femont's final command. At the time of the appointment, the Mountain Army was so small and inconsequential that Lincoln didn't believe Fremont could do much damage to the cause.
General George McCllellan stepped aboard the USS Commodore at Alexandria 150 years ago today, the ship departed for the Peninsula and what was to be McClellan's first look at the battleground he had chosen. Promised that McDowell's large Corps would be joining him once operations got underway, Mac sailed with the belief that he would have 150,000 men to command, or, by his calculations, 100,000 fewer than the enemy.
As a final sting before his departure, President Lincoln detached the 10,000 man division of General Louis Blender and added it to the Mountain Army which The Pathfinder was to command. Mac still came out ahead, he had removed 20,000 troops from that force.
Aboard the Commodore, McClellan wrote his wife that he was tremedously relieved to be away from Washington, a place he characterized as "..that sink of iniquity."
The battleground Mac had selected was about 60 miles long from Fortress Monroe to Richmond, and 15 miles wide at the point of the York and James Rivers greatest separation. It was low lying land with sandy soil, sparsely populated, heavily wooded and crisscrossed by numerous small streams.
The maps available to the Yankees were old, out of date and short on details. One piece of misinformation from those maps was to prove important. The Warwick River, which the Union maps had as just one more inconsequential East/West running stream, had been greatly modified by the construction of some mill dams. What had been a sluggish stream was now wide to the point where it could only be crossed by bridges or forded at a few spots. General Magruder had compounded all this by constructing three more dams designed to widen the river across its entire length and now its course was more North/South, or across the Peninsula.
Magruder anchored his main defensive line behind this River, something the Union forces were to learn in a few days, much to their surprise and dismay.
General Albert Sydney Johnston was after personal redemption. As supreme Confederate commander in the west, he was ultimately responsible for the series of reverses suffered by the South in that region. Although he would never lose the respect and admiration of President Davis, his reputation in the newspapers and with the public was in decline.
His answer was to be the great Confederate counter offensive in the west, a blow struck at Grant's army gathering at Pittsburg Landing on the Tennessee, before his numbers were swelled by the arrival of General Halleck's other army, the 30,000 men commanded by General Buell. Added to Grant's 48,0000 spread among six divisions, Buell would make them assault proof.
Johnston's army numbered 45,000 at this point and he wanted to wait until General Van Dorn's 15,000 survivors from Pea Ridge could arrive from NE Arkansas before attacking. 150 years ago today, events accelerated Johnston's timetable.
Brigadier General Benjamin Cheatham had been posted by Johnston to a point 23 miles NW of Corinth where the rebels were gathered. His job was to be on the lookout for General Lew Wallace's Federal division, said to be approaching from that direction. Cheatham's brigade arrived at Purdy to establish an outpost and was immediately spotted by cavalry scouts which Wallace had sent out far in advance of his movement.
Both commanders overreacted. When Wallace's scouts reported Cheatham's arrival, Wallace feared it was the vanguard of a major attack. He formed his men in a line of battle and waited for the attack which never came. Cheatham misinterpreted matters as well, sending word back to Corinth by telegram announcing that a Federal movement in force was underway in this area.
The message arrived at General Beauregard's tent and he lept to the conclusion that this aggressiveness by the Yankees could only mean that Buell was near at hand and about to join Grant. Beauregard passed the message, and his interpretation on to Johnston, who took the telegram to General Bragg, who also said that it meant that the attack must be launched immediately.
Buell was actually another six days away from Pittsburg Landing, but urged on by his subordinates, Johnston decided to set his assault in motion. Orders went out that the army was to begin moving out at six am the following morning, with the attack itself planned for April 5th. Van Dorn and his men would just have to miss the battle.
Also on this day, General McClellan arrived on the Peninsula to the cheers of his men. He had indeed made them into a real army, one of the best equipped, best fed and best trained that ever marched anywhere. They had spent eight months drilling 5 to 8 hours a day, learning to manuever in companies, regiments, brigades, divisions and corps. They had learned discipline, unit pride, camp sanitation, how to care for their weapons, they were nothing at all like the amatuers who had fought at Bull Run. Their morale was high and they had great confidence in, and affection for, their leader who they called "Little Mac."
General A.S. Johnston
General P.G.T. Beauregard
Last edited by Grandstander; 04-01-2012 at 06:10 PM..
Among the many firsts produced by the American Civil War, was the employment of railroads for the strategic and rapid transport of men and materials. Already railways had played critical roles; the troops rushed to the defense of Washington in the war's first days, came by rail, the sabotage of that rail line in Maryland had been President Lincoln's justification for his suspending civil liberties in Maryland, and President Davis' excuse for suspending the same in eastern Tennessee. The Battle of Bull Run had been tipped in the South's favor by the timely arrival of General Joe Johnston's troops from the valley, brought by railcars. The Army of the Mississippi had been assembled by General Albert S. Johnston using the railways to collect his scattered soldiers at Corinth for their planned thrust at Grant's army.
A map of the main Southern railways. It is easily evident that the most critical points were where the North/South running lines intersected with the East/West running lines. The capture of Corinth or Chatanooga would give the Union control of Virginia's most direct connection to the western Confederacy. Denied that Northern route, goods would have to be shipped via a series of independently constructed shorter lines, none continuous from Mississippi, and none of the same gauge, meaning that at the end of one line, everything would have to be off loaded from one train and reloaded on to another, several times.
http://americancivilwar.com/civil_war_map/Confederate_Railroad_Map.jpg (broken link)
It was therefore manifest to both sides that railroads which they controlled had to be closely guarded, and those of the enemy destroyed to whatever degree was possible. Lincoln had been hoping that General Buell would have employed the Army of the Ohio to advance from Kentucky and capture Chatanooga, a crucial railroad intersection. Instead, Buell had remained inactive until the fall of Fort Donelson opened the Cumberland River and allowed him to capture Nashville without opposition. Lincoln then pleaded with Buell to move from there against Chatanooga, but once more Buell found scores of reasons why he should not attempt it. So instead, Lincoln made General Halleck overall commander in the west, placed Buell's army under him, and Halleck ordered it to join Grant for their movement on Corinth, another key railway intersection.
Buell wasn't bringing the entire Army of the Ohio with him, he left 18,000 men to occupy and guard Nashville, and created a semi independent command of 8,000 under General Ormsby M. Mitchel, charged with conducting raids against the rebel railroads. Mitchel was thought by Buell to be non aggressive, someone who would take no undue risks, a product of Mitchel being one of the leading intellectuals in the US armed forces. Mitchel had been accepted at West Point at age 15, received his engineering training there, and then stayed on as a math instructor upon graduation. Mitchell also was a college professor in astronomy and philosophy, and had been the founder of a dozen astonomy associations throughout the nation. He was short and slender man, lending weight to the idea that he was not a fighter.
Buell was mistaken about Mitchel's aggressive instincts. The latter had been extremely annoyed with Buell's slowness and caution, and now with what amounted to an independent command, Mitchel started thinking big. He planned an advance all the way to the Alabama border where he would seize Huntsville, and advance from there against Chatanooga, planning to do with 8,000, what Buell had been afraid to attempt with 60,000.
150 years ago today, Mitchel met with a mysterious man who came with a proposal for preventing the Confederates from using the railroads to rush men from Georgia and Alabama to oppose Mitchel's advance against Chatanooga. What if, the stranger asked, the Western and Atlantic railroad, which connected Atlanta to Chatanooga, could be wrecked in conjunction with Mitchel's movements? What if a small group of men were to dress as civillians, slip South to a point near Atlanta, steal a locomotive and head North with it, wrecking the railroad and burning the rail bridges as they went?
The mystery man was James J. Andrews, born in western Virginia, raised in Kentucky, and now making a living as a spy. For which side he was a spy was not entirely clear. Andrews had offered his services to the North, but then convinced his handlers that in order to persuade the Southerners that he was actually on their side, he would act as a double agent. To that end, Andrews proposed that he pretend to be a quinine smuggler. Quinine was in great demand in the South in the malarial areas, but their supplies had come from Northern or European producers, now denied to them. Andrews was able to purchase quinine at five dollars a bottle in the North, and sell them for fifty dollars a bottle in the South. Andrews did indeed bring back intelligence reports with military information when he returned from this trip, but he also came back with a healthy profit for himself.
And this ultimately was what really motivated Andrews. He was a double agent, with each side beleiving that his true loyalties lay with them, but Andrews' actual loyalties were to making money. For his proposed raid, he was asking for a 20,000 dollar payment. In the 1958 Walt Disney film about Andrews raid, he would be portrayed as 100 percent loyal and heroic by Fess Parker, but that was not at all the reality. Andrews was a war profiteer and he did not discriminate about sides as long as he made money. He could be relied upon once bought, he would carry out whatever mission he promised to undertake, but a month later he might be selling his services to the other side.
The General and the spy stayed up all night planning. Andrews idea was to infiltrate to Marietta, Georgia, board the train which departed from Atlanta that morning, ride it one stop to Big Shanty where there was a twenty minute breakfast stop, and steal the train while the crew was dining. Mitchel was intrigued by the daring involved and agreed to allow Andrews to recruit a couple of dozen volunteers from among his Ohio soldiers. Andrews' target date was April 11th, coordinated to take place the same day that Mitchel attacked Huntsville.
Also on this day, General A.S. Johnston got his Army of the Mississippi on the march, headed for Pittsburg Landing and General Grant. And in Washington, DC, that "fire in the rear" which had so plagued General McClellan, blazed up once more as the President and Secretary of War Stanton studied the papers left by Mac which outlined how 74,000 troops remained for the defense of the Capitol. McClellan had doubled counted some troops, and was also counting all the soldiers in the three armies which were operating in the Valley. By their calculations, there were actually just 20,000 troops manning the defenses immediately around DC.
Worse, this information was soon leaked to the radical Republicans on the Joint Committee For the Conduct of the War, and they, being the sort to never sit around calmly when the situation called for hysteria, began yelling that McClellan had deliberately sold out the nation and left it defenseless.
To calm this stormy reaction, Lincoln, for the second time, decided to retain General McDowell's 35,000 man Corps for the defense of Washington. When McClellan got this news, he mirrored the members of the Committee in overreaction, announcing that this had been done by the radicals in an effort to insure Mac's failure.
And in this bloom of political and miltary harmony, the Peninsula campaign begun.
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